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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellee/Petitioner concurs that this court has jurisdiction to review this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The facts concerning this appeal are relatively simple, notwithstanding the 
long chronology of the case. The undersigned believes that the best way to 
reference the parties is to utilize the method followed by the appellant. Penny 
Brockbank, the Petitioner/Third party plaintiff, will be referred to as "Penny." 
James Brockbank, the Respondent, will be referred to as "James." The third 
party defendant, Cheryl Racheie a.k.a. Cheryl Hunsaker, will be referred to as 
"Cheryl." 
Penny and James were divorced pursuant to a Partial Decree of Divorce. 
(Record at p.259.) A Supplemental Decree (Record at p. 289.) was subsequently 
entered. The supplemental decree, inter alia: 
1. Awarded custody of the children and child support to Penny; 
2. Awarded alimony to Penny;1 
3. Awarded certain real property to James; 
1
 James appealed the ruling of the trial court concerning the alimony award. 
This court affirmed the trial court's decision. This was the first appeal in this case. 
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4. Awarded Penny a lien secure payment of her alimony against all of the 
real property awarded to James. 
5. Awarded Penny judgment for amounts due pursuant to a temporary 
order, and not paid by Respondent. 
James continued the course of action he has followed throughout this 
proceeding by failing to pay the amounts he was ordered to pay. Penny 
attempted to collect amounts due to her by issuing an Order to Show Cause 
whereby she requested the trial court order transfer of 48 East2 in exchange for 
credit against amounts owed by James of the value of property, at the time of the 
Order to Show Cause. James objected to this procedure, arguing that Penny 
should be required to execute on her judgment either by foreclosing the judicial 
lien, in a separate proceeding, or by Writ of Execution, pursuant to Rule 69 Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court agreed with James and refused to order 
transfer of 48 East. At this time, the trial court entered an order restraining 
James from taking any action to convey or pledge the real property awarded to 
him. Penny secured a Writ of Execution. A sheriffs sale was conducted 
pursuant to the Writ. Penny was the only bidder at the sheriffs sale. 48 East 
was sold to Penny at the sheriffs sale. 
James assigned his Rule 69 right of redemption to Cheryl for $100. 
James also executed a Warranty Deed to Cheryl for $50. 
^roughout this proceeding, both in this court, and in the trial court, the 
subject property has been referred to as "48 East." The property is located at 48 
East 100 North, Price, Utah. 
2 
Funds were tendered to redeem 48 East. 
Penny discovered the Assignment and Warranty Deed and immediately 
filed a Motion for Joinder to join Cheryl in the action. The Motion for Joinder was 
accompanied by a complaint (Record at p. 472.) seeking an order voiding the 
Assignment and Warranty Deed.3 
Penny submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment on her third party 
complaint. Cheryl also submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial 
court granted Penny's Motion and denied Cheryl's Motion. Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, (Record at p. 1497) and an Order (Record at p. 1507) were 
entered by the trial court. This action of the trial court is the present subject of 
this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Penny argued before the trial court, and now before this court, that James' 
transfer of 48 East by the Assignment and Warranty Deed constitute a fraud as 
to her. Penny sought to void the Assignment and Warranty Deed, and credit 
James for the amount she received in the redemption of 48 East. 
The trial court agreed that the Assignment and Warranty Deed were the 
product of a fraud. The trial court voided the Assignment and Warranty Deed, 
thus restoring title, and right of possession, to James. The trial court gave James 
3ln a collateral action, in the divorce case, Penny asked the trial court to hold 
James in contempt for executing the Assignment and Warranty Deed. The trial 
court found James in contempt. James appealed the finding to this court. This 
court affirmed the trial court. This was the second appeal in this case. 
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credit for the amount received by Penny. The trial court noted that Cheryl had a 
cause of action against James. [See the trial court's memorandum decision 
(labeled "Order"), Record at p. 1400 and Addendum Exhibit F.] 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I - FACTS NOT DISPUTED 
It is significant that Cheryl is not appealing the factual findings of the trial 
court. The trial court found, inter alia, the following: 
1. That Penny was a creditor of James (Findings of Fact U 19, Record at 
p. 1500 and Addendum Exhibit G.); 
2. The Assignment and Warranty Deed constituted a "transfer" within the 
definition of that term under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (Findings of 
Fact H 23, Record at p. 1601.); 
3. There was no value in the transaction between Cheryl and James 
concerning either the Assignment or the Warranty Deed (Findings of Fact fl 26 
and 27, Record at p. 1501); 
4. The amount paid by Cheryl to James for the Assignment and Warranty 
Deed did not constitute fair market value. (Findings of Fact H 28 and 29, Record 
at p. 1501.) 
5. The transfer of 48 East by James to Cheryl was intended to place that 
asset beyond the reach of Penny (Findings of Fact 1f 32, Record at p. 1502.); 
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6. A fraudulent intent existed in the transaction between James and 
Cheryl (Findings of Fact fl 33, Record at p. 1502.). 
Cheryl attacks the trial court's Findings of Fact in Point I of her argument. 
Insofar as she attacks the Findings of Fact, she has failed to comply with Rules 
of this Court. 
Cheryl's appeal should be denied because of her failure to cite this court 
to those portions of the record which support the trial court's findings. 
POINT II - Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act Is Applicable 
Cheryl and James argue that the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act can not 
apply to the assignment of a right of redemption. Penny disagrees with this 
argument as it fails to consider certain crucial definitions of the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act. Those definitions, as taken from Utah Code Annotated 
Section 25-6-2 (Addendum Exhibit L), are as follows: 
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not 
include: (a) property to the extent that it is encumbered by a valid 
lien; 
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt under non-
bankruptcy law; or 
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties 
the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim 
against only one tenant. 
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the 
right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, 
contingent, matured, on matured, disputed, undisputed, legal, 
equitable, secured, or unsecured. 
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim. 
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim. 
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim. 
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of 
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ownership, (emphasis added) 
(12) 'Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, 
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or 
parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes 
payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other 
encumbrance. 
The trial court applied these definitions to the factual setting presented by 
this case. Essentially, the trial court found that James and Cheryl acted 
fraudulently, in this transfer, and that the victim of the transfer - Penny - should 
not suffer from their fraudulent acts. 
James and Cheryl argue that the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act cannot, 
as a matter of law, apply to the assignment of a right of redemption. This 
argument flies in the face of the definitions of "Property" and 'Transfer." Again, 
"Property" is defined as "anything that may be the subject of ownership." 
(emphasis added) 'Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or 
conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or 
an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and 
creation of a lien or other encumbrance, (emphasis added) 
Is apparent that the ownership of a "right of redemption" pursuant to Rule 
69 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is "property" within the definition of that term in 
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Further, the assignment by James to 
Cheryl constitutes a "transfer" within the definition of that term in the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
The trial court found that the transfer of 48 East by James to Cheryl was 
intended to place 48 East beyond the reach of Penny. This finding of fact is not 
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challenged on this appeal. 
The argument by James and Cheryl that the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act cannot apply to the assignment of right of redemption is misplaced. 
POINT III - Summary Judgment Appropriate 
The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act codifies previously existing case law 
concerning those situations where property is transferred in an effort to put that 
property beyond the reach of a creditor. This court reviewed the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act in Bradford vs. Oemita, 993 P.2d 887, (Ct. App. 1999). 
(Addendum Exhibit I.) In that case, this court noted that badges of fraud are 
adequate to show actual intent. The transfer was held void by the trial court. 
(See Bradford at {20}, Addendum Exhibit F.) The trial court's holding was 
affirmed by this court. 
In this case, the determination by the trial court that the Assignment and 
Warranty Deed were void was the product of finding badges of fraud and 
intention to place the asset beyond Penny's reach. 
It is significant that the transfers - i.e. the Assignment and Warranty Deed 
- were declared void. Void has been defined as "of no legal effect; null." 
Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, 1999. 
From the outset of this phase of this case, Penny has taken the position: 
1. That the Assignment and Warranty Deed were void - i.e. of no legal 
effect, and; 
7 
2. That James should be restored to title, and right of possession, of 48 
East, as if the Assignment and Warranty Deed had not occurred, and; 
3. That James should be credited the amount paid in the redemption 
process. 
If Penny had taken the course of action requested by James and Cheryl, 
that is returned the funds received in the redemption process, Penny should now 
be the owner of 48 East because the redemption did not occur. Penny did not 
take this action as it is not equitable. 
POINT III - Summary Judgment Appropriate 
James and Cheryl are on the horns of a legal dilemma. In the first 
instance, they argue that the Assignment of a right of redemption granted by 
Rule 69 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be the subject of a cause of action 
under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The thrust of this portion of their 
argument is to the effect that James had the unfettered right to transfer his right 
of redemption, without being subjected to the allegation that his action 
constituted a fraud on creditors. On the other instance, James and Cheryl argue 
that Penny is stuck with only the $15,000, and cannot reach the asset, 48 East 
(valued then at $45,000), to satisfy the lien granted by the trial court to secure 
payment of alimony.4 
The trial court looked at this case on a much broader scale than James 
4Penny argues that this result benefits the wrongdoer and punishes the 
innocent party. 
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and Cheryl. James and Cheryl ask this court to look only at the narrow factual 
situation surrounding the Writ of Execution, and the redemption. Penny argues 
such a narrow view is not required by law, and certainly is not mandated by 
equity. 
The trial court found Penny to be a creditor, within the definition of that 
term under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. (See Findings of Fact H 19, 
Record at 1500.) This makes sense because James owes Penny thousands of 
dollars for unpaid alimony. The trial court found James owed Penny a debt, 
within the definition of that term under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. (See 
Findings of Fact U 20, Record at p. 1500.) The trial court found James to be a 
debtor within the definition of that term under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act. (See Findings of Fact U 21, Record at p. 1501.) Again, all of these Findings 
make sense. The trial court found 48 East to be property within the definition of 
that term under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. (See Findings of Fact 1J 22, 
Record at p. 1501.) The trial court found the Assignment and Warranty Deed 
were transfers within the definition of that term under the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act. (See Finding of Fact H 23, Record at p. 1501 .)• 
In addition, the trial court found other facts. No value was given by Cheryl 
to James for the Assignment, or Warranty Deed. (See Findings of Fact H 24 and 
25, Record at p. 1501.) There was no bargained for exchange concerning the 
Assignment and Warranty Deed, and James and Cheryl are not parties dealing 
5None of these factual findings have been challenged in this appeal. 
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at arms length. (See Findings of Fact U 26, 27, 28, and 29, Record at p. 1501.) 
The amount paid by Cheryl to James for the Assignment, or the Warranty Deed, 
did not constitute fair market value. (See Findings of Fact fl 29 and 30, Record 
at p. 1501.) The transaction between James and Cheryl did not involved a willing 
buyer and a willing seller. (See Findings of Fact U 31, Record at p. 1501.) 
Of importance is the finding that the transfer by James to Cheryl was 
intended to place 48 East beyond Penny's reach. (See Finding of Fact 1f 32, 
Record at p. 1502.) Also important is the paragraph summarizing the badges of 
fraud found by the trial court. (See Findings of Fact fl 34, Record at pp. 1502 
and 1503.) Those badges of fraud are: 
a. The nature of the relationship between James and Cheryl; 
b. The insignificant monetary amount paid by Cheryl to James for the 
Assignment and Warranty Deed; 
c. Payment of the mortgage from James' account subsequent to the 
Assignment, Warranty Deed, and redemption; 
d. Timing of the Assignment and Warranty Deed in relation to the posture 
of the divorce case; 
e. James' testimony concerning the reason for the Assignment and 
Warranty Deed; 
f. The transaction between James and Cheryl seemed to be concluded in 
a hurried manner; 
g. The transaction between James and Cheryl seemed to depart from the 
usual method of business where arms length parties negotiate a transaction for 
10 
fair market value; 
h. The fact that Cheryl has not made claim against James concerning the 
funds utilized to exercise the right of redemption transfer by the Assignment in 
light of the Third Party Complaint against her.8 
Utah Code Annotated Section 25-6-8 (Addendum Exhibit M.) is titled 
"Remedies of creditors." This Section summarizes the options available to the 
trial court in an action for relief of a fraudulent transfer. Section (1) (a) states, 
In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this 
chapter, a creditor, subject to limitations in Section 25-6-9, may 
obtain: (a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent 
necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim. 
Another option to the trial court is summarized in Section (1) (c) (iii), which 
states: 
In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this 
chapter, a creditor, subject to the limitations of Section 25-6-9, may 
obtain (c) subject to applicable principles of equity and in 
accordance with applicable rules of civil procedure (iii) any other 
relief the circumstances may require. 
Here, the trial court voided the Assignment and Warranty Deed, and 
treated the redemption as if it were performed by James. This method of 
proceeding is fair to both parties. James gets the property back and receives a 
reduction of the amounts due. Penny keeps the $15,000. 
Penny argues that the remedy fashioned by the trial court falls well within 
the parameters allowed by (1) (a) and/or (c) (iii) of Utah Code Annotated Section 
25-6-8. 
6None of these factual findings have been challenged in this appeal. 
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POINT IV - Trial Court's Result Is Equitable 
A number of significant cases have been before the appellate courts of 
this state concerning transactions taken in an effort to defraud creditors. 
Ned J. Bowman Co. vs. White, 369 P. 2d 962 (Utah 1962) was an action 
by a judgment creditor to set aside a real estate mortgage, as a fraudulent 
conveyance. The Supreme Court noted "A creditor may also have a conveyance 
to set aside if it was made with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud either 
present or future creditors." (See Addendum Exhibit K, at p. 2.) Continuing, the 
court noted: 
Whether a conveyance is fraudulent as to creditors must be 
determined from the facts of each case and from the circumstances 
surrounding the transaction, keeping in mind that the purpose of 
our statute is not to prevent a debtor from securing his honest 
debts, (emphasis added) (See Addendum Exhibit K, at p. 2) 
The purpose of this language is to emphasize that a debtor has a right to 
transfer his property to pay honest debts. Had James established an honest 
debt between him and Cheryl, the trial court's decision could have been different. 
However, the only affidavit submitted in opposition to Penny's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was a five paragraph affidavit by Cheryl (Record at p. 1352. 
- See addendum exhibit E.) containing self-serving, conclusory statements to the 
effect that: 
1. She did not receive any funds generated to redeem the 48 East 
property; 
2. She has full possession of 48 East; 
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3. She did not intend to defraud Penny; 
4. Penny has not returned the redemption funds to to her. 
Another enlightening case is Territorial Savings and Loan Association 
vs. Baird, 781 P. 2d 452 (Ct. App. 1989). (Addendum Exhibit J.) In that case, 
this court discussed issues of "fair consideration" and "good-faith." This court 
Thus, under the statute, fair consideration requires a fair equivalent 
exchange and that the conveyance was made in good faith. See 
also Meyer vs. General Amer. Corp., 569 P. 2d 1094,1096 (Utah 
1977). Presented another way, TSL can demonstrate that the 
conveyance lacked fair consideration rf either, 1) a fair equivalent 
was not exchanged, or 2) the conveyance was not made in good 
faith.... Fair equivalent means "such a price as a capable and 
diligent businessman could presently obtain for the property after 
conferring with those accustomed to buy such property." Meyer, 
569 P. 2d at 1097 (quoting Utah Assets Corp. vs. Dooley 
Brothers Ass'n, 92 Utah 557,70 P. 2d 738,742 (1937)). Fair 
equivalent does not mean "exact equivalent" but rather the statute 
requires only that the consideration be fair. Utah Assets, 70 P. 2d 
at 741 ('The qualifying term here is 'fair* and implies some 
modification of the term 'equivalent.'") (See Addendum Exhibit ? at 
p. 6-7.) 
This court also said, in Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
Although the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act does not define 
"good-faith," the term is defined elsewhere in the Utah Code as 
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concern." Utah Code 
Annotated § 70A-1-201 (19) (1989) (Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code). In the context of fraudulent conveyances, other courts 
considering whether a conveyance was made in good faith, have 
examined the subjective beliefs and intentions of both the transferor 
and transferee concerning the propriety of the activities, their 
knowledge that the result would take unconscionable advantage of 
others.(See Addendum Exhibit ? at p. 8.) 
Bradford vs. Demita, 993 P. 2d 887 (Ct. App. 1999) (Addendum Exhibit 
I.) also contained an interesting analysis, in Bradford, the plaintiffs wife 
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transferred her interest in real property to her son. Plaintiff initiated an action to 
set aside that transfer as fraudulent. The trial court found the plaintiff to be a 
"creditor" even though, at the time of the transaction between plaintiffs wife and 
her son, there was no judgment determining an indebtedness. The appellate 
court confirmed that a fraudulent transfer had occurred, citing Utah Code 
Annotated §25-6-5(1) (1998), by noting that a transfer by a debtor is fraudulent 
as to a creditor if the transfer is made "(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud any creditor of the debtor." (See Bradford {17}.) Continuing, this court 
said, 
A creditor who claims a debtor transferred property with actual 
intent to defraud under section 25-6-5 (1) (a) must establish that 
claim by clear and convincing evidence. See Territorial Savings 
and Loan Association vs. Beard, 781 P. 2d 452,462 (Utah Court 
of Appeal 1989). Nevertheless, "fraudulent intent is ordinarily 
considered a question of fact and 'may be inferred from the 
presence of certain indicia of fraud or "badges of fraud.""* Id. at 462 
(quoting Dahnken, inc. v. Wilmarth, 762 P.2d 420,423 (Utah 
1986)) (other citations and footnotes omitted). (See Bradford 
{18}-) 
In Bradford, this court concluded that "badges of fraud" are adequate to 
show actual intent by a transferor in an alleged fraudulent conveyance, and 
sufficient to hold the transfer void. (See Bradford {20}.) 
The trial court summarized the badges of fraud present in this case. That 
summary is contained in Findings of Fact H 34 (Record at p. 1502-1503.) 
Upon determining that the Assignment and Warranty Deed were void, the 
trial court had two options. One option was to order the money returned to 
Cheryl. Had the trial court followed that course, the result would have been 
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ownership of 48 East by Penny pursuant to her purchase of that property in the 
sheriffs sale and the failure of James to redeem. The other option was to void 
the Assignment and Warranty Deed, and give James credit for the sum paid at 
the redemption. 
The trial court selected the second option. This is the option requested by 
Penny, and is the most equitable. 
POINT V - Attorney's Fees for Penny 
Penny requests an award of attorney's fees for this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Penny argues that the trial court's order voiding the Assignment and 
Warranty Deed is equitable and is allowed by Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-8 (1) 
(a)or(c)(iii). 
Dated this IP day of October, 2000. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
John E. Schindler 
Attorney for Appellee 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the t/^ day of October, 2000, I caused to be 
mailed, by first class mail, postage prepaid, the foregoing, BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE, addressed to Brent D. Young, P. O. Box 657, Provo, UT 84506. 
Q^iiSJlJlk 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBITS 
A. Assignment 
B. Warranty Deed 
C. Third Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment with attached affidavit of 
Third Party Plaintiff (Record at p. 1283.) 
D. Third Party Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Third Party Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment (Record at p. 1193.) 
E. Third Party Defendant's Affidavit In Support of Third Party defendant's Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment; and In Opposition to third Party Plaintiffs Motion 
For Summary Judgment (Record at p. 1352.) 
F. memorandum decision concerning cross Motions for Summary Judgment 
(labeled "Order") (Record at p. 1400.) 
G. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law concerning the cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment by Third Party Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant (Record at 
p. 1497.) 
H. Order (concerning the cross Motions for Summary Judgment) (Record at p. 
1507.) 
I. Bradford vs. Demita, 993 P.2d 887, (Ct. App. 1999) 
J. Territorial Savings and Loan Association vs. Baird, 781 P. 2d 452 (Ct. 
App. 1989). 
K. Ned J. Bowman Co. vs. Whits, 369 P. 2d 962 (Utah 1962) 
L Utah Code Annotated §25-6-2 
M. Utah Code Annotated §25-6-8 
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A. Assignment 
ASSIGNMENT 
JAMES L. BROCKBANK hereby assigns, sets over, and transfers all of his right to 
redemption pursuant to the Sheriffs Sale which was conducted on 23 December, 1998 at the 
Carbon County Courthouse, to CHERYL RACHELE for the sum of FIFTY and no/100 
DOLLARS ($50.00) and other good and valuable consideration. The Assignment of the 
redemption applies to the following described property, located at 48 East 100 North, Price, 
Carbon County, State of Utah: 
Beginning at a point 214 feet East of the Northwest Corner of Lot 3, Block 40 PRICE 
TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running thence East 50 feet; thence South 152.5 feet, thence 
West 50 feet; thence North 152.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
Subject to, and together with a joint right of way over and across the following described 
tract of land: 
Beginning at a point 209 feet East of the Northwest Comer of Lot 3, Block 40 PRICE 
TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running thence East 10 feet; thence South 152.5 feet; thence 
West 10 feet; thence North 152.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
Dated this /^dav of January, 1999. \ 
s^AMES L. BROCKBANK 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of CARBON ) 
On the £ day of January, 1999, personally appeared before me JAMES L. 
BROCKBANK, signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that 
he executed the same. _<*/ ^ 
H *LSER£ -MAAGIENDWVE 
KRISTIL GREEN 
9 HOMFWJC-SIMJUTJUi 
248 EAST MAIN 
PRICE. UT 84501 
C0MM. EXP. 4-14-2001 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
' yz sr 
821 
EXHIBIT 
t-& 
B. Warranty Deed 
WARRANTY DEED 1399 M OS 13:24 PN FS HP.0O «T 
JAMES L. BROCKBANK, grantor of Price, County of Carbon, hereby conveys 
and warrants to CHERYL RECHELE, of ft/0. Bny g 7 < ? __, Price, 
Utah, for the sum of One-hundred Dollars ($100.00), the following described tract of land 
in Carbon County, State of Utah. 
Subject to the first mortgage held by Juanita Rasmussen. 
This property was titled in James L. Brockbank. It was sold pursuant to a Sheriffs 
Sale on December 23,1998 at the Carbon County Courthouse. This deed is therefore 
subject to the right of redemption pursuant to Rule 69(j). 
Beginning at a point 214 feet East of the Northwest Comer of Lot 3, Block 
40 PRICE TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running thence East 50 feet; thence 
South 152.5 feet, thence West 50 feet; thence North 152.5 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
Subject to, and together with a joint right of way over and across the 
following described tract of land: 
Beginning at a point 209 feet East of the Northwest Comer of Lot 3, Block 
40, PRICE TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running thence East 10 feet; thence 
South 152.5 feet; thence West 10 feet; thence North 152.5 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor this £~ day of \J*.AU AA^. , 1999. 
e 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
"'JAMES L. BROCKBANK 
Countv of Carbon ) 
On the 3 " ^ day of,]d,„,„ut- 1999. personally appeared before me 
JAMES L. BROCKBANK, the signet of the within instrument who duly acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same. 
KRIST1L GREEN 
mnxffmx-srmdUfM 
248 EAST MAIN 
PRICE. UT 84501 
COMM. EXP. 4-U-2001 
Notarv Public 
C. Third Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment with 
attached affidavit of Third Party Plaintiff 
JOHNE. SCHINDLER#3619 
Attorney for Petitioner 
80 West Main, Suite 201 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435)637-1783 
FAX: (435) 637-5269 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
CARBON COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JAMES L. BROCKBANK, 
Respondent. 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
W w I 
CHERYL RACHELEa/k/a 
CHERYL HUNSAKER. 
Third Party Defendant. 
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT 
Civil No.: 954700226DA 
Judge: Bruce K. Halliday 
COMES NOW the Third Party Plaintiff and moves the court for an order awarding 
her summary judgment against the Third Party Defendant and as grounds therefore states 
that there are no material issues of fact and-Third Party Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of Law. 
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Attached hereto is Third Party Plaintiffs Affidavit. 
Submitted contemporaneously herewith is a Memorandum in Support. 
DATED this £*> day of (\JL i-gj yyj AJLA~S , 1999. 
^Awrl(L 
IN E. SCHINDLER 
Attorney for Third Party Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the <3 3 d a v of tlLte,™ LJ^ . 1999, I mailed a 
true and correct copy of the above THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT by placing same in the 
U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, to Brent D. Young, Attorney for Respondent, 48 North 
University Ave. ,P. 0. Box 657, Provo, UT 84603. 
—is>s, 
myfiles\brockbankPenny\3rdPartyMotSumJudge*mo 
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JOHN E. SCHINDLER#3619 
Attorney for Petitioner 
80 West Main, Suite 201 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435)637-1783 
FAX (435)637-5269 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
CARBON COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
vs. 
JAMES L BROCKBANK, 
Petitioner, 
•Respondent. 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
CHERYL RACHELE a/k/a 
CHERYL HUNSAKER. 
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 954700226DA 
Judge: Bruce K. Halliday 
Third Party Defendant. 
} 
:ss 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CARBON } 
COMES NOW PENNY BROCKBANK, and being first duly sworn upon her oath, 
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deposes and states: 
1. Affiant is the Third Party Plaintiff. 
2. Affiant filed a Notice of Interest on October 28, 1997. Attached hereto, as Exhibit 
A, is a copy of said Notice of Interest. 
3. The property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, Utah, was valued at trial at 
$45,000. 
4. Affiant does not believe the property decreased in value from the date of trial to 
January 5, 1999. 
5. In other words, Affiant states that she believes the value of the real property 
located at 48 East, as of January 5, 1999, was at least $45,000. 
6. Affiant was a creditor of Respondent as of January 5, 1999 due to the 
Supplemental Decree concerning the judgment awarded Affiant therein, against 
Respondent, and due to amounts due to Affiant from Respondent as awarded by the 
Supplemental Decree. 
DATED this day of December, 1999. 
PENNY BROCKBANK V , JOHN E. SCHINDLER 
Third Party Plaintiff Attorney for Third Part y Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH ' ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF CARBON ) 
PENNY BROCKBANK being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says that she is 
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the Petitioner in the above entitled action, that she has read the foregoing AFFIDAVIT and 
understands the same is true to her own knowledge except as to matters therein stated on 
information and belief, and as to such matters she believes them to be true. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this .£2^ day of December, 1999. 
nrynes 3rockbankPenny\Aff Mot Sum Judg \mo 
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Recorded at the Request of: South Eastern Utah Title 
O O C . 5 9 6 BW0397 Pg00297-0tt»-
m B. O'BRIEN-COUNTY OF CflflBCN 
1997 OCT 28 14:44 PM FEE! 114.00 BY 
REQUEST: SOUTH EASTERN UTAH TITLE CO 
NOTICE OF INTEREST 
The Undersigned, Penny Brtxkbank, does hereby claim and assert an interest in and to the real property hereafter described 
by virture of a Divorce proceeding in Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for CarbonCounty. 
The real property is located in the State of Utah, County of Carbon, described as follows: 
Attached Descriptions 
we have herjgwito affixed our handssand seals this lA^ day of ^^f £\ 
State of Utah } 
{ ss. 
County of } 
Personally appeared before me this ?\. day of CTd^U ^k Penny, Brockbank, the signer of the within instrument who duty acknowledged to me that she executed the. same. 
SEUTCO 
Accomodation Recording 
Not Examined 
EXHIBIT 
\-JL 297 
298 
/ - - » 7 Beginning 171 feet East of the NW Comer of Lot 3, Block 40, PRICE TOWNSITE SURVEY, 
thence E 43 feet, S 152.5 feet, W 43 feet, N 152.5 feet to the beginning. 
:r^? Beginning 214 feet E of the NW Comer of Lot 3, Block 40, PRICE TOWNSITE SURVEY, 
thence E 50 feet, S 152.5 feet, W 50 feet, N 152.5 feet to beginning. 
Beginning 207.89 feet N of the SE comer of Lot 1, Block 9, LOCAL SURVEY, thence N 85 
feet, W 228 feet, S 81 feet 10 inches, E 17 feet, S 3 feet 2 inches, E 211 feet to beginning. 
D. Third Party Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Third Party 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
JOHNE. SCHINDLER#3619 
Attorney for Petitioner 
80 West Main, Suite 201 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435)637-1783 
FAX: (435) 637-5269 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
CARBON COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JAMES L. BROCKBANK, 
Respondent. 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
CHERYL RACHELE a/k/a 
CHERYL HUNSAKER. 
Third Party Defendant. 
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THIRD 
PARTY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT 
Civil No • 954700226DA 
w l V I I l l w . . J v * T i v v ^ i 4 . U U n 
Judge: Bruce K. Halliday 
COMES NOW the Third Party Plaintiff and submits the following Memorandum HI 
support of her Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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BACKGROUND 
This matter was initiated by a Third Party Complaint dated January 6, 1999. Said 
Complaint alleges that the transfer of the property described in the Complaint, by 
Respondent to Third Party Defendant, was a fraudulent transaction and should be voided. 
INTRODUCTION 
The parties were divorced by Decree in the underlying action. A Supplemental 
Decree was entered awarding alimony to Third Party Plaintiff, awarding certain real 
property to Respondent, and awarding a lien to Third Party Plaintiff on the real property 
awarded to Respondent to secure amounts determined to be due by Respondent to Third 
Party Plaintiff, including alimony. 
A subsequent order was entered restraining and enjoining Respondent, from 
conveying his interest in real property. (See Order dated September 11, 1998) 
Respondent failed to pay the amounts ordered to be paid to Third Party Plaintiff by 
Respondent. Third Party Plaintiff obtained a Writ of Execution directing the sale of real 
property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, Utah (hereinafter referred to as "48 East"). 
Third Party Plaintiff purchased 48 East at the Sheriffs Sale. Respondent executed 
an Assignment (See attached Exhibit A.), and a Warranty Deed (See attached Exhibit B.) 
The Third Party Defendant redeemed the property, pursuant to the Assignment and 
Warranty Deed, and Rule 69 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Third Party Plaintiff initiated the pending action seeking an order voiding the 
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Assignment and Warranty Deed, thereby restoring title of the property to Respondent. 
Presently before the court is a Motion for Summary Judgment submitted by Third 
Party Plaintiff. Said Motion is supported by Third Party Plaintiffs Affidavit (attached to 
Motion for Summary Judgment), and exhibits submitted as attachments hereto as well as 
exhibits to the Memorandum. By this Motion, Third Party Plaintiff argues that there are no 
issues of material fact and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
UNCONTESTED MATERIAL FACTS 
Third Party Plaintiff submits the following facts, which she asserts are not contested. 
1. A Supplemental Decree was entered: 
A. Awarding alimony to Petitioner; 
B. Awarding real property located at 48 East to Respondent (fl 5B); 
C. Awarding Petitioner a lien against all real property awarded to 
Respondent to secure the Respondent's alimony obligation (fl 10). 
2. Third Party Plaintiff filed a Notice of Interest with the Carbon County Recorder 
concerning the property at 48 East on October 28, 1997. (See Exhibit A, attached to Third 
Party Plaintiffs Affidavit, attached to Third Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.); 
2. Respondent was restrained and enjoined from conveying any interest in real 
property by an Order dated September 22,1998, labeled "Order on Order to Show Cause 
Heard September 1, 1998" (See paragraph 4). 1 
Paragraph 4 states: "Respondent is hereby restrained and enjoined from taking any 
action to convey or pledge any of the real property awarded him by the Supplemental Decree." 
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3. 48 East was sold at a Sheriffs Sale to Petitioner/Third Party Plaintiff; 
4. Respondent executed an Assignment (See attached Exhibit A) concerning his 
right of redemption pursuant to Rule 69 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
5. Respondent executed a Warranty Deed (See attached Exhibit B.) 
6. Third Party Defendant redeemed 48 East. 
7. The value of 48 East, as of the date of redemption, was at least $45,000. (See 
Third Party Plaintiffs Affidavit, fl5.) 
7. Petitioner initiated the pending action against Third Party Defendant; 
8. Third Party Defendant testified at a hearing on March 15, 1999, as follows:2 
A. One payment of the mortgage, concerning 48 East, was made from 
Respondent's account after the redemption; 
B. That Respondent and Third Party Defendant have a personal relationship 
"as in boyfriend and girlfriend." (See page 118.) 
C. That Third Party Defendant paid $100 for the Assignment (See page 
121 ). 
9. Respondent testified at a hearing on March 15, 1999, as follows: 3 
A. Third Party Defendant paid $100 for the Assignment (See page 146.); 
B. Third Party Defendant paid $50 for the Warranty Deed (See page 146.); 
C. He transferred the property to Third Party Defendant because he did not 
2Attached as Exhibit C is a copy of Third Party Defendant's testimony in total. 
Attached as Exhibit D is a copy of Respondent's testimony in total. 
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want the property (48 East)" . . . to be trashed like the apartments were before I got them 
back." (See page 151.); 
D. A payment was made concerning 48 East, to the mortgage holder after 
the Assignment and Warranty Deed. This payment was from his account. (See page 
159.) 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
NO ISSUES OF FACT 
To prevail concerning the pending Motion, Third Party Plaintiff must establish that 
there are no material issues of fact, and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Pappas vs. Richfield City, 962 P.2d 63 (Ct. App. 
1998). 
Third Party Plaintiff submits that all of the facts, listed above, have either been 
established by written document, or by testimony of opposing parties - i.e., Third Party 
Defendant and Respondent. To prevail'on a Motion for Summary Judgment, the moving 
party must establish that there are no material issues of fact. 
Third Party Plaintiff submits that these facts are uncontroverted, and that she, 
therefore, has satisfied the first hurdle to obtain an order granting her Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
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Point II 
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER 
The second hurdle facing the moving party in a Motion for Summary Judgment is 
to establish that they are entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, based on the 
uncontroverted facts. Third Party Plaintiff submits that, as a matter of law, based on the 
established, uncontroverted facts she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act is found at Utah Code Annotated Title 25 Chapter 
6. Third Party Plaintiff argues that these statutes mandate a ruling in her favor. 
Utah Code Annotated §25-6-2 contains several definitions which are helpful in 
making the conclusion that Third Party Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Those definitions are as follows: 
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor; 
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment; 
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim; 
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim; 
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim; 
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of 
a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by 
agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings; 
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership; 
(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, or 
voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset. 
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From these statutory definitions the following is clear: 
1. 48 East is an asset; 
2. Third Party Plaintiff has a claim against Respondent; 
3. Third Party Plaintiff is a creditor of Respondent; 
4. A debt existed between Third Party Plaintiff and Respondent; 
5. Respondent is a debtor; 
6. 48 East was subject to a lien; 
7. 48 East is "property"; 
8. Respondent transferred the property (48 East) to Third Party Defendant. 
Third Party Plaintiff submits the transfer was not for value. 
Value" is defined at Utah Code Annotated §25-6-4 (1) as follows: (1) "Value is given for 
a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is 
transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied." In this case, Third Party 
Defendant paid Respondent $100 for the Assignment, and $50 for the Warranty Deed. 
With these transfers, Third Party Defendant received real property valued in at least the 
amount of $45,000. Third Party Plaintiff asserts there was not a " bargained for exchange" 
cer.veen "arms length" parties, which also indicates value was not given by Third Party 
Defendant. 
Third Party Plaintiff argues that the transfer was not for fair market value. Fair 
r«;-rket value is defined as "the amount at which property would change hands between 
a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and 
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both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." Philip A. vs. Salt Lake City, 
983 P 2d 566 (Utah 1999), In Re Estate of Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969 (Utah 1996), 
UCA §59-2-102(11). 
Courts of this jurisdiction have voided transfers when the transfer of property was 
designed to place a debtor's assets beyond reach of the debtor's creditors. Butler vs. 
Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987), Dahnken, Inc. vs. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 (Utah 
1S86). 
In Dahnken the Court stated: 
Wilmarth's third claim, that the evidence did not support the 
trial court's finding that the assignment was made with actual 
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Davis' creditors, is also 
without merit. Although actual fraudulent intent must be shown 
to hold a conveyance fraudulent pursuant to § 25-1-7, its 
existence may be inferred from the presence of certain indicia 
of fraud or "badges of fraud." Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 
287, 291, 351 P.2d 959, 962 (1960). Badges of fraud that 
pertain to this case are a debtor's (1) continuing in possession 
and evidencing the perquisites of property ownership after 
having formally conveyed all his interest in the property, (2) 
making a conveyance in anticipation of litigation, and (3) 
making a conveyance to a family member without receiving fair 
consideration. Id 
"Badges of Fraud" have also been discussed in other cases in Utah. The Court of 
Acpeais in Territorial Savings and Loan Association vs. Baird, 781 P. 2d 452 (Ct. App. 
1989)4. stated: 
"[Badges of fraud] are said to be facts which throw suspicion 
on a transaction, a*»M*iraebca&forai*«qDtarumo*... More 
simply stated, they are signs or marks of fraud. They do not of 
4This case is attached as Exhibit E 
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themselves or per se constitute fraud, but they are facts having 
a tendency to show the existence of fraud, although their value 
as evidence is relative not absolute. They are not usually 
conclusive proof; they are open to explanation* They may be 
almost conclusive, or they may furnish merely a reasonable 
inference of fraud, according to the weight to which they may 
be entitled from their intrinsic character and the special 
circumstances attending the case. Often a single one of them 
may establish and stamp a transaction as fraudulent...." 
The generally recognized badges of fraud are the lack of 
consideration for the conveyance, the transfer of the debtor's 
entire estate, relationship between transferor and the 
transferee, the pendency or threat of litigation, secrecy or 
hurried transaction, insolvency or indebtedness of the 
transferor, departure from the usual method of business, the 
retention by the debtor of possession of the property, and the 
reservation of benefit to the transferor. 
"Badges of Fraud," or other indicators of fraud "have been described as facts which 
"throw suspicion on a transaction and which call for an explanation. . . facts having a 
tendency to show the existence of fraud, although their value as evidence is relative not 
absolute. Selvage vs. J.J.Johnson & Assoc. 910 P. 2d 1252 (Ct. App. 1996)5, citing 
Territorial Savings & Loan Association vs. Baird, supra. 
In this case, all of the "badges of fraud" are present - and are uncontroverted facts. 
There is a lack of consideration for the conveyance. There is a relationship between the 
transferor and the transferee. There is pending litigation. There is a departure from the 
usual method of business. There is a reservation of benefit to the transferor. There is. 
continued involvement with the transferred property by the transferor in the form of a 
payment, and in the form of anticipated return of the property (See Respondent's testimony 
5This case is attached as Exhibit F 
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at p. 151 of Exhibit D wherein he indicates that he did not "want the property to be trashed 
like the apartments
 w e re before I got them back") 
Third Party Plaintiff submits that the uncontroverted facts establish that she is 
entitled to judpmaoj as a matter of )aw in that the transfer of Ad East by Respondeat to 
Third Party Defendant constitutes a fraudulent conveyance as contemplated by the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and applicable case law. 
CONCLUSION 
Third Party Plaintiff has established that both hurdles required by a moving party 
to prevail in a motion for summary judgment have been surmounted. There are no material 
issues of fact. Based on the uncontroverted materiaf issues of fact, Third Party Plaintiff 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Third Party Plaintiff submits that she is entitled to an order voiding the transfer of 
48 East by Respondent to Third Party Defendant thus restoring title of said property to 
Respondent. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the , J j day of j i ^ , < L^^ . 1999, I mailed a 
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true and correct copy of the above THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT by placing same in the 
U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, to Brent D. Young, Attorney for Respondent, 48 North 
University Ave. ,P. 0. Box 657, Provo, UT 84603... , : 
rrv.ies DrockbankPenny\Mem.Mot.Sum.Judg.\mo 
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ASSIGNMENT 
JAMES L. BROCKBANK hereby assigns, sets over, and transfers all of his right to 
redemption pursuant to the Sheriffs Sale which was conducted on 23 December, 1998 at the 
Carbon County Courthouse, to CHERYL RACHELE for the sum of FIFTY and no/100 
DOLLARS (S50.00) and other good and valuable consideration. The Assignment of the 
redemption applies to the following described property, located at 48 East 100 North, Price, 
Carbon County, State of Utah: 
Beginning at a point 214 feet East of the Northwest Comer of Lot 3, Block 40 PRICE 
TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running thence East 50 feet; thence South 152.5 feet, thence 
West 50 feet; thence North 152.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
Subject to, and together with a joint right of way over and across the following described 
tract of land: 
Beginning at a point 209 feet East of the Northwest Comer of Lot 3, Block 40 PRICE 
TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running thence East 10 feet; thence South 152.5 feet; thence 
West 10 feet; thence North 152.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
\ Dated this /~day of January, 1999. 
s^AMES L. BROCKBANK 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of CARBON ) 
On the _£_ day of January, 1999, personally appeared before me JAMES L. 
BROCKBANK, signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that 
he executed the same. ~l/- / iJ 
Spjsrf?: A. • >£2UJ2± 1 
H^L SERS\MAJlGIE\DWV€j 
KRISTIL GREEN 
fi HOTJMPWC'STAIWI/rjIH 
248 EAST MAIN 
PRICE. UT 84501 
C0MM. EXP. 4-14-2001 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
82] 
EXHIBIT 
_£ 
, „ i , . , . CQMTTtF'OIH1 
WARRANTY DEED mij* «Jg«a,ai Fg nfc» W 
JAMES L. BROCKBANK, grantor of Price, County of Carbon, hereby conveys 
and warrants to CHERYL RECHELE, of ft/9, Bny < o 7 9 , Price, 
Utah, for the sum of One-hundred Dollars ($100.00), the following described tract of land 
in Carbon County, State of Utah. 
Subject to the first mortgage held by Juanita Rasmussen. 
This property was titled in James L. Brockbank. It was sold pursuant to a Sheriffs 
Sale on December 23, 1998 at the Carbon County Courthouse. This deed is therefore 
subject to the right of redemption pursuant to Rule 69(j). 
/ - '' ( 7 
Beginning at a point 214 feet East of the Northwest Comer of Lot 3, Block 
40 PRICE TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running thence East 50 feet; thence 
South 152.5 feet, thence West 50 feet; thence North 152.5 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
Subject to, and together with a joint right of way over and across the 
following described tract of land: 
Beginning at a pqint 209 feet East of the Northwest Comer of Lot 3, Block 
40, PRICE TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running thence East 10 feet; thence 
South 152.5 feet; thence West 10 feet; thence North 152.5 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor this £~ day of \Ja.* ,1999. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
County of Carbon ) 
On the J"*-day of
 t Id. /..;a/LU. 
^""JAMES L. BROCKBANK 
_, 1999. personally ajipeared before me 
•^mmt^m^mm • T ijfl II HIT If i * - - » 
JAMES L. BROCKBANK, me signer of the within instrument who duly acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same. 
KRIST1L GREEN 
mtmrmjt'Srmtim 
248 EAST MAIN 
PRICE. UT «4S01 
COMM. EXP. 4-14-2001 
Notary Public 
1 THE COURT: Ms. Rachele, will you step 
2 forward, raise your right hand and be sworn. 
3 COURT CLERK: Raise your right hand, please. 
4 You do solemnly swear that the testimony you're about 
5 to give in the case now before the Court will be the 
6 truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so 
7 help you God? 
8 THE WITNESS: I do. 
9 COURT CLERK: Be seated, please. 
10 CHERYL RACHELE, 
11 having been f i r s t duly sworn, 
12 t e s t i f i e d as follows: 
13 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
14 BY MR. SCHINDLER: 
15 Q. Would you state your name, please. 
16 A. Cheryl Rachele. 
17 MR. SCHINDLER: Could I have Exhibit 7 and 8, 
18 your Honor. 
19 Q. BY MR. SCHINDLER: Ms. Rachele, let me hand 
20 you Exhibits 7 and 8. Give you a second to take a 
21 look at those, and ask you if you're the grantee in 
22 each of those documents. 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Now, I note that your name is spelled 
25 differently on the two documents. Do you notice? 
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1 A. I notice now. I didn't before. 
2 Q. Okay, but you're the same person? 
3 A. I am the same person. 
4 Q. Do you go by — you go by "Rachele," do you 
5 not? 
6 A. Well, it all depends. Actually, half of 
7 the time — if it has to do with my kids, I go by 
8 Hunsaker, and if it doesn't have to do with my kids 
9 then I go with Rachele. 
10 Q. Let me hand you Exhibit 18 and ask if you 
11 can identify that. 
12 [ A. Yes, that's me. 
13 Q. Is that a check that you signed? 
14 A. Yes, it is. 
15 Q. Payable to Jixanita Rasmussen? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. On the account of JLB Rentals? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. And you signed i t ''Cheryl Hunsaker"? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. So am I accurate, then, ma'am, to say that 
22 you go by both Cheryl Rachele and Cheryl Hunsaker? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Which spelling of Rachele is correct? 
25 A. R-a-c-h-e-1-e. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
the 
MR. 
future to 
an "a," 
Q. 
also 
THE 
MR. 
BY ] 
SCHINDLER: Judge, I'd ask 
designate pleadings Cheryl 
known as Cheryl Hunsaker. 
COURT: Any objection? 
YOUNG: No. 
MR. SCHINDLER: Ms. Rachele, 
permission in 
Rachele with 
how do you 
know Mr. Brockbank? 
THE COURT: So ordered. 
MR. SCHINDLER: Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: I am his office manager. 
Q. BY MR. SCHINDLER: How long have you been his 
office manager? 
A. Since May of *98. 
Q. Does your relationship go beyond that? 
A* Yes, it does. 
Q. And how long — 
MR. YOUNG: Objection, relevancy, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Where are you going? 
MR. SCHINDLER: Well, we're talking about 
irreparable injury, and I'm submitting that this 
individual's involvement with Mr. Brockbank — 
THE COURT: Go ahead. For that purpose I'll 
allow it. 
Q. BY MR. SCHINDLER: How would you characterize 
that relationship? 
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1 A. Well, it's been like we have a personal 
2 relationship as in boyfriend and girlfriend. I date 
3 him. 
4 Q. Okay. So you're dating him? 
5 A. Yes, I am. 
6 Q. How long have you been dating him? 
7 A. Since May of '98. 
8 THE COURT: I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you. 
9 THE WITNESS: May of %98. 
10 Q. BY MR. SCHINDLER: Now, as an office manager 
11 I guess you're authorized signatory on some of his 
12 accounts; is that true? 
13 A. I'm authorized on all of them but his own 
14 personal accounts. 
15 Q. So there's several accounts, I take it. 
16 A. Well, the office account and JLB Rentals. 
17 Q. And what's the purpose of the JLB Rental 
18 account? 
19 A. That has to do with the apartments. The 
20 48 East and Franklin Apartments. 
21 Q. And do you keep the records for those 
22 apartments? 
23 A. Yes, I do. 
24 Q. The 48 East apartments, there are rentals 
25 in those apartments; isn't that true? 
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1 A. Yes, it is. 
2 Q. Oh, and so do you collect the rent? 
3 A. What happens is they bring it into the 
4 office and I make the deposit check• 
5 Q. And how about the Franklins; do you collect 
6 those as well? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. And that's part of your function as office 
9 manager, is it? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Okay. So you make the deposits and you also 
12 write out the checks? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q# And that's what you were doing when you 
15 signed Exhibit 18; is that true? 
16 A. Right. 
17 Q. Tell me how this assignment, this Exhibit 7 
18 came to pass. Why did that happen? 
19 A. Because there was a fire in one of the 
20 units, and so Jim took it over, and then since I was 
21 the office manager, and I paid bills in the other 
22 — for the office, he just had me pay them for the 
23 apartments, too. 
24 Q. Because there was a fire in the apartments; 
25 is that what you said? 
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1 A. Yes, and he let the other office — or the 
2 apartment manager go, and he took over. 
3 Q. Okay. So at that time he indicated to you 
4 that he wanted to assign this assignment to you; is 
5 that what you're telling me? 
6 A. (Inaudible). 
7 Q. And that was fine with you? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Okay. Did you pay him anything for this 
10 assignment? 
11 A. No. 
12 MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, I would request that 
13 Mr. Schindler show the witness which exhibit he's 
14 talking about, because it's clear to me that she's 
15 confused. 
16 MR. SCHINDLER: She's got it in front of her. 
17 I handed it to her — * 
18 MR. YOUNG: Well, she's not looking at it. 
19 THE WITNESS: Are we talking about this ~ 
20 I'm talking about JLB Rentals. 
21 MR. SCHINDLER: I'm talking about the Exhibit 
22 7 now. 
23 THE WITNESS: Oh, which one is 7? Oh, right 
24 down here? Oh, I thought you were still on the JLB 
25 Rentals. 
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1 Q. BY MR. SCHINDLER: The question is whether 
2 you paid him anything for this assignment. 
3 A. Yes, I paid him $100. 
4 Q. Do you see Exhibit 8 there, ma'am? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Tell me how that deed came to be. Whose 
7 idea was it? 
8 A. Oh, it was all three of ours; Mr. Young, 
9 Mr. Brockbank and I. 
10 Q. Where were you when you discussed that idea? 
11 A. I'm not sure if it was in the office or at 
12 his house, because we discussed it both places. 
13 Q. Mr. Brockbank's office or at Mr. Brockbank's 
14 home; is that your answer? 
15 A. Yes, and Mr. Young's office. 
16 Q. Okay. So you've accompanied Mr. Brockbank 
17 to Mr. Young's office; is that your testimony? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. At any time in Mr. Young's office was this 
20 deed discussed? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Okay. When the concept of this deed first 
23 came to be, how did that come to pass, to be? Whose 
24 idea was that? 
25 MR. YOUNG: Objection, your Honor. I think 
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1 this gets to the attorney/client privilege, 
2 THE COURT: Well, it's foundational, Counsel. 
3 If she is testifying as to matters that are between 
4 her and her Counsel, since Mr. Young is her Counsel, 
5 there may be a privilege. If she is testifying as to 
6 matters between Mr. Brockbank and Mr. Young, I don't 
7 see that there's any problem with her testifying. 
8 MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, let me state — 
9 THE COURT: So it may be foundational, but 
10 you need to lay some additional foundation for that, 
11 but I don't think at this point that I can make a 
12 ruling that it's privileged. 
13 MR. YOUNG: Let me be clear on our position 
14 with respect to the deed. Our position is they — and 
15 I think it's consistent with Utah law that the deed 
16 doesn't mean anything. The deed was intended to — it 
17 probably should have been a quit-claim deed. Should 
18 have addressed the clearing up of title. 
19 Our position is now, after having further 
20 researched it, that there — it's the assignment which 
21 is the operative document, and the deed is a matter of 
22 law when you're dealing with the right of redemption. 
23 I think we're accurate in that regard. It's set forth 
24 in our memorandum. It doesn't really mean anything. 
25 THE COURT: The position of Counsel is to the 
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1 I contrary, I take it. You think that both documents 
2 have some relevancy to the matter before the Court. 
3 MR. SCHINDLER: I do. 
4 Q. BY MR. SCHINDLER: I don't know that we've 
5 established — Ms. Rachele, let me ask you this. 
6 THE COURT: I'm just going to let it go. Go 
7 ahead. 
8 Q. BY MR. SCHINDLER: Okay. Let me ask, do you 
9 object to the Court telling you can't get rid of this 
10 property until all of this is sorted out? 
11 A. Like — 
12 Q. Do you want to sell this property? Do you 
13 want to mortgage it? Do you want to trade it, to 
14 convey it? Do you want to do anything with it today? 
15 Well, excuse me, not today, but while this case is 
16 pending? 
17 A, No, I will hold onto it until the appeals 
18 court decides what they want to do. Then after that 
19 I will discuss what I will do. 
20 Q. Do you oppose the Court ordering you to not 
21 transfer or encumber the property? 
22 A. No, I will just keep it. 
23 Q. You're willing to just hold onto it while 
24 all this gets sorted out? 
25 A. Yes. 
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SCHINDLER: I'm being fecicious 
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and I 
laugh, 
shouldn't have. 
THE COURT: I didn't hear it. So I can't 
f chuckle or (inaudible). Sorry, Counsel. 
MR. SCHINDLER: She's indicating that it's 
okay with her — 
but I 
THE COURT: I understand what she's saying, 
understand that Counsel is saying that he's not 
saying that. 
Court 
do. 
Maybe 
going 
and I 
MR. SCHINDLER: I don't know whether the 
wishes at this point to let me know or — 
THE COURT: Well, I know what I'm going to 
MR. SCHINDLER: Well, then please do it. 
I'll sit down. 
THE COURT: Wait until the appeal. There's 
to be an order that requires her not to convey, 
want it to be every adverb now, and — 
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1 MR. SCHINDLER: I would solicit Mr. Young's 
2 help in that because he seems to be better at that 
3 than me. So as long as we've closed all of those 
4 doors so there's no — 
5 THE COURT: I guess at least for the time 
6 being, Mr. Young, it's only until such time as the 
7 decision in the appellate court, because if the 
8 appellate court decision overrules me, then there's 
9 all kinds of things that are up in the air at that 
10 point. If she wants to try and do something, them 
11 maybe I can't continue that order. 
12 MR. SCHINDLER: Well, it's our intention to 
13 move forward on the third-party action, Judge. We 
14 don't intend to just sit on that. 
15 THE COURT: I understand. 
16 MR. SCHINDLER: Part of the reason why we 
17 have not done anything is we were waiting for the 
18 hearing to happen today to see whether the order was 
19 going to be in place and whether the case — because 
20 there was a motion to dismiss and all that pending, 
21 and we intend to move forward with that and we'll do 
22 that. For purposes presently, it's my understanding 
23 that the Court intends to restrain her from — 
24 THE COURT: Didn't you file a lis pendens 
25 besides? 
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1 the third parties out there that may or may not have 
2 some interest, and I don't even care about it, to tell 
3 you the truth. 
4 MR. YOUNG: All right, but I just want to 
5 illustrate the problem. Some third party comes in 
6 and says, "Ms. Rachele — * 
7 MR. SCHINDLER: Well, we had a — 
8 MR. YOUNG: Just a second. 
9 THE COURT: And what lies between that third 
10 party and Ms. Rachele, maybe she's out of luck. Maybe 
11 Mr. Brockbank's out of luck. Maybe she's out of luck, 
12 but I'll decide that when I — 
13 MR. YOUNG: Well, before this third party 
14 comes up and says, "Ms. Rachele, I have a right of 
15 redemption because I'm in the chain of title. Here 
16 is your $16,000. Now the property is mine," are you 
17 restraining that third party, that unknown third 
18 party? 
19 MR. SCHINDLER: Well, he can't do that. He's 
20 not saying he is. We've got enough trouble looking at 
21 us in the face without talking about what may be out 
22 there. 
23 MR. YOUNG: Exactly, and that's my point. So 
24 let's — 
25 THE COURT: But I've got her here. I've got 
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1 may issue only upon a showing by the applicant — " 
2 and we're not the applicant, Judge. The applicant. 
3 That's them — "that the applicant will suffer 
4 irreparable harm unless the order or injunction 
5 issues a threatened injury to the applicant outweighs 
6 whatever damage the proposed order injunction may 
7 cause the party restrained or enjoined, the order 
8 injunction of issue would not be adverse to the public 
9 interest, and there is a substantial likelihood that 
10 the applicant will prevail." 
11 Requirement. "The Court shall condition 
12 issuance of the order or injunction on the giving of 
13 security by the applicant in such sum and for as the 
14 Court deems proper, unless it appears that none of 
15 the parties will incur or suffer costs, attorney's 
16 fees or damage as a result of any wrongful order or 
17 injunction, unless there exists some other substantial 
18 reasons for dispensing the requirement of a security." 
19 Now, if she wants to sell the property, she 
20 may suffer a loss if she's enjoined. She may suffer 
21 attorney's fees. They are to post a bond. 
22 MR. SCHINDLER: But she sat here today 
23 saying, "I'm willing to not do that. I'm willing to 
24 sit on it until all of this gets resolved." If she's 
25 willing to accept it, why can't we, and get on down 
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1 stage I think that Counsel has presented to the Court 
2 sufficient evidence to show that the party asking 
3 for the temporary relief is legitimately in fear of 
4 irreparable damage to her secured position which this 
5 Court tried to place her in in the original decree of 
6 divorce. 
7 MR. SCHINDLER: The last thing that I have, 
8 Judge, is I'd like to tender Exhibit 18. I don't 
9 want to offer it, but I would like it to be part 
10 of the record here, because she's identified it 
11 with reference to her name, and it may be of some 
12 consequence down the road, and I'd like to tender it 
13 for that purpose rather than to make it part of our 
14 record, but for no other purpose at this point. 
15 MR. YOUNG: I don't understand. 
16 THE COURT: Well, make it a part of the 
17 record and you can withdraw the original and put a 
18 copy in the record. 
19 MR. YOUNG: Is this being offered as an 
20 exhibit? 
21 MR. SCHINDLER: It's marked as an exhibit and 
22 she identified it as her signature and her name in 
23 terms of — and also known as and using another name. 
24 MR. YOUNG: Well, I don't have any objection 
25 to it being received for that purpose. 
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1 JAMES BROCKBANK, 
2 having been first duly sworn, 
3 testified as follows: 
4 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
5 BY MR. YOUNG: 
6 Q. Would you tell me your name, please. 
7 A. James Lynn Brockbank. 
8 Q. Very quickly will you inform the Court with 
9 respect to the status of the 38 properties. 
10 A. Well/ I was instructed to come in and sign 
11 documents at 11 o'clock. When I came in Clay Holbrook 
12 showed me that Penny had already been in. He said' 
13 that everything looked good, and that the seller would 
14 be coming up with the money that he had already had 
15 available, but that it was in a — some kind of an 
16 account, but that there was no question as to whether 
17 the sale would go through. 
18 Q. All right. Now, you understand there's how 
19 much money resulting from that sale? 
20 A. Oh, $36 and change. 
21 Q. That's $36,000/ don't you mean? 
22 THE COURT: Yeah, I was going to say somebody 
23 really got a good deal. 
24 Q. BY MR. YOUNG: Is Mr. Holbrook at the title 
25 company under specific instructions what to do with 
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THE WITNESS: I have had a difficult time 
paying her, and there have been stretches of time 
where she has not been paid her salary. 
Q. BY MR. YOUNG: What is your condition of your 
health? 
MR. SCHINDLER: Objection to relevance, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
MR. YOUNG: We're talking about contempt. 
We're talking about state of mind. We're talking 
about state of mind. 
THE COURT: For the purposes of contempt I'll 
allow him to explain his comment. If the explanation 
deals with his health, I'll hear questions about him. 
THE WITNESS: I am seeing two psychologists. 
One with a PhD, the other one with a Master's Degree, 
as to my mental state which is severe anxiety and 
depression. I'm on medication that if I am taken off, 
I am nonfunctional. 
In fact, right now, because of the stress 
of what has gone on here, I have a chronic pinch in 
my back that if I were to have that in my office, I 
would not be able to concentrate at all and do my 
profession. 
Q. BY MR. YOUNG: How many days a week do you 
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1 WTTNF.F' alium at 
19 night to he^F a., *^. . aid causing 
2 0 ! - - • * - • • : . 
1 H rrN:~ l meant to ask you why y o u ' r e 
22 d, . . 
23 , ^  „ u o 
24 ' fur.rrion as a *:.--• rmal person. 
i able tw address you " *- --
1 ask you this. With medications, how are you able to 
2 function at work? 
3 A. At this point it's very difficult because 
4 I've been under such prolonged stress- I have a very 
5 hard time focusing on my job, and finishing the work 
6 that might come in. 
7 Q. Okay. Now, tell us why you've refused to 
8 sign the deed on the marital home. 
9 A. Well, I don't feel — I honestly feel that 
10 if Penny had to either sell the house or transferred 
11 it in somebody else's name and I had tried to get her. 
12 to — because of the apartments which the Judge has 
13 awarded to me, they're collateral for the convenience 
14 store, and they also have value, and the value that 
15 these apartments have are rendered useless to me, and 
16 I'm also at the mercy of whatever she does, and I 
17 would lose the apartments and she would not lose 
18 anything. 
19 Q. Now, you've heard my statement to the Court 
20 that she's entitled to the judgment on the AT&T bill 
21 for $8,597. You've heard my representation. 
22 MR. YOUNG: Is it okay if I sit down, your 
23 Honor? 
24 THE COURT: It is. 
25 Q. BY MR. YOUNG: You've heard my representation 
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1 I: h a L s h e"" s e r i L i L1 e d L u I h a L j u d yine n L. 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Do y ou agree with ; ~w. 
4 . A . ! ! i >, 
5 I Q. Now, if the 48 • - or 38 property • - — ^ 
6 won't the taxes be picked up? 
7 . A . Taxes 
8 Q. Okay, ana sne . ,_.. t- awarded any i n t e r e s t in 
9 the 3 8 propert ies , was she? 
10 A. No. 
1 1 Q . ' M i d I W i i | i mi 11 111 i i p i t 1 i I / . 
1 2 ' 'A. Yes. 
13 MR. SCHINDLER: The question/ "any in tere s t"? 
1 4 j in :ii s s ed tl le I'i les t i on. 
1 :! I T H E • :::OU RT: We] 1 , I 1 .hj i: ik so, but I don t 
16 think he was referring." to any 1 i en interest. 
I MR. SCHINDLER: All right. Just so long as 
ide r s i din (III" i, that. 
19 I Q. BY ME ! ! : UNG: She wasn't awarded any dollar, 
equity value i i i the 38 East properties, was she ? 
A. No 
Q. Nor for that matter, the 48 East properties, 
//as she? 
A. In that sale? 
Q . N" :: i i :: • i i ::: 
i ^ p 
1 she wasn't awarded any — 
2 A. No, she was not. 
3 Q. Those were your properties, 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Now, the — and I'm probably repeating 
6 myself, but the 38 interest — the 38 properties, 
7 if sold and if they close, taxes will be paid and the 
8 $35,000 or $36,000 will be placed in a trust account? 
9 A. Correct. 
10 Q. Now, with respect to the 48 East properties, 
11 whoever bought the property will have to pay the taxes 
12 to protect them from the May sale; do you understand 
13 that? 
14 A. Yes, they would. 
15 MR. YOUNG: May I just have a moment, your 
16 Honor, to review my notes? 
17 THE COURT: You may. 
18 MR. YOUNG: She's (inaudible). 
19 THE COURT: I thought you were just hot under 
20 the collar. 
21 MR. YOUNG: No, that's next week. 
22 THE COURT: Maybe I'll give my robe to my 
23 clerk and I'll leave. 
24 MR. YOUNG: I don't have any more. 
25 THE COURT: You may cross examine. 
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4 
Mi-1, SCHINDLER:, l'hank you, 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SCHINDLER: 
Q. Mr Yoi ing asked y en 1 a boi it com Ing i i; l a,=?t-
week, I think it was, to get: a release on the 
attorney's lien on 38 East. Do yon recall that 
question"1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was i t last: week? 
A. Yes, i t was. 
Q. When an i you — 
A. Well, let's see. Today's Monday? 
THE COURT: Monday rr.«=» *•'" 
THE • 
Q. BY MR. SCHINDLER: Doesn r . ree. l.ice a 
Monday to you ? 
i 
A. No. 
Q. Feels like one to me. 
A. Feels like a Friday, ~ ?~ .. -" d - •-* •*. 
Q. What did you-do to accomplish that? 
p a n ""' "imi "  • 
No, . umped in my car and 1 drove up t 
3 Q. i:.: •:. ;: ~ pay him anything for that, j ~ . 
just signed B release? 
A t pay h im anything, but I — 
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Q* Did somebody pay him something on your 
behalf, Mr. Brockbank? 
A. At that time nobody paid him anything. 
Q. Have there been payments to Mr. Young during 
the course of this proceeding? While this divorce 
case has been pending have you been able to make 
payments to him? 
A. I have been making token payments to him, 
because he's aware of my financial situation. 
Q. When was the last time you made a token 
payment, Mr. Brockbank? 
A. I think I made — I'm not sure when the last 
one was made. I — 
Q. I'm going to give you another minute and see 
if you can recall. 
A. Well, I'm not able to cover — 
Q. The question was, when was the last time you 
made him a payment; do you recall? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q, You don't recall. 
THE COURT: That's a good answer in this 
Court. 
Q. BY MR. SCHINDLER: Thank you. Do you recall 
the amount? 
A. It's usually $25 or $50. 
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Q. • Okay. So he signed a release, is that: your 
testimony, on the J8 East property last week when 
went up r.oqerher ? 
A. ies, he did. 
Q. The psychologists that you're seeing, could 
you give me their names. 
A. Kar J Krantz. 
Q. Karl Krantz Is it our Karl down here? 
A. Uh-huh, Karl here. 
Q. He' "i psyclio 1 oq i":." , y u 'understand? 
A. Well, he said he was. 
Q. He said he was? 
A . He MI»II nil hi(-"> in .1 i-i"", ill"" Sia ui hip llvi Il .n M a s t e r ' s 
The other is Karen Mahnf, M-a-h-n-f. 
Where is she? 
She's out:'of — or from Park Cit y 
In i Karen? 
Karen Mahnf. 
ir. * , . related three medications to the 
Cour- • I thai? 
Zoloft, Xanax and Valium? 
And then I take Oxycodone. 
- le? 
Oxycodone. 
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1 Q. Who prescribes these for you? 
2 A. Well, either my brother or Mack Morgan. 
3 Dr. Morgan. 
4 Q. Your "brother," being Kevin, the local 
5 physician; is that true? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. How often do you see Kevin? 
8 A. I see Kevin — 
9 Q. See him on a professional basis for these 
10 medications, I'm sorry. 
11 A. Well, because he's my brother, he has to 
12 monitor this very closely or he could be put in 
13 jeopardy. So his record is very well documented. 
14 Q. My question, Mr. Brockbank, is how often do 
15 you see Dr. Brockbank for these medications? 
16 A. For one of them, once a month. The others, 
17 once every two to three months. 
18 Q. When was the last time you saw Dr. Morgan 
19 professionally? 
20 A. It's been — it was just before — 
21 Q. Was it this year? 
22 A. It was last year. 
23 Q. Before Christmas? 
24 A. It was about like September, around there. 
25 Q. You've taken these kinds of prescription 
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medications during your entire marriage to Penny, 
i r i n ' t , o ui " 
A. "I have taken — I have been on —• taken 
blood pressure medication during my marriage with her 
Q. Dxa you take Xanax during the marriage with 
Penny? 
MR. YOUNG: Excuse me, your Honor 
THE WITNESS: On occasion, but — i _.i a 
i: eg u ] ar basi s 
MR. YOUNG: I think Mr Brockbank needs to be 
afforded an opportunity to — 
THE COURT: Complete an answer before we — 
MR. SCHINDLER:- Well , in I Mat. r e g a r d il i* 
ask the Court to instruct him to get to the answer. 
THE COURT: Well, and maybe *r * appropriate 
f o r . . ! '" ' * ; 1 t S II!'"," 
policy to tel. ^Ltnesses t;;ai.. L. *• ina p-w particular 
attention to . . question asked by Counsel, whether 
i t' s : .. f? t: h e r 11 s M r . S <" h i nd 1 e r . 
Just answer the question. 
Again, as I've indicated a little bit ago, 
"I don't, know," v,,l don't remember," "I have records 
somepJ d". e el se , \' I I -, an I remember , '" a 1 ] of tl: lose 
are answers I accept. So we don't; expect you to have 
a recollection of 100 percent. 
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1 If you need something to refresh your 
2 recollection, we'll get that for you. If you just 
3 can't remember, "I can't remember is an appropriate 
4 response," but it's appropriate for you to concentrate 
5 on the questions asked by Counsel and to try to move 
6 with some sort of direct answer as quickly as possible 
7 so that we can get through here hopefully today. 
8 MR. SCHINDLER: Thank you, your Honor. 
9 Q. BY MR. SCHINDLER: Okay. Let me ask you 
10 this, Mr. Brockbank. Is it true that you have taken 
11 an antidepressant, whether it's Zoloft or some other 
12 antidepressant during your marriage? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Is it true that you took Xanax during your 
15 marriage with Penny? 
16 A. Some. 
17 Q. How about Valium? 
18 A. Some. 
19 Q. I think the Oxycodone is fairly recent; is 
20 that true? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. You've been taking that for quite some time? 
23 A. No. 
24 Q# How long have you been taking Oxy — 
25 A. Since the back pain. 
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• • ^  *: • /alium • is that the other — 
Valium and : 'i ng it right, Oxycodone? 
A. Oxycodone. 
Q. Okay, Oxycodone. Those two a re tor back 
z : s : ; . ? 
6 A. Valium i s a iiiiihu 11» ii laXiinl Oxycodone i s 
7 for pain. 
8 1 Q. Who prescribed the Valium for you? 
. 9 A. My brother 
10 Q. How about the Oxycodone? 
A. My brother. He does. 
I Q # w'hu prescribed the Xanax for you? 
,A Kevin. 
1- 0. Who prescribed the Zoloft for you? 
1 . & Ke^i'n 
i 
1:> ! 0, Did you bedi Mt< HaeheU-'s testimony to the 
17 effect that she paid $100 for the assignment "•" 
IS I Yes 
1 9 . ! > 1,11 fit t M I P > ' > 
20 v.-* , 
21 -, Oka^ Were any funds paid for the warranty" 
2-1 :ie* * Did she pav vou anything for the warranty deed, 
23 Mr ^.rockbank? 
24 Yes, $50' 
25 y. where did the $15,000 come from, or $lb,UGiM 
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Where did that money for the redemption, where did 
that come from? 
A. Most of it came from Cheryl. 
Q. How much of it? 
A. I'm not sure exactly. I know over $10,000. 
Q. Over 10. Did you contribute any of that 
money, yourself? 
A. I did not have any money. 
Q. So you personally didn't contribute any? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you help Ms. Rachele raise the $16,000-
plus for the redemption? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you go to relatives and ask to borrow 
any money or any of that kind of thing? 
MR. YOUNG: Objection, asked and answered. 
He said he didn't do anything to get it. 
THE COURT: I'm going to allow it to go on, 
because I want Mr. Brockbank to be aware that these 
are questions that Counsel is going to be relying upon 
his answers. They are under oath. They are subject 
to the pains and penalties of perjury, and as such 
Counsel can ask the questions, but in order for it to 
be subject to pains and penalties of perjury, Counsel 
must bring to the witness' attention the specifics. 
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For that purpose I'm going to allow Counsel to ask 
specific qu e s t i o n s and 1: o b e mo r e do g g e d 11 :i h i s 
inquiry, 
Q. BY MR. SCHINDLER: Do you remember the 
question ? 
A. Yes, but you referred to $16,000, 
Q. Do you know how much was paid for the 
redempti on? 
A. Yes, $ lb, 000' - or Sli^u ill) xnd change. 
Q. Did you go to any relatives and obtain any 
portion of that $16,000 and change? 
A. No, 1 di d i lot 
Q. Do you of your own. knowledge know where the 
$16,000 and change came from? 
A. Okay ' -.-:"*••. - L JLL came from Cheryl. 
My recollection .. . and my —• I don " t 
recall the amount, but'there was some additional 
needed, and my dad used a credit card Lw uku/wc ^ the 
difference 
Q. Do you know the amount he put on his credit 
card? 
A.. No I :Ioi r"r t: remember 
Q. Do you have records that wi 11 reveal that 
amount to you? 
A. He does. 
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1 Q. The question was whether you have those 
2 records. 
3 A. I have records? No. 
4 Q. Now, it's my understanding you did not 
5 participate in obtaining any portion of the $16,000 
6 and change in terms of — well, let me back up. Why 
7 did your dad put this on his credit card? Did you go 
8 and ask him? 
9 A. Let's see. I'm trying to remember exactly. 
10 He offered. I did not ask him. He offered to help 
11 her because he knew she was short. 
12 Q. Were you involved in that conversation? 
13 A. Yes, I believe I was. 
14 Q. Were you or weren't you; do you remember? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Where did that occur? 
17 A. In our living room. 
18 Q. Whose living room? 
19 A. My father's living room. 
20 Q. Okay. So Ms. Rachele was over there at your 
21 father's home, and you were present and you discussed 
22 making up the difference that she didn't have for the 
23 redemption; is that right? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. When did that occur? 
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A I don't remember the actual date* because 
t h a t 4 a s a r e -a ] 11: a u m a t i • ::i t :i me * i th . : . h a v i n q 
cancer and dyii ng, and it just was back — 
Q You don't remember. That's an acceptable 
answer in th I s Court, and that s fine. If you don'I 
i emember , that' s f i ne I'OU don' t: remember? 
A No 
Q So it's your testimony that you did not go 
t o \, ::: i :i i: i.l.11.1 111"i J. 1 ,' si,1 ninet,h 1 ;nqi l 1 ,i t ihe e f f e",', I , "We• " r e 
short on redeeming this property., Can you help me out 
or help Cheryl out," or anything like that? 
A Please •« • again. 
Q : - - : -. '0 your father and ask him, 
for his help; is that right? 
A That' s 1:2 ght 
Q • An ::! yoi ,1 • i :i dn' t: :jo t ;:  any < :: f y 
elatives and ask for help? 
A Mo, ! didn' t. 
"J And it's your testimon -: • - - * - o 
sset',i: 01: tijinjb available t- » contribute ; •: . 
redemption; is that ricnt ? 
A, Change. 
0 Change 9 
A
 . mean, ' ^ iicf had » ~mal 1 amount in my 
checking account. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
\ . How much? 
A. I don't — back then i t might have been $400 
or $500. I don't r e c a l l e x a c t l y . 
Q. Well, we're you i n t e r e s t e d in making t h i s 
redemption happen? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why? 
A. Because I was afraid of what Penny was going 
to do to the property. 
Q. You were afraid of what she was going to do 
to the property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you wanted to get the property back to 
your own — to you, didn't you? 
A. To me? I just didn't want the property to 
be trashed like the apartments were before I got them 
back. 
Q. You didn't want the property to go to Penny; 
is that right? 
A. I did not want Penny to do to 48 East what 
she did to the Franklin Apartments. 
Q. Whose idea was it, Mr. Brockbank, to do this 
assignment? Was it yours? 
A. I believe it was Counsel's. 
Q. And when did that idea first get discussed? 
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A. I don't recall. 
Q. was IL before the actual sale or after? 
A. 1^ was after. 
Q. You understood, did you not. that I f" .-- -
requires you to pay alimony of $3 ,500 a month? 
A. Yes, ' :iu. 
Q. Did you understand -- do yen understand thai, 
the decree also gives Penny a lien on all of the reaJ 
awarded to you? 
A. Yes . ". 
Q. And do you consider t: be 4:he r ignt 01 
ademption an i n t e r e s t i n property? 
A. I dun i i,nulerstand 
Q, Do you consider the interest .-s 
redemption right to be an interest in property? 
MP YOUNG: Your H — objection. Calls for 
a legal conclusion, I t s i: i , . . <- :y. 
The question is whether it's a . j, : - :c.-s. property. 
THE WITNESS: Well, I don't understand the 
question. 
THE COURT: He doesn't understand the 
question, 1 think that answers at least for now — 
F ? v f« IP SCHINDLER: Well, let me make sure I 
understand, Mi , Br ocKbdJI k . "f u iJ 'ISa i d I na t i 1. was 
Counsel's idea to do this assignment, right? 
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1 I A. Right, 
2 | Q. And the purpose of the assignment was what? 
3 1 A* I didn't understand for really what the 
4 function of the assignment was. 
5 Q. So you just signed it; is that right? You 
6 didn't understand what it was all about or what it was 
7 for, but just signed it. 
8 A. No, we — he's my attorney. I went on his 
9 recommendation. 
10 Q. Okay. You understood, did you not, that 
11 under the writ of execution rule in our statute 
12 that you had a right to redeem this property? You 
13 understood that, didn't you? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q* And you understood that that was based — 
16 the price to do that was based on the amount of the 
17 sale price, plus certain fees and costs and stuff like 
18 that, right? 
19 A. Yeah. 
20 Q. And you received word that the total figure 
21 there was $16,000 and change, as you've been saying. 
22 You were aware of that, weren't you? 
23 A. Yeah. 
24 Q. And yet you elected to sign the assignment 
25 so that Ms. Rachele did the redemption; is that your 
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test, imonv * 
A* Yes, 
Q. And you did that based on your attorney's 
recommendation to you? 
A* Yes 
Q. And did you recall the restraining order 
issued back In'September about you not transferring 
MR. YOUNG: Object! i— fa. i s r,o: in 
evidence , "r.*- . r it-; I. ? :u - ^l 3 .-. 
THE COURT: - -\> — ^anguage has 
become crA - . --1 "0 r xx 
i , language that appears L,I trie order, 
35 apposed Uw w language which you may feel is rhe 
eqi 1 1 Vd ! W.1H 
Q, BY MR. SCHINDLER: " Oi- wei:« iwar-i ',naf" „ ou 
were restrained and enjoined from taking any action 
u '"^ nvfty or pledge any of the real property awarded 
to you in trie suppleme # 
Mr. Brockbank? 
A. Yes. 
"0- ' - 5::.er, the 
assignment because your attorney i.z,
 ; ;: Lh.ii 
your t es t imony? 
5fes • 
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1 Q. Okay, and when you signed the assignment, 
2 Mr. Brockbank, were you even thinking about that 
3 restraining order that I just read to you? Did you 
4 give that any thought at all? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. You paid AT&T $1,000 under the stipulation/ 
7 did you not? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. You didn't? 
10 A. I paid them $2,000. 
11 Q. Okay. Where did you get that money? 
12 A. I have a cashier's check that shows that was 
13 paid. 
14 Q. Where did the funds come from that allowed 
15 you to obtain a cashier's check so that you could pay 
16 AT&T $2,000? 
17 A. Very difficultly through — 
18 Q. Through your work? 
19 A. It came from me. 
20 Q. Okay. You worked and produced income and 
21 then paid that; is that what you're telling me? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Okay. Do you claim a present interest in 
24 the property at 48 East, Mr. Brockbank? 
25 A. Do I claim a present interest? 
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Ves, sir. 
A. 1 cionM understand the legalities ?f -
C" We" ] my quest: - - - - , y 
intei; e.si i.w l„)ii,b property a East, Brockbank? 
As far as you're concerned c. j .; "is e any :ia^ Cw it 
or any interest .r 
MR * ' ection, calls for a legal 
conclusion Requires him to analyze the consequence 
of a sheriff's sale, the facr — ^f~ r * le went to 
Mrs. Brockbank that he si >,]]"- - ^  -* lis riaht-
edemption- I" don,p r think he understands that. I 
ion t think ne#l s competent --
THE COURT: Well, it d i ,so rrusea imesliun^ i 
•".o whetih'pr lie has VAine claim oil inheritance, as his 
father apparently kicked in some bucks. 1 don1" t know 
whether it raises that or not. 
MR. " ~"~*.:"M..EP : ftfte - your Honor, we're 
-jealina wi *- estate appraiser, He's Lived his 
whole life 
THE COURT: iJxn 'iwar^  nt I- h a 1 ''m Inn- on Hat-
ha n 1 ~ 
MR. YOUNG: He's also not mentally healthy 
right now. 
MP , SCHTNDLEP . W»:> I I , - • F, 
THE COURT, I hrive st *. concern as the Court. 
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1 Until and unless I see an absolute incomprehension, 
2 I'm not going to make any judgment. 
3 MR. SCHINDLER: Thank you. 
4 THE COURT: So again, I guess, you know, 
5 Mr. Brockbank, it is an answer that is accepted. If 
6 I do not understand the question, you may say, "I do 
7 not understand the question." If I don't know the 
8 answer, say, "I don't know the answer." If you just 
9 want them to rephrase the question so you can better 
10 understand it, ask them to rephrase it, but we need 
11 to have as full an answer as we possibly can. 
12 Now, again, I'm allowing Counsel specific 
13 authority to proceed with his inquiry with some 
14 specificity because of the nature of the claim made 
15 by your former wife. 
16 THE WITNESS: What was the question? 
17 Q. BY MR. SCHINDLER: Whether you claim an 
18 interest in the property at 48 East. 
19 A. I guess not. 
20 Q. You have no interest in the property at 
21 48 East; is that your testimony? 
22 A. As far as I understand, it was like in 
23 Penny's case, she had the property and somebody else 
24 now has that interest. I don't understand any more 
25 than that. 
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YOUNG: Objection askr-i ana answered. 
Mr SCHINDLER: a/*;. sorr\ j. don 
-ue ail*. * 
,] MTxir. ^ . a n s w e r -•-- : quote, 
guess not ," unquote. 
CHINDLER: I . J i l ess r i o t . . a 
Brockbank? 
11T don't know." 
ior f * know, 
icier s tand — 
^ « / for things you don't have an 
n t e r e s t in , Brockbank? 
A. I guess i f " s ,« "ni /# 
Q. All right. --We'll Cake it as an *l don't 
know." Do you pay for things you don't have an 
interest ir •* Brockbank? 
1 . ention, argumentative. 
Q. BY MR. SCHINDLER: Who made payment on the 
property the first part of this month, m . • bank'1 
A. Which property? 
Q. The property at 48 East. 
A. Who made the payment? 
Q. Yes, sir. 
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1 A. Cheryl made the payment. 
2 Q. Out of what account? 
3 A. Out of JLB Rentals. 
4 Q. And that's your account; is it not? 
5 A. That is correct. 
6 Q. Let me hand you Exhibit 18, if I may. Thank 
7 you. Is that a copy of the check, Mr. Brockbank? 
8 A. Yes, it is. 
9 Q. Now, after a redemption there were some 
10 payments due to the mortgage holder. You understand 
11 that, don't you? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Did the payments for the mortgage holder 
14 come out of that same account? 
15 A. Yes, they did. 
16 Q. And that's your account, isn't it? 
17 A. Yes, it is. 
18 MR. SCHINDLER: I think that's all. 
19 THE COURT: Any redirect? 
20 MR. YOUNG: Just very briefly, your Honor. 
21 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
22 BY MR. YOUNG: 
23 Q. Mr. Schindler's first question to you 
24 related to the amount of attorney's fees which you 
25 have paid. Have you paid any significant attorney's 
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fees at all since we started this in September of *95? 
MR. SCHINDLER: Object to the form of the 
3 I question. The determination of "significant" has a 
4 | very — 
5 I THE COURT: Yeah. Could you rephrase. 
6 I significant is a very — 
7 | Q. BY MR. YOUNG: What amounts have you paid to 
8 I my office for attorney's fees since you retained me 
9 in September of *95? Your best guess as to the total 
10 amount that you have paid? Not the transcripts for 
11 trial, but just attorney's fees. 
12 A. Less than $500. 
13 Q. Okay. Now, Mr. Schindler asked you about 
14 the prescriptions that you have had now and during the 
15 course of the marriage. Is the depression from which 
16 you suffer now different than what you were suffering 
17 at the time of your marriage? 
18 MR. SCHINDLER: Objection, your Honor. I 
19 think that calls for something that he can't testify 
20 to. That's a medical question. 
21 MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, I'm just following up 
22 on his question on direct. 
23 MR. SCHINDLER: Maybe so, but I object to 
24 foundation. There's not sufficient foundation for him 
25 to ~ake that — 
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1 THE COURT: Sustained. 
2 Q. BY MR. YOUNG: Mr. Brockbank, did you visit 
3 your psychologists or medical doctors at the time you 
4 were married to Mrs. Brockbank? 
5 A. Yes, I did. 
6 Q. Did you come to an understanding of whether 
7 or not you were depressed? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. After the divorce and since the divorce and 
10 separation have you consulted with medical doctors 
11 with respect to your depression? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. And in your view, how do you feel now as 
14 compared to then? 
15 MR. SCHINDLER: Same objection, your Honor. 
16 MR. YOUNG: I just asked him how he felt. 
17 THE COURT: I'm going to allow it. 
18 MR. SCHINDLER: How he felt? How he feels? 
19 Then I'd ask that his answer be limited to how he 
20 feels. 
21 THE COURT: How he feels now as compared to 
22 then? 
23 MR. YOUNG: Righ t . 
24 THE WITNESS: I 'm c o n s i d e r a b l y worse . 
25 MR. SCHINDLER: Objec t ion and ask t h a t i t be 
-161-
1 stricken. That's not responsive. "I'm considerably 
2 worse" is not how he feels. I can feel depressed, I 
3 can feel happy. 
4 THE COURT: I can feel considerably worse. 
5 MR. SCHINDLER: I don't think that — that's 
6 a description as opposed to a — 
7 THE COURT: I'm going to allow him to finish 
8 the sentence. Then you can make your objection. 
9 You're considerably worse — 
10 THE WITNESS: I'm considerably worse, because 
11 I cannot concentrate. I suffer from memory loss. I 
12 have times when I feel like committing suicide, and I 
13 never felt that way during the marriage period. 
14 Q. BY MR. YOUNG: Now, just prior to the time of 
15 separation did you have a large contract with Carbon 
16 County? 
17 A. Yes, I did. 
18 Q. Were you able to concentrate and perform 
19 those functions then? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. How are you doing right now, as we sit here 
22 in this courtroom right now? 
23 A. We're not getting by. 
24 Q. You're having difficulty getting — 
25 A. We're not making our payments. 
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Q . Now, how are you doing today? Are you 
having difficulty understanding my questions today? 
A. Yes, I am. 
MR. YOUNG: That's all I have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything on those matters? 
MR. SCHINDLER: No. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Brockbank. You 
may step down. Any other witnesses, Mr. Young? 
MR. YOUNG: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Mr. Young, I'm looking at the 
memorandum opposing nullification of assignment, which 
you have given to the Court. Attached to that are a 
number of cases. In addition to that, there was a 
note for the Court, and I believe they're the same 
pages, aren't they? 
MR. YOUNG: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Oh, they're additional suits, the 
ones that are in the — 
MR. YOUNG: What happened, your Honor, the 
first cases that are attached that are with the 
dividers, those were the cases that did not appear in 
the Pacific Reporter, and I thought that it would — 
you know, the Court would have ready access to the 
cases that I citec that were in the Pacific Reporter, 
but on second thought, I decided I'd go back and make 
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OPINION 
JUDITH M BILLINGS, Judge 
This appeal arises from a garnishment proceeding filed by appellant Territorial Savings & 
Loan Association ("TSL") to enforce a deficiency judgment against respondent John N Baird 
The parties cross-motioned for summary judgment The tnal court granted Baird's motion and 
denied TSL's motion TSL appeals from this order, claiming the tnal court erred in concluding as 
a .natter of law, that Baird's conveyance of real estate into an irrevocable trust was not void under 
.a-ious provisions of the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act 1 We affirm in part, and reverse and 
'enand in part 
FACTS 
Since this case was disposed of on a motion for summary judgment, we review the facts and 
mierences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to TSL See, e.g., Hardy v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Amen, 763 P2d 761, 763 (Utah 1988), Guardian State Bank v. 
Humpherjs. 762 P 2d 1084, 1086 (Utah 1988) In May 1983, TSL loaned $325,000 to John 
Baird and his wife The loan was secured by a second mortgage on the Bairds' Hawaii residence 
Tile Bairds defaulted on the loan in September 1984 TSL completed foreclosure proceedings, 
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applied the sale proceeds to pay the first mortgage and foreclosure expenses, and obtained a 
deficiency judgment against Baird in the amount of $237,174 79 in June 1986. 
On June 22, 1984, approximately two months before the Bairds defaulted on the TSL loan, 
Baird created the KOA Irrevocable Trust ("trust"), and designated his son, John Knapp Baird, as 
trustee Baird conveyed one of his only remaining valuable assets, the Meadowview Convalescent 
Center ("Meadowview")^ to the trust. At the time of the conveyance, Meadowview was valued 
at approximately $1.7 million but was encumbered by $1.2 million in mortgage debt. 
Meadowview was operated by an independent lessee under a ten-year lease. The lessee paid Baird 
monthly payments in excess of $16,000. The leasehold was also conveyed to the trust. 
Contemporaneously with creating the trust, Baird directed the trustee to issue $166,000 in 
promissory notes from the trust to Baird, his wife, and his children 
In exchange for the property and lease agreement, the trust assumed the following obligations: 
.. Mortgages on Meadowview $1,225,000.00 
Z . Notes to non-family creditors 245,467,93 
:. \*ctes to family creditors 136,250.00 
4. Note payable to Baird 30,000.00 
excluding interest) $1,636,717.93 
Two of the notes to non-family creditors were also apparently executed contemporaneously 
witli the creation of the trust. The notes to Baird's family and non-family creditors allegedly 
represented antecedent debts and past services performed. The trust has paid approximately 
S28.000 to Baird personally, and $12,000 to his wife and children since the trust was created. No 
payments have been made to the non-family creditors. 
Although the property was conveyed to the trust in 1984, Meadowview continued to make 
lea e^ payments to Baird directly until 1986. Moreover, Baird has made personal payments on 
se\eral of the obligations purportedly assumed by the trust. The trustee has maintained no record 
or these payments or of the trust's resulting obligations to Baird 3 The trust has never filed a state 
or federal income tax return. 
After TSL obtained the Hawaii deficiency judgment against the Bairds, it conducted a search 
for the Bairds' assets but found none sufficient to satisfy its judgment other than Meadowview and 
the related lease. Accordingly, TSL filed its deficiency judgment in Salt Lake County, and served 
a '.\nt of garnishment on the nursing facility lessee to garnish the lease payments owed by the 
lessee to Baird. The lessee answered that Baird's interest in the lease had been assigned to the 
KOA Trust TSL then served a writ of garnishment on the trustee to garnish the lease payments 
and any other sums owed by the trust to Baird. The trustee answered that the trust owed Baird 
onl\ S2.000 TSL commenced these proceedings by filing a reply to the trustee's answer alleging 
mat Bairds conveyance of the nursing facility and lease into the trust was void under several 
?:o\ isions of the Utah Fraudulent Convevances Act 
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Following extensive discovery, both TSL and the trustee moved for summary judgment. The 
district court denied TSL's motion and granted the trustee's motion. TSL appeals from this order, 
claiming the district court erred in concluding as a matter of law, (1) that the conveyance was not 
void under Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-11; and (2) that there are no genuine issues of material fact 
concerning whether the conveyance was constructively fraudulent under Utah Code Ann. § 
25-1-4, or actually fraudulent under Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-1-7, -8, and that (3) the district court 
erred in imposing a clear and convincing standard of proof under Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-11, and 
in failing to properly apportion the parties' respective burdens of proof 
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD 
Prior to oral argument, TSL moved to supplement the record claiming it had inadvertently 
failed to include John Baird's deposition in the record filed on appeal. Baird responded that not 
only had TSL failed to file the deposition on appeal, but that TSL also did not file it with the trial 
court in conjunction with TSL's motion for summary judgment. Thus, the trial court did not have 
John Baird's deposition before it when it granted the trustee summary judgment. Evidence not 
available to the trial judge cannot be added to the record on appeal, Conder v. A.L. Williams & 
Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 635-36 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), and thus we deny TSL's motion to 
supplement. Accordingly, we consider only facts properly before the trial court, notwithstanding 
that both parties to this action repeatedly cite to Baird's deposition in their appellate briefs. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the undisputed material facts before the trial court 
demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(c); Guardian State Bank v. Humpherys, 762 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Utah 1988). In 
reviewing a summary judgment, we afford no deference to a trial court's conclusions of law but 
review them for correctness. See, e,g., Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988) 
In granting summary judgment, a trial court must not weigh or resolve4 disputed evidence. 
See, e.g., Hardy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 763 P 2d 761, 765 (Utah 1988); W.M. 
Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981) M[T]he sole inquiry 
to be determined by the trial court] is whether there is a material issue of fact to be decided.''^  
Furthermore, M[c]ross-motions for summary judgment do not dissipate factual issues, even though 
both parties contend for the purposes of their motions that they are entitled to prevail because 
there are no material issues of fact." Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Assocs., 635 P 2d 53, 55 
(Utah 1981). 
With the foregoing principles in mind, we review TSL's claim that there are material issues of 
fact concerning whether the conveyance into the trust was void under the Utah Fraudulent 
Conveyances Act 
TRUST FOR GRANTOR VOID--Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-11 
We first address whether the trial court correctly concluded as a matter of law, that the 
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conveyance was not void under Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-11. Section 25-1-11 provides, with our 
emphasis: 
All deeds, gifts, conveyances, transfers or assignments, verbal or written, of goods, chattels, 
or things in action made in trust for the use of the person making the same shall be void as 
against the existing or subsequent creditors of such person. 
There are no reported Utah decisions defining the term Tor the use of as it appears in § 
25-1-11. However, the Utah Supreme Court has declared that the underlying purpose of § 
25-1-11 is to prevent debtors from using trusts as a device to place their property beyond the 
reach of their creditors' just claims, while simultaneously retaining and enjoying virtually all the 
advantages of ownership. Leach v. Anderson, 535 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1975). The relevant 
inquiry for purposes of § 25-1-11 is not how much the grantor actually receives from the trust, 
but "what [he or] she has a right to take under its terms during [his or] her lifetime...." Id. In 
Leach, the grantor created a spendthrift trust and by the express terms of the trust provided, 
among other things, that it would: 
1. "pay to or for the benefit of the grantor" the necessary income to maintain the grantor's 
reasonable standard of living and to maintain her home; 
2. purchase a new car every two or three years at the grantor's request; and 
3. provide the necessary income for the grantor and a companion to vacation... 
Id. at 1242. The terms of the trust in also permitted the grantor to direct and control the 
operation of the trust assets. The trust in Leach clearly transgressed the provisions of § 25-1-11, 
as the Utah court aptly noted, Hthe entire trust res, income and principal, [was] committed to 
maintain [the grantor] in her standard of living and adjuncts thereto." Id. at 1243-44. 
Similarly, other jurisdictions considering analogous, if not identical, statutes invalidating a 
trust created for the use and benefit of the grantor have stated that the primary focus is whether 
the grantor has effectively insulated his or her assets against creditors1 lawful claims, while 
retaining all the advantages of ownership. *> Moreover, in all of the cases considered, it was clear 
that the grantor retained significant control over the trust assets and, in most, reserved the right to 
the trust income over the grantor's lifetime, While simultaneously insulating the income from his or 
her creditors. 
TSL contends it is entitled to summary judgment on its claim under § 25-1-11 because there 
are no genuine issues of material fact concerning the use and benefits reserved by Baird under the 
trust, claiming: 1) The trust assumed Baird's liability for the first and second mortgages on the 
nursing facility; 2) the trust assumed Baird's liability on purported debts owed to Baird's family 
and friends, 3) the trust executed a $30,000 promissory note payable to Baird, of which $28,000 
has been paid, 4) Baird is entitled to cash reimbursements from the trust for all payments he 
makes on the debts to family and friends, a potential benefit in excess of $500,000, and 5) Baird is 
relieved from paying the debts to all creditors not listed in the trust agreement because, having 
safely conveyed away his last valuable asset, he is now judgment and collection proof. 
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Baird, on the other hand, asserts the trial court properly dismissed TSL's claim under § 
25-1-11 because these facts do not establish that Baird retained the type of benefits contemplated 
by the statute We agree 
Unlike the trust invalidated in Leach, Baird has not reserved any power of revocation or 
control over the trust. The express terms of the trust divest Baird of ownership and control over 
Meadowview and its income, and give full ownership and control to the trustee. The trustee has 
no authority to pay Baird trust income for his personal needs When all the debts are satisfied, the 
trustee is obligated to distribute the income only to Baird's children It is true that Baird received a 
S30,000 note in exchange for conveying the property to the trust However, the $30,000 was not 
insulated from his creditors. Had the garnishment been in place at the time of the exchange, TSL 
would have been entitled to the proceeds paid to Baird Any compensation Baird is entitled to in 
the future to reimburse him for payments to his creditors, is similarly subject to his creditor's 
lawful claims 
Thus, we agree with Baird that the "benefits'1 alleged by TSL do not constitute the type of 
reserved interests contemplated and prohibited by the statute Accordingly, we hold there are no 
genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the benefits retained by Baird under the trust 
agreement were for his use and benefit and affirm the tnal court's summary judgment dismissing 
rSL's claim under § 25-1-11.7 
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD-Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-4 
We next address TSL's claim that there are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether 
Baird's conveyance was constructively fraudulent under Utah Code Ann § 25-1-4. Section 25-1-4 
provides 
E\ery conveyance made, and every obligation incurred, by a person who is, or will be thereby 
rendered, insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors, without regard to his actual intent, if the 
com evance is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair consideration 
To prevail under this section, TSL bears the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing 
eudence8 that 1) TSL was a creditor, 2) Baird was insolvent or rendered insolvent by the 
con\e\ance, and 3) the conveyance was made without fair consideration See, e,g., Furniture 
Mfrs. Sales, Inc. v. Deamer, 680 P 2d 398, 399 (Utah 1984), Meyer v. General Amer. Corp., 
5P° P 2d 1094, 1096 (Utah 1977) If the undisputed facts clearly demonstrate that TSL could not, 
anaer an\ circumstances, meet one of the foregoing elements, the tnal court's summary judgment 
dismissing the constructive fraud claim was proper 
i Creditor Status 
For purposes of the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act, a creditor is defined as "a person 
naung an> claim, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or 
contingent " Utah Code Ann § 25-1-1 It is undisputed that on May 27, 1983, Baird executed a 
promissory note to TSL evidencing a loan of S325,000 TSL foreclosed on the loan and obtained 
'
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a deficiency judgment in excess of $237,000. Based on the foregoing, we find as a matter of law, 
TSL was a creditor within the meaning of § 25-1-1 at the time of the conveyance. Cf. Furniture 
Manufacturers, 680 P 2d at 399; Meyer, 569 P 2d at 1096 
2 Insolvency 
The Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act defines insolvency as follows: 
A person is insolvent when the present fair salable value of his assets is less than the amount 
that will be required to satisfy his probable liability on his existing debts as they become absolute 
and matured. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-2. In Meyer, the Utah Supreme Court construed § 25-1-2 and stated: 
The level of insolvency necessary to meet the statute requirement is not insolvency in the 
bankruptcy sense but merely a showing that the party's assets are not sufficient to meet liabilities 
as they become due. 
569 P 2d at 1096. See also Furniture Manufacturers, 680 P 2d at 400 n.10 (insolvency is 
established by showing a negative net worth). 
TSL claims, and we agree, there are significant material issues of fact concerning whether 
Baird was insolvent either before or after he transferred the property into the trust. Baird claimed 
m his affidavit filed in support of his motion for summary judgment, that he had a positive net 
v\orth of over $1 million both before and after the date of the conveyance. However, TSL 
submitted comprehensive expert testimony asserting that Baird had overstated his assets and 
understated his liabilities. One of the most significant asset discrepancies is a speculative mining 
venture that Baird invested in as a tax shelter. Baird claimed the investment was worth over $1 
million TSL produced an affidavit from the chief geologist at the mine attesting that the incidence 
o\ gold in the mine was insignificant, and that extractions could not possibly be profitable. 
\ccordingly, TSL claims the mine was worth nothing 9 
Based on the foregoing, we find there are factual disputes as to Baird's solvency 
3 Fair Consideration 
Section 25-1-3 defines the "fair consideration" necessary to avoid a finding of constructive 
fraud under § 25-1-4 as follows: 
Fair consideration is given for property, or obligation 
1) when in exchange for such property, or obligation, as a fair equivalent therefor, and in good 
faith, property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied 
Thus, under the statute, fair consideration requires a fair equivalent exchange and that the 
conveyance was made in good faith. See also Meyer v. General Amer. Corp., 569 P 2d 1094, 
109b (Utah 1977) Presented another way, TSL can demonstrate that the conveyance lacked fair 
consideration if either, 1) a fair equivalent was not exchanged, or 2) the conveyance was not made 
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in good faith. 10 We conclude there are material issues of fact concerning both elements. 
a. Fair Equivalent 
Fair equivalent means msuch a price as a capable and diligent businessman could presently 
obtain for the property after conferring with those accustomed to buy such property.'" Meyer, 
569 P.2d at 1097 (quoting Utah Assets Corp. v. Dooley Bros. Assfn, 92 Utah 577, 70 P.2d 738, 
742 (1937)). Fair equivalent does not mean "exact equivalent" but rather the statute requires only 
that the consideration be fair. Utah Assets, 70 P.2d at 741 ("The qualifying term here is 'fair1 and 
implies some modification of the term 'equivalent.1"). 
As noted earlier in this opinion, the trust assumed approximately $1.2 million in mortgage 
debt and $400,000 in unsecured antecedent debt in exchange for property valued at approximately 
$1.7 million. The trial court concluded that the foregoing constituted fair consideration as a 
matter of law, stating: 
The documents on file herein show that there is no genuine issue concerning the fact that the 
KOA Irrevocable Trust gave, and John N. Baird received, a full and fair consideration in exchange 
for the real property transferred into the Trust. 
TSL claims that the agreement by the trustee to pay off the encumbrances on the property is 
not regarded as valuable consideration as against Baird's creditors. Additionally, TSL argues there 
are material factual issues concerning whether the debts assumed by the trust were bona fide. We 
address each of these arguments separately. 
As a general proposition, the assumption of mortgage debt in exchange for the conveyance of 
property constitutes a fair equivalent "where the value of the land and the amount of the mortgage 
are substantially equal. " ^ However, in cases where the value of the property conveyed exceeds 
the amount of its encumbrances, a creditor may challenge the conveyance for want of adequate 
consideration due to the disparity. See, e.g., Peterson v. Wilson, 88 Cal. App. 2d 617, 199 P.2d 
757,763(1948). 
Disparity between the amount of the mortgage and the value of the property is a factor which 
will arouse the suspicion of the court... and where the disparity is so great as to be inequitable it 
will be set aside. How great the disparity must be to accomplish this result it is difficult to state, 
the question being one of degree. 12 
It is undisputed that at the time of the conveyance, Baird's equity in the nursing facility was 
worth approximately $500,000. Accordingly, the very narrow issue presented on appeal is 
whether the trial court correctly concluded that the antecedent debts assumed by the trust 
constituted the fair equivalent for Baird's $500,000 equity in Meadowview as a matter of law. 
Both parties agree that the trust's assumption of Baird's antecedent debts constituted valuable 
consideration for the conveyance of Meadowview so long as the debts were genuine and bona 
fide.^ However, Baird claims TSL did not challenge the bona fide nature of the debts in the 
proceedings below, and is, therefore, precluded from challenging them on appeal. 
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Conversely, TSL claims its memorandum opposing the trustee's motion for summary 
judgment cited portions of the record raising an issue of fact concerning whether the debts were 
bona fide. After reviewing TSUs memorandum and those portions of the record referred to 
therein, we are persuaded, although it was a very close call, that TSL sufficiently disputed the 
legitimacy of the antecedent debts assumed by the trust in the proceedings below. The 
memorandum alleges, among other things, that the notes to the family creditors were executed 
contemporaneously with the creation of the trust, and prior to that time, there was no 
documentation of the claimed family debts and services; all monies from the trust have gone to 
Baird and his family creditors, and non-family creditors have received no payments; and although 
Baird is authorized to receive reimbursement from the trust for payments he makes on the 
non-mortgage debts, the trustee keeps no record of those payments or the resulting obligation to 
Baird. In fact, the trustee testified that he has no idea how much is owing on the various 
obligations. The record also indicates that several of the non-family notes were also executed 
contemporaneously with the creation of the trust. 
Not only do we find that TSL sufficiently raised the issue, but based on the foregoing, we also 
conclude that TSL's allegations demonstrate that there are material issues of fact concerning 
whether the debts assumed by the trust were genuine and bona fide. CI. Zuniga v. Evans, 87 
Utah 198, 48 P.2d 513, 518-20 (1935); Paxton v, Paxton, 80 Utah 540, 15 P.2d 1051, 1056 
(1932). Accordingly, we hold the trial court erred in concluding the debts assumed by the trust 
were bona fide and thus a fair equivalent as a matter of law. 
In the alternative, Baird claims even if the antecedent debts are not considered toward the 
purchase price, the mortgages alone equal eighty percent of the value of the nursing facility and 
constitute a fair equivalent as a matter of law. We are not persuaded by Baird's argument. Baird 
conveyed $500,000 in excess equity to the trust and we are not prepared to declare that an 
exchange of $1.2 million in mortgage debt for property valued at $1.7 million is a fair equivalent 
as a matter of law. Ordinarily, fairness is an issue of fact and should be resolved, only after the 
fact finder has had the opportunity to hear testimony and review the evidence. *4 
b. Good Faith 
As we discussed earlier, under Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-3, fair consideration requires both a 
fair equivalent, and a good faith conveyance. We find there are also genuine issues of fact 
concerning whether the good faith element was satisfied. 
Although the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act does not define "good faith," the term is 
defined elsewhere in the Utah Code as "honesty in feet in the conduct or transaction concerned." 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(19) (1989) (Utah Uniform Commercial Code). In the context of 
fraudulent conveyances, other courts considering whether a conveyance was made in good faith, 
have examined the subjective beliefs and intentions of both the transferor and transferee 
concerning the propriety of the activities, and their knowledge that the result would take 
unconscionable advantage of others. ^ 
TSL asserted multiple facts that could support a finding that the transfer lacked good faith. 
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For instance, TSL claims Baird conveyed his only valuable asset into a trust controlled by his 
son,16 both Baird and his son ignored the trust for several years, the trustee has kept no records 
of Baird's payments to secured and unsecured creditors, and the trust was insolvent from its 
inception. Moreover, there is evidence in the record that Baird's son knew of pending litigation 
and of Baird's financial difficulties at the time of the conveyance. 
As TSL notes in its reply brief, 
[Respondents cover seven pages of their brief attempting to refute all the indicia of bad faith 
present in this case. The attempt merely illustrates and confirms the sharp differences and how 
reasonable persons may view the same evidence. Clearly, the issue of good faith is both material 
and disputed. 
In sum, what constitutes good faith or fair equivalent under the fair consideration requirement 
is not susceptible to a bright-line test. Rather, it involves a subjective interpretation of all of the 
surrounding circumstances. Such an endeavor renders a fair consideration determination generally 
a jury question. Accordingly, we find there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the 
conveyance was constructively fraudulent under Utah Code Ann § 25-1-4, and thus reverse the 
trial court's order in this respect. 
ACTUAL FRAUD-Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-1-7, -8 
As a preliminary matter, Baird claims TSL did not raise this theory below, and therefore 
cannot now raise the actual fraud theory on appeal. TSL, on the other hand, claims its reply to the 
answer of garnishee, John Knapp Baird, specifically alleged that the conveyance of the nursing 
facility to the trust "was a fraudulent conveyance and voided by the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances 
Act-Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-1-1 et seq." without limitation as to particular sections within the 
Act Furthermore, TSL moved for summary judgment "on all issues raised in its reply." 
The trial court's summary judgment order provides in relevant part: 
Plaintiff claimed that the conveyance was in violation of the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances 
Act in that allegedly: 
Various badges of fraud existed in connection with the trust and the conveyance into trust; 
The conveyance into trust was actually fraudulent (intentionally)... 
The trial court's summary judgment order concluded 
The established facts fail to establish the necessary elements of the claims that the subject 
transfer into trust was fraudulent. 
Accordingly, based on the record before us, we conclude TSL's actual fraud claim was raised 
below, and therefore adequately preserved for this appeal. ^ 
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Addressing the merits of TSL's claim, Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-7 provides: 
Every conveyance made, and every obligation incurred, with actual intent, as distinguished 
from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay or defraud either present or future creditors is 
fraudulent as to both present and future creditors. 
Similarly, § 25-1-8 provides: 
Every conveyance or assignment, in writing or otherwise, of any estate or interest in lands,... 
or of rents or profits issuing therefrom,... made with the intent to delay, hinder or defraud 
creditors, or other persons, of their lawful suits, damages, forfeitures, debts or demands,... shall be 
void 
Actual fraud is never presumed, but instead must be established by clear and convincing 
evidence ^ Fraudulent intent is ordinarily considered a question of fact, 19 and "may be inferred 
from the presence of certain indicia of fraud or badges of fraud.M|20 
" [Badges of fraud] are said to be facts which throw suspicion on a transaction, and which call 
for an explanation... More simply stated, they are signs or marks of fraud. They do not of 
themselves or per se constitute fraud, but they are facts having a tendency to show the existence 
of fraud, although their value as evidence is relative not absolute. They are not usually conclusive 
proof; they are open to explanation. They may be almost conclusive, or they may furnish merely a 
reasonable inference of fraud, according to the weight to which they may be entitled from their 
intrinsic character and the special circumstances attending the case. Often a single one of them 
may establish and stamp a transaction as fraudulent...M21 
The generally recognized badges of fraud are the lack of consideration for the conveyance, the 
transfer of the debtor's entire estate, relationship between transferor and the transferee, the 
pendency or threat of litigation, secrecy or hurried transaction, insolvency or indebtedness of the 
transferor, departure from the usual method of business, the retention by the debtor of possession 
of the property, and the reservation of benefit to the transferor 22 
However, ,H[t]he facts which are recognized indicia of fraud are numerous, and no court could 
pretend to anticipate or catalog them all."1 Koch, 716 P.2d at 184 (quoting 37 Am. Jur. 2d 
Fraudulent Conveyances § 10 (1968)). 
In light of the foregoing, we find that, based on facts set forth throughout this opinion, there 
are genuine issues of material fact as to multiple badges of fraud rendering the trial court's 
summary judgment inappropriate.23 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we affirm the trial court's order insofar as it dismisses TSL's claim under § 
25-1-11 There are no material issues of fact concerning whether Baird created the trust for his 
use and benefit under the narrow meaning of the statute and accordingly, he is entitled to 
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judgment as a matter of law. We further hold that there are material issues of fact precluding 
summary judgment in favor of Baird under § 25-1-4 including whether, 1) Baird was insolvent 
either before or after the conveyance, 2) Baird received the fair equivalent for conveying 
approximately $500,000 worth of equity into the trust, and 3) whether the conveyance was made 
in good faith. There are also material issues of fact precluding judgment under §§ 25-1-7, and -8. 
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court's summary judgment dismissing the 
constructive and actual fraud claims under §§ 25-1-4 and -7, -8 respectively, and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with our opinion. 
OPINION FOOTNOTES 
1 Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-1-1 to -16 (1984) (repealed by 1988 Utah Laws, ch. 59, § 16). For current 
comparable provisions, Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-1 to -13 (1988), Utah's Fraudulent Transfer Act. All 
references to the Fraudulent Conveyances Act throughout this opinion are to the 1987 version, as 
amended. 
2 This facility is presently operating as the Glenwood Convalescent Center. 
3 One provision in the trust agreement expressly provides that the trust was to reimburse Baird for 
any payments he made on the obligations assumed by the trust. 
4 Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988), wherein the court wrote, "[w]e note at the 
outset that a challenge to a summary judgment presents for review conclusions of law only because, by 
definition, summary judgments do not resolve factual disputes." 
5 W.M. Barnes, 627 P.2d at 59. The trial court's summary judgment order stated, with our emphasis, 
"[TSL] has a burden of supporting its contentions by clear and convincing evidence (burden) and 
the established facts show that [TSL] is unable to do so...." 
If the trial court had relied on the foregoing statement for the purpose of concluding that TSL was 
entitled to summary judgment on its claims, the statements concerning burden of persuasion were 
appropriate. However, in reviewing the trial courts entire order, it appears that the trial judge improperly 
relied on the proposition as the basis for granting Baird's motion for summary judgment. This was error, 
as it is well settled that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment need not "prove" its theory or 
theories, but rather it need only establish facts that "create a genuine issue of material fact." See, e.g., 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42,47 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
6 See, e.g., Arizona Bank v. Morris, 6 Ariz. App. 566,435 P.2d 73, 74 (1967), modified, 7 Ariz. App. 
107, 436 P.2d 499 (1968); In re Camm's Estate, 76 Cal. App. 2d 104,172 P.2d 547, 551 (1946); Herd v. 
Chambers, 158 Kan. 614, 149 P.2d 583, 589 (1944). Gross v. Douglass State Bank, 261 F. Supp. 
1002, 1006 (D. Kan. 1965); Morton v. Morton, 394 Pa. 402, 147 A.2d 150, 151-52 (1959); Glass v. 
Carpenter, 330 S.W.2d 530, 533-34 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). 
7 As one of its principal arguments on appeal, TSL claims the trial court incorrectly imposed a clear 
and convincing standard of proof under § 25-1-11. We agree that the appropriate burden under § 25-1-11 
is preponderance of the evidence. Leach, 535 P.2d at 1243. However, since we find that the trust was 
not for Baird's use and benefit as contemplated by the statute, we find the trial court's error harmless. 
8 As discussed earlier, one of TSL's arguments on appeal is that the trial court erred in apportioning 
the parties' respective burdens of proof. TSL claims that under § 25-1-4, the initial burden of proof lies 
with the moving party to make a prima facie showing of (1) creditor status, (2) insolvency, and (3) lack of 
consideration. TSL argues that once this is done, the defendant then has the burden of going forward 
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with evidence to rebut the moving party's evidence. TSL mistakenly relies on Brimhall v. Grow, 25 Utah 
2d 298, 480 P.2d 731, 734 (1971), which involved § 25-1-8. However, we concede there is some 
confusion in Utah authority concerning the applicable burdens of proof. For a full discussion, in re 
Grooms, 13 Bankr. 376, 377-84 (D. Utah 1981). Nonetheless, we find that the more recent decisions 
clearly state that a creditor must prove ail three elements by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., 
Furniture Mfrs. Sales, Inc. v. Deamer, 680 P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 1984); Nelson v. Nelson, 30 Utah 2d 
80, 513 P.2d 1011,1013 (1973). 
9 In addition to the conflicting evidence concerning Baird's net worth, Baird candidly admits in his 
brief that there are issues of fact "left unresolved with respect to... Baird's insolvency." 
10 See also, e.g., United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 574 (D. Pa. 1983) (initial 
question of fair consideration determination is whether the transaction was made in good faith, second 
question is whether it was exchanged for a fair equivalent); Neal v. Clark, 75 Ariz. 91, 251 P.2d 903, 906 
(1952) (determining what constitutes "fair consideration" involves more than considering only the price 
received); Smith v. Whitman, 39 N.J. 397, 189 A.2d 15, 20 (1963) (there can be no fair consideration in 
the absence of good faith); Sparkman & McLean Co. v. Derber, 4 Wash. App. 341, 481 P.2d 565, 
589-91 (1971) (good faith is separate element of the fair consideration requirement). 
11 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraudulent Conveyances § 22 (1968). See also Annotation, Assumption of 
Mortgage as Consideration for Conveyance Attacked as in Fraud of Creditors; 6 A.L.R.2d 270, 272 
(1949). 
12 Annotation, supra note 9, at 274. 
13 See, e.g., Boccatero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063, 1067 (1942); Matusik v. Large, 85 
Nev. 202, 452 P.2d 457, 460 (1969). See generally Given v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959, 
963 (1960); Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540,15 P.2d 1051,1056 (1932). 
14 See, e.g., Kielb v. Johnson, 23 N.J. 60, 127 A.2d 561, 564 (1956) (fairness is a question of fact). 
We emphasize that whether a fair equivalent was exchanged is ordinarily a factual determination. There 
may be, on occasion, instances where it is clear that a fair equivalent was exchanged. However, this 
case is not such an occasion. 
15 See generally In re Independent Clearing House Co., 77 Bankr. 843, 868 (D. Utah 1987); United 
States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 574 (D. Pa. 1983); Smith v. Whitman, 39 N.J. 397, 
189 A.2d 15, 20 (1963). Comment, Good Faith and Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 495 
(1983). 
16 Although transactions between family members do not, by themselves, render a transaction 
fraudulent, Utah courts, nonetheless, have often declared that the transactions must be dosely 
scrutinized. See, e.g., Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 13 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962, 963 (1962); Givan 
v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959, 962 (1960); Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540, 15 P.2d 1051, 
1056(1932). 
17 Cf. Clark v. Second Circuit Court, 741 P.2d 956, 957 (Utah 1987) (issues deemed tried by 
consent of the parties); Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Wick Constr. Co., 680 P.2d 1100, 1103 n.1 (Ak. 
1984) (findings and conclusions demonstrate the issues were litigated); Quillin v. Hesston Corp., 230 
Kan. 591, 640 P.2d 1195, 1196 (1982) (issue was considered by trial court even though not specifically 
raised by the parties). 
18 See Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 P.2d 236, 239 (1974); In re Grooms, 13 Bankr. 376, 
379-83 (D. Utah 1981). Koch Eng'g Co. v. Faulconer, 239 Kan. 101, 716 P.2d 180, 185 (1986). Once 
again, as one of its principal arguments on appeal, TSL contends that the trial court improperly allocated 
the parties' respective burdens of proof. TSL claims that a plaintiff may create a presumption of 
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fraudulent intent by establishing the presence of badges of fraud. Once this occurs, TSL asserts that the 
defendant then bears the burden of proof to rebut such a presumption. Although it is arguably a matter of 
semantics, we find the more accurate terminology is that once a plaintiff establishes by circumstantial 
evidence or otherwise, an inference that the defendant harbored actual intent to defraud, the burden of 
coming forward with rebuttal evidence, not the burden of proof, shifts to the defendant. Compare Koch, 
716 P.2d at 186, with In re Grooms, 13 Bankr. at 383. 
19 See, e.g., Gabaig v. Gabaig, 717 P.2d 835, 838 (Ak. 1986); Grfford-Hill & Co. v. Stoller, 221 
Neb. 757, 380 N.W.2d 625,630 (1986) (provided by statute). 
20 Dahnken Inc. of Salt Lake City v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420, 423 (Utah 1986) (quoting Gh/an v. 
Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959, 962 (1960)). See also Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 
P.2d 1063,1065(1942). 
21 Montana Nafl Bank v. Micheis, 631 P.2d 1260. 1263 (Mont. 1981) (quoting Humbird v. Amet, 
99 Mont. 499, 44 P.2d 756, 761 (1935)). 
22 Id. (citing 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraudulent Conveyances § 10 at 701 (1968)). See also Gabaig v. 
Gabaig, 717 P.2d 835, 839 (Ak. 1986); Koch, 716 P.2d at 184; Morris v. Holland, 529 S.W.2d 948, 953 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Gifford-Hill & Co. v. Stolier, 221 Neb. 757, 380 N.W.2d 625,630 (1986). 
23 Cf. Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d 
685, 688 (1965); Conder v. A.L Williams & Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah a . App. 1987) (both 
cases reverse summary judgments in fraud cases on the basis of material issues of fact). 
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OPINION 
GREEN-WOOD, Judge 
W llham C Selvage and William C Selvage, Inc (collectively "Selvage") appeal the amount of 
a:torne\ fees awarded by the trial court against Sear-Brown Associates and The Sear-Brown 
Group. Inc (collectively "Sear-Brown"). Sear-Brown cross-appeals the trial court's order finding 
it liable to Selvage under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act and a common law theory of mere 
instrumentality We affirm in part and remand in part on the attorney fees issues 
BACKGROUND1 
In 198b. Selvage entered into an agreement with J J Johnson & Associates (MJohnson"), 
A herein they agreed that Selvage would sell his architectural business to Johnson The 
arrangement involved three separate written contracts, each of which provided for attorney fees. 
On April 7, 1987, Selvage filed an action against Johnson, alleging breach of all three contracts. 
On September 30, 1988, while the lawsuit was pending, Sear-Brown became Johnson's sole 
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shareholder, and on October 1, 1988, Johnson ceased to do business. Between October 1, 1988 
and February 1989, Sear-Brown transferred to itself all of Johnson's assets. On July 6, 1990, 
Sear-Brown caused Johnson to file a bankruptcy petition. 
On January 22, 1991, Selvage filed an Amended Complaint, contending for the first time that 
Sear-Brown was Johnson's alter ego, or, in the alternative, that H Sear-Brown has assumed the 
liabilities of J.J. Johnson and Associates or is otherwise responsible in law and fact for the 
liabilities of J.J. Johnson and Associates." In December 1992, Selvage filed a Second Amended 
Complaint, adding a mere instrumentality claim and claims under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act (U.F.T.A). Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-1 to -13. (1995). The complaint alleged liability 
pursuant to the U.F.T.A. under four theories. The first was that the transfers from Johnson were 
made to an insider, Sear-Brown, in violation of section 25-6-6(2). The three remaining claims 
were brought under section 25-6-5(1 )(a), alleging that the transfers were made with an intent to 
hinder, delay or defraud a creditor, namely Selvage. 
Before trial, Sear-Brown filed a motion for summary judgment contending, among other 
things, that Selvagefs insider transfer claim under the U.F.T.A. was barred by the one-year time 
limit in Utah Code Annotated section 25-6-10(3) (1995). The motion was denied. 
At trial, the attorney who, until that time, had. represented both Johnson and Sear-Brown, 
announced that he was no longer representing Johnson and would represent only Sear-Brown 
during the trial. At the end of Selvage's case, Sear-Brown moved for a directed verdict, again 
arguing the U.F.T.A.'s one-year time limit barred the insider transfer claim. The motion was 
denied. However, the trial court granted Selvage's motion for a directed verdict against Johnson 
on the grounds that Johnson had failed to appear and mount a defense. Accordingly, the jury 
returned special interrogatories finding Johnson liable to Selvage in the amount of $ 109,400.32, 
plus interest and costs. The jury also found by special interrogatory that Sear-Brown was liable to 
Selvage for the amounts owed to Selvage by Johnson under all of the U.F.T.A. claims and under 
the mere instrumentality theory. 
After trial, Selvage's attorney filed an affidavit with the court in support of Selvage's 
application for prejudgment interest and attorney fees. The affidavit attached billing records 
describing the services rendered, by whom they were rendered, and the billing rates. The affidavit 
stated that a reasonable attorney fee was $ 175,000. Sear-Brown did not contest the requested 
amount of attorney fees, nor the affidavit in support of the application for attorney fees. It did, 
however, contend that fees were recoverable only for the contract claims, and that because the 
affidavit did not allocate time among the various causes of action, no fees should be awarded. 
The trial court adopted the jury's findings and awarded Selvage judgment against Johnson for 
$ 191,644.60 in principal, costs and interest, and $ 42,500 in attorney fees. The trial court's award 
of attorney fees was founded upon the attorney fee provision in the three contracts between 
Selvage and Johnson. The trial court's findings of fact state the amount of the attorney fees award 
is based on "the amount in dispute, the complexity of the issues presented, the hourly rates 
charged by the plaintiffs' attorneys and the total evidence presented at trial." 
The trial court entered judgment for Selvage against Sear-Brown in the same amounts as it 
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awarded against Johnson. The trial court also concluded that Selvage's insider transfer claim was 
not time-barred by section 25-6-10(3) of the U.F.T.A. because of the discovery and relation back 
rules. 
Both parties appeal. Sear-Brown contends that the insider transfer claim was barred by the 
U.F.T.A.'s one-year time limit, and that this limit is a statute of repose and not a statute of 
limitation. It further argues that the evidence did not support the jury verdict under the intent to 
hinder, delay or defraud, and that it was error to conclude that Johnson was the mere 
instrumentality of Sear-Brown. 2 Selvage challenges the trial court's award of attorney fees, 
contending that: the award of $ 42,500 in attorney fees is inadequate; the trial court failed to enter 
sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law; and the trial court abused its discretion by foiling 
to grant an evidentiary hearing on the question of attorney fees. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the time limit for the insider transfer claim is a statute of repose or a statute of 
limitation is an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review for correctness as a question of 
law. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). The application of the time limit is also a 
question of law, reviewed for correctness. Gramlich v. Munsey, 838 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 
1992); McKean v. McBride, 884 P.2d 1314, 1316-17 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 
1231 (Utah 1995). 
Review of the jury's verdict, however, places a difficult burden on the challenging party. "To 
support a claim that the jury verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, an appellant must 
marshal all of the evidence that supports the findings and demonstrate that when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict, there is insufficient evidence to support it." Steenblik v. 
Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872, 277 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 17 (Utah 1995). Furthermore, all reasonable 
inferences are drawn in favor of the verdict, and if the evidence supports the verdict, we will 
affirm. Id. 
Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law, which is reviewed for 
correctness. See Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah App. 1992). Similarly, 
whether the trial court's findings of fact in support of an award of attorney fees are sufficient is 
also a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 459 (Utah 
App), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993) (citing State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 
(Utah 1991)). However, Hthe trial court has broad discretion in determining what constitutes a 
reasonable fee, and we will consider that determination against an abuse-of-discretion standard." 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P 2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988), Regional Sales Agency v. 
Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah App. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 830 P.2d 252 
(Utah 1992). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Timeliness of the Insider Transfer Claim 
Sear-Brown appeals the trial court's ruling that Selvage's insider transfer claim was not 
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time-barred At trial, the jury found Sear-Brown liable, in part, on the grounds that the transfer of 
Johnson's assets to Sear-Brown was an insider transfer The insider transfer claim was based upon 
section 25-6-6 (2) of the U.F T.A., which provides 
A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the 
transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor 
was insolvent at the time, and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor 
was insolvent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-6(2) (1995). The jury found, by special interrogatory, that Selvage 
had proved all of these elements at trial. However, this section is governed by the time limits 
section of the U.F T.A., section 25-6-10, which provides. 
A claim for relief or cause of action regarding a fraudulent transfer or obligation under 
this chapter is extinguished unless action is brought. 
(3) under Subsection 25-6-6(2), within one year after the transfer was made or 
the obligation was incurred. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-10 (1995). Sear-Brown argues that Selvage's insider transfer claim is 
time-barred by the one-year time limit in section 25-6-10(3) because it was not asserted until the 
Second .Amended Complaint, filed in December 1992, whereas the insider transfer was completed 
in Feoruary 1989 
The trial court ruled that, pursuant to the discovery and relation back doctrines, Selvage's 
msi Jer transfer claim was not barred by the one-year statute of limitation On appeal, Sear-Brown 
argues that the time limit in section 25-6-10(3) is a statute of repose, and that the discovery and 
relation back doctrines are not applicable to a statute of repose We disagree with the contention 
that section 25-6-10(3) is a statute of repose 
!n Utah, the determination of "whether a statute that bars or terminates a claim for relief is a 
statute oflimitations or a statute of repose depends on the nature of the statute and the manner in 
\\ hich it operates to cut off the legal right of a person to obtain a remedy for an injury M Stoker v. 
Workers' Compensation Fund, 889 P 2d 409, 411 (Utah 1994) Beginning with the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P 2d 670 (Utah 
! °S5), Utah courts have consistently followed the same test for determining whether a time limit 
LS a statute of repose or one of limitation Simply put, a statute of repose begins to run from a date 
or e\ent independent and unrelated to the date of legal injury By contrast, a statute of limitation 
' '
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does not begin to run until the cause of action has accrued. Id. at 672 ("A statute of repose bars 
all actions after a specified period of time has run from the occurrence of some event other than 
the occurrence of an injury that gives rise to a cause of action."), Raithaus v. Saab-Scandia of 
Am., Inc., 784 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah 1989) (finding Utah Product Liability Act "fits squarely 
within the precise definition of a statute of repose because the period of limitation begins to run 
from a date unrelated to an injury."), Middlestadt v. Industrial Comm'ii, 852 P.2d 1012, 1013 
(Utah App. 1993) (stating that "statute requiring filing within a set period following the accident 
is therefore a statute of limitation, not a statute of repose."); Avis v. Industrial Comm'n, 837 
P 2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993) (finding time limit for 
filing claim for compensation with industrial commission "is a statute of limitations because it runs 
from the date of injury, when the cause of action accrues, not from a point in time unrelated to 
when the cause of action arose."); Velarde v. Industrial Comm'n, 831 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah 
App. 1992) ("A statute of repose . . prevents suit a statutorily specified number of years after a 
particular event occurs, without regard to when the cause of action accrues"). 
Applying this test to section 25-6-10(3), we must therefore determine whether the time limit 
begins to run when the cause of action accrues, or is triggered by an event unrelated to the injury. 
Section 25-6-10(3) prohibits a claim under section 25-6-6 (2) unless it is brought "within one year 
after the transfer was made." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-10(3) (1995). The "transfer" referred to in 
section 25-6-10(3) is the same transfer which gives rise to a claim under section 25-6-6(2). 
Therefore, it is apparent that the two events—the commencement of the running of the section 
25-6-10(3) time limit, and the creation of the insider transfer claim—are, in fact, simultaneous. 
Because a claim under 25-6-6(2) does not accrue until the event causing the injury, the time limit 
in section 25-6-10(3) is a statute of limitation. 
Sear-Brown advances two additional arguments, neither of which changes the results of this 
analysis. First, Sear-Brown refers to the Comment to section 9 of the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act (Uniform Act), which notes that the purpose of section 9 "is to make clear that lapse 
of the statutory periods . . . bars the right and not merely the remedy " Unif Fraudulent Transfer 
Act § 9 cmt. 1, 7A U.L.A. 665-66 (1985). Sear-Brown contends that because the comment 
speaks of barring a right, and not just a remedy, it indicates that the time limit was intended to act 
as a statute of repose. This, however, is a purely semantic argument. The Utah Supreme Court 
has acknowledged the small weight accorded to semantic distinctions in this area, noting that 
'references to 'statutes of limitations1 in cited material should not confuse the reader since many 
courts and commentators do not distinguish between statutes of limitations and repose." Sun 
Valley Water Beds v. Hughes & Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188, 189 n.5 (Utah 1989), cf. Berry, 717 
P 2d at 679 (rejecting argument that statute of repose does not abrogate claim, but only defines 
time during which the claim exists, because "constitutional protection cannot be evaded by the 
semantic argument that a cause of action is not cut off but only defined to exist for a specified 
period of time"). Similarly, we do not believe this single reference in the commentary to the 
Uniform Act, without further clarifying explanation, undermines the validity of the 
well-established and consistently-applied distinction between statutes of limitation and repose 
discussed above.5 Furthermore, the fact that a time limit acts to bar a suit does not transform that 
statute into one of repose-were this the case, all statutes of limitation could also be interpreted as 
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statutes of repose. Accordingly, the commentary to the Uniform Act does not persuade us that 
section 25-6-10(3) is a statute of repose. 
Second, Sear-Brown argues that even if the time limit in section 25-6-10(3) is a statute of 
limitation, the discovery rule still does not apply. 4 Sear-Brown argues that because section 
25-6-10(1) contains an explicit discovery rule,^ and the other two sections of the time limits 
statute do not, the legislature implicitly meant to preclude the application of the discovery rule to 
claims brought under subsections (2) or (3). However, as the Utah Supreme Court noted in 
Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990), a statutory discovery rule is only one rationale 
for invoking the discovery rule. Id. at 872. The discovery rule also applies in situations where 
"there is proof of concealment or misleading by the defendant" or where "application of the 
general statute of limitation rule would be irrational or unjust." Id. Accordingly, the trial court 
could properly have applied the discovery rule in the absence of statutory authority to do so. 
On appeal, Sear-Brown does not challenge the trial court's application of the discovery rule on 
either of the alternate grounds given in Klinger. Instead, Sear-Brown contends that Selvage 
should have been on notice of the facts giving rise to the insider transfer claim in October 1991, 
when Sear-Brown produced certain documents which provided the basis for the insider preference 
claims at trial. Sear-Brown argues that because these documents were produced more than one 
year before the filing of the Second Amended Complaint in December 1992, the first complaint to 
make claims under the U.F.T.A., the insider transfer claim is time-barred by the one-year time 
limit in section 25-6-10(3). This argument is contrary to the trial court's determination that the 
insider transfer claim "was not brought more than one year after the transfer took place and not 
more than one year after the plaintiffs were provided with all the documentation . . . relating to 
the questioned transfers." 
Sear-Brown's arguments fail for several reasons. First, this contention was not raised by 
Sear-Brown until its reply brief. As a general rule, an issue raised in a reply brief will not be 
considered on appeal. RomreU v. Zions First Nafl Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah 1980), 
Furthermore, Sear-Brown did not marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's pertinent 
findings, instead selecting only evidence supporting its position. Such selective presentation is not 
sufficient to challenge the trial court's findings. Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & 
Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah App. 1994). For these reasons, we decline to 
question the trial court's application of the discovery rule and accept its findings on the subject as 
valid Id. 
In addition, Sear-Brown argues that the trial court erred in applying Rule 15(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to relate back the Second Amended Complaint to the date of the first 
.Amended Complaint. Rule 15(c) provides that when "the claim . . . asserted in the amended 
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth 
in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading." Utah R. 
Civ p 15(c). Such an amendment is allowed, if certain criteria are met, even if the statute of 
limitation has run in the meantime. Meyers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah 1981), 
Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P 2d 1350, 1359 (Utah App.), cert denied, sub 
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nom Ringwood v. Hernandez 795 P 2d 1138 (Utah 1990) 
Sear-Brown's only argument addressing the relation back ruling is based on Diehl Lumber 
Transportation, Inc. v. Mickelson, 802 P.2d 739 (Utah App. 1990). However, this argument 
was based upon the assumption that the time limit in section 25-6-10 (3) is a statute of repose, 
and is therefore "jurisdictional," an argument which we have rejected. Furthermore, Diehl 
addressed only the time limit for filing an action based on a mechanics' lien, which is governed by 
considerations specific to the mechanics' lien context. Id. at 744. Accordingly, Diehl is not 
applicable, and does not defeat the application of Rule 15(c) to Selvage's claims under the 
UFT.A.6 
The trial court correctly determined that the time limit for the insider transfer claim in section 
25-6-10(3) was a statute of limitation, and not one of repose. Furthermore, pursuant to the 
Klinger opinion, the trial court did not err by applying the discovery rule, despite the absence of a 
statutory discovery provision. Likewise, Sear-Brown has not persuaded us that the trial court 
erred in applying the relation back doctrine of Rule 15(c). Selvage's insider transfer claim under 
section 25-6-6(2) was therefore timely. Because Sear-Brown concedes that Mit is undisputed that 
Johnson Associates' transfers to Sear-Brown in partial satisfaction of antecedent debts met the 
elements of insider transfers" under section 25-6-6(2), Sear-Brown remains liable under the 
insider transfer provision of the U.F.T.A7 
II. Sufficiency of Evidence 
Sear-Brown contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's findings of an 
intent to hinder, delay or defraud, because the only evidence submitted was evidence of a 
preferential transfer, which, standing alone, is insufficient to support such findings. Further, 
Sear-Brown argues that the jury did not understand that a preferential transfer is not the same as a 
fraudulent transfer-that the former may be set aside if the action is timely, without any fault 
finding, but that the latter may be voided only if there is actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud. * 
Selvage counters that the jury was properly instructed and that the evidence presented 
supports the jury's determination. Selvage further argues that Sear-Brown has failed to properly 
marshal all the evidence supporting the jury's findings. 
The trial court found that between September 30, 1988 and February 17, 1989, while Johnson 
was insolvent, Johnson transferred to Sear-Brown assets with a value of at least $ 504,478.94. 
The jury determined, by special interrogatories, that Selvage had shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the asset transfer was made with an actual intent to hinder or delay Johnson's 
creditors. The jury also determined, again by special interrogatories, that Selvage had shown by 
clear and convincing evidence, that the transfer was made with actual intent to defraud Johnson's 
creditors 
After review of the trial proceedings, we conclude there is substantial credible evidence to 
support the jury's determination that the transfer of Johnson's assets to Sear-Brown was made 
with an actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud. The pertinent statute states: 
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(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, 
whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation 
was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: 
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(1) (1995) (emphasis added) The statute also enumerates factors 
which the fact-finder may consider, among others, to determine if "actual intent" existed. These 
include whether: 
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; (b) the debtor retained possession or 
control of the property transferred after the transfer; (c) the transfer or obligation was 
disclosed or concealed; (d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the 
debtor had been sued or threatened with suit; (e) the transfer was of substantially all the 
debtor's assets; (f) the debtor absconded; (g) the debtor removed or concealed assets; (h) 
the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the 
value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; (i) the debtor was 
insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was 
incurred; (j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was 
incurred; and (k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who 
transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(2) (1995). These enumerated factors, along with others determined 
to be relevant in a given case, are termed "badges of fraud." See Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 
726 P 2d 420, 423 (Utah 1986) (applying former version of U.F.T.A., noting that "although 
actual fraudulent intent must be shown . . . its existence may be inferred from the presence of 
certain indicia of fraud or badges of fraud/") (citation omitted). Such indicators of fraud have 
been described as facts which "throw suspicion on a transaction and which call for an explanation 
facts having a tendency to show the existence of fraud, although their value as evidence is 
relative not absolute." Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P 2d 452, 462 (Utah 1989) 
(citation omitted). 
The existence of fraudulent intent is a factual question, which may be inferred from all of the 
attendant circumstances. See id. It necessarily involves weighing the evidence presented and 
assessing the credibility of witnesses—tasks largely within the province of the fact-finder. In re 
Beesleyr883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994), State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah App. 1994), 
State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1040 n.4 (Utah App 1993),affU 910 P 2d 1196, 1995 Utah 
LEXIS 88, 279 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Utah 1995), State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 582 (Utah 
App ), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
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Substantial evidence was presented to the jury in the instant case, which met certain of the 
enumerated statutory factors, from which the jury could infer an actual intent to hinder, delay or 
defraud. We refer to some, but not all, of this evidence. The evidence established that between 
October 1, 1988 and February of 1989, all of Johnson's assets were transferred to Sear-Brown. 
Johnson was insolvent when these transfers occurred, as its liabilities exceeded its assets by $ 
499,000. The jury heard testimony that Sear-Brown owned all of Johnson's stock at the time of 
the transfers, compelling the conclusion that Sear-Brown was an insider. Evidence was also 
presented that Sear-Brown waited almost two years after the transfers before placing Johnson into 
bankruptcy in July of 1990, and did not disclose the transfers on the bankruptcy schedules 
prepared by an attorney hired by and paid for by Sear-Brown. In fact, Leon Clary, Sear-Brown's 
president, testified at trial that part of the decision regarding the date for placing Johnson into 
bankruptcy was to allow the one-year statute of limitation to expire. The jury also heard evidence 
that Selvage sued Johnson in the spring of 1987, prior to the asset transfer, and that the transfers 
were made at or near the time that Selvage filed his motion for summary judgment on the 
promissory note executed by Johnson. Furthermore, as the trial court observed in its findings of 
fact. Selvage's pending lawsuit was discussed at a board meeting on August 6, 1988, and 
instructions were given to continue negotiations with Selvage to try to settle the litigation. The 
jury could have reasonably inferred that these negotiations were intended to buy time to complete 
the transfer of Johnson's assets to Sear-Brown. 
As to the amount of consideration received by the debtor, the jury was presented with 
evidence from which it could infer that the consideration Johnson received was not equivalent to 
the value of the assets transferred to Sear-Brown. Selvage also presented evidence that 
Sear-Brown undervalued Johnson's business by excluding factors such as its value as an ongoing 
business and its good will. The jury could also consider that Johnson did not concede the validity 
of the debt to Selvage until the eve of trial, despite having been controlled by Sear-Brown for 
some time. The existence of even a single one of these factors "may establish and stamp a 
transaction as fraudulent." Territorial Sav,, 781 P.2d at 462 (citations omitted). Therefore, the 
jury properly found that Sear-Brown's actions indicated an intentional attempt to hinder, delay or 
defraud rather than merely a bona fide purpose to reduce Johnson's debt to Sear-Brown. See 
Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. Lumber Prods. Co., 590 P.2d 661, 665 (Okla 1979) (noting motivation 
is pivotal in determining actual intent). While the evidence was sufficient to meet the clear and 
convincing standard of proof necessary to establish fraud, it even more certainly meets the less 
stringent preponderance of the evidence standard necessary to prove an intent to hinder or delay 9 
To the extent that Sear-Brown contends that the elements of preferential and fraudulent 
transfers are mutually exclusive, we disagree. The facts that establish a preferential transfer may 
also be relevant to a fraudulent transfer. In fact, the very first of the enumerated factors which the 
jury may consider is whether "the transfer or obligation was to an insider" Utah Code Ann. § 
25-6-5(2)(a) (1995). The critical added element is intent In this case, the jury had before it the 
facts establishing an insider transfer, additional facts-most notably the existence of Selvage's 
!~\\ suit prior to the transfer and Sear-Brown's decision to place Johnson into bankruptcy-and an 
opportunity to listen to and observe witnesses testifying at trial Based upon that experience, the 
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jurors could reasonably have inferred an intent to hinder, delay or defraud. Accordingly, we affirm 
the trial court's determination that the transfer violated section 25-6-5(1) because it was made 
with an actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud. 
III. Award of Attorney Fees 
After the conclusion of trial, both parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions 
of law in support of their positions regarding an award of attorney fees. Selvage requested $ 
175,000 in attorney fees, and submitted a supporting affidavit which attached detailed billing 
records. The trial court awarded Selvage $ 42,500 in attorney fees, making specific reference to 
the attorney fees provisions in the contracts between Selvage and Johnson. 
Selvage appeals the trial court's award, contending that the trial court abused its discretion by 
not awarding all of the requested attorney fees, by failing to make sufficient findings of fact 
explaining the reduction in the amount of fees, and by refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing. 
Sear-Brown responds that the trial court's award of attorney fees should be upheld because it was 
properly based upon a reasonable fee for enforcing the original contract action only, and that the 
findings of fact implicitly support the fee award. Sear-Brown also argues that Selvage's failure to 
allocate between fees incurred on the contract and non-contract claims would have justified denial 
of the fee application in its entirety. Finally, Sear-Brown contends Selvage was not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing because Selvage had an adequate opportunity to be heard. 
In Utah, the general rule "is that attorney fees cannot be recovered by a prevailing party unless 
a statute or contract authorizes such an award." Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 
759, 782 (Utah 1994), Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053, 1058 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 899 
P2d 1231 (Utah 1995). Accordingly, in order to recover all of his requested attorney fees, 
Selvage must demonstrate that there is either contractual or statutory authorization for such an 
award ^ 
On appeal, Selvage does not contend that the contractual attorney fees provisions entitled him 
to all the fees he requested. Rather, he relies on statutory and case law arguments in support of 
this position. Turning to Selvage's statutory argument, he claims an award of attorney fees is 
authorized under the U.F.T.A. Specifically, Selvage refers to section 25-6-9(2) which provides 
that the creditor may recover "the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim. " Utah Code 
Ann § 25-6-9 (2) (1995). In interpreting the meaning of a statute, the court must look first to its 
plain language. A statute will not be interpreted to contravene its plain meaning. Salt Lake 
Therapy Clinic v. Frederick, 890 P 2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995); Harmon v. Ogden City Civil 
Sen. Comm'n, 890 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah App), cert, granted, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). By its 
plain meaning, the language upon which Selvage relies does not include attorney fees. The 
statute's language never specifically refers to attorney fees, but instead only to the amount of the 
creditor's claim. A claim for damages under the U.F.T.A. is separate and distinct from an award of 
attorney fees. See, e.g., Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988) (treating 
damages and attorney fees as separate, noting that amount of damages does not necessarily place 
limit on amount of attorney fees) (citing Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1983)), 
Arnica Mut Ins. Co- v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 965 (Utah App. 1989) ("Even if attorney fees 
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are recoverable in this case they are not properly classified as 'general damages'"). In this case, 
Selvage's "creditor claim" is the amount owed by Johnson under the three contracts, including the 
attorney fees incurred to enforce those contracts, but not fees to enforce any rights under the 
U.FT.A. 
Next, Selvage contends that he is entitled to all of his attorney fees under the analysis 
conducted in Radney v. Clear Lake Forest Community Ass'n, 681 S.W 2d 191 (Tex. Ct. App 
1984). In Radney, the plaintiff homeowners' association sought to enforce a deed restriction 
against a homeowner who had constructed a garage in violation of the restriction. Id. at 193-94. 
Shortly before trial, however, the homeowners' association was informed that the property had 
been transferred to an offshore corporation, whereupon the homeowners' association amended its 
complaint to include a fraudulent conveyance claim. Id. at 194. After prevailing at trial, the 
homeowners' association sought to recover attorney fees pursuant to a Texas statute allowing the 
prevailing party in a restrictive covenant dispute to recover reasonable attorney fees. The 
homeowner argued that recovery of attorney fees under the statute did not extend to those fees 
incurred in pursuit of the fraudulent conveyance claim, as this claim was not covered by the 
statute. Id. at 199. The Texas Court of Appeals disagreed: 
The statute allows the recovery of attorney's fees in an action based on a restrictive 
covenant. We believe that the fraudulent conveyance action was in part based on and 
related to the breach of the restrictive covenant. . . . In order to obtain the complete relief 
to which they were entitled because of the breach, it was necessary for appellees to have 
the fraudulent conveyance voided. The fraudulent conveyance action would not have been 
necessary if appellants had not conveyed the property in order to avoid the suit to enforce 
the restriction. In this situation, the entire suit was based on the breach of the restriction. 
Id Selvage urges this court to adopt the same reasoning, and find Sear-Brown liable for the 
attorney fees incurred in pursuing the claims under the U.F.T. A. 
.Although the reasoning of the Radney court may have some merit, adoption of the position 
urged by Selvage would contravene the plain language of the U.F.T.A., as discussed above, 
allowing an award of attorney fees clearly not authorized by the statute. Such a result would 
"infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there." Harmon, 890 P.2d at 6 (citations 
omitted) Because this "court has no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not 
expressed," id, we must reject the reasoning of the Radney court, at least as concerns the instant 
statutory context See Spanier v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 127 Ariz. 589, 623 P 2d 
19, 28-30 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (adhering to general rule that attorney fees are only awarded 
under contract or statute, rejecting arguments that attorney fees are recoverable in every 
fraudulent conveyance action) Therefore, Selvage is not entitled to attorney fees incurred in 
pursuit of the non-contract claims. 
Finally, Selvage contends that the mere instrumentality theory,11 upon which Selvage 
prevailed at trial, "places Sear-Brown directly in Johnson's shoes" and that "Sear-Brown is 
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directly and contractually liable for those fees." However, Selvage cites no authority for this 
proposition, nor does he provide any further analysis as to why Sear-Brown should be liable for 
attorney fees simply because a mere instrumentality claim was the tool used to enforce liability on 
the contracts. Mere assertions are not enough to defeat the application of the general rule that 
attorney fees are proper only where authorized by statute or contract. Utah R. App. P. 24 (a) (9); 
State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to address issue where "brief 
wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support" argument), State v. Reiners, 803 P.2d 1300, 
.1301 n.2 (Utah App. 1990) (declining to address issue where "argument contains no citations to 
authorities and only vague reasoning"). Therefore, Selvage is not entitled to attorney fees incurred 
litigating the mere instrumentality claim. 
While it follows, given the posture of this case, that Selvage is entitled only to the attorney 
fees he reasonably incurred in enforcing his contractual rights, it does not automatically follow 
that the amount awarded by the trial court can be sustained. We must now determine whether the 
trial court's findings of fact were sufficient to support the amount of the award. 
In making an award of attorney fees, the trial court must consider certain factors, and make 
findings of fact supporting its conclusion. Utah appellate courts have "consistently encouraged 
trial courts to make findings to explain the factors which they considered relevant in arriving at an 
attorney fee award." Regional Sales Agency, 784 P.2d at 1215; see, e.g., Willey v. Willey, 866 
P 2d 547, 555 (Utah App. 1993). 
The trial court's findings of fact recite that the award of $ 42,500 in attorney fees is based on 
"the amount in dispute, the complexity of the issues presented, the hourly rates charged by the 
plaintiffs' attorneys and the total evidence presented at trial." Such conclusory statements do not 
satisfy the requirement that awards of attorney fees must be supported by adequate findings of 
fact see, e.g., Willey, 866 P 2d at 555-56, Rappleye v< Rappleye, 855 P 2d 260, 266 (Utah 
App 1993), Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 517-18 (Utah App. 1989). 
The need for sufficiently detailed findings is especially great where, as here, the reasonableness 
of the fee and the supporting affidavit were uncontroverted by the opposing party. Selvage argues 
that under Utah law, the reduction of an uncontroverted fee calls for an explanation of the 
reduction which explicitly considers the relevant factors. In support of this proposition, Selvage 
notes that: 
a trial court abuses its discretion in awarding less than the amount of attorney fees 
requested when there is adequate and uncontroverted evidence in the record to support 
those fees unless the court offers an explanation for the reduction considering the 
factors previously discussed. 
Regional Sales Agency, 784 P 2d at 1215 (emphasis added), see also Dixie State Bank, 764 
P 2d at 989-91. In short, when reducing an uncontroverted fee, "it is necessary that the trial court, 
en the record, identify such factors and otherwise explain the basis for its sua sponte 
reduction." Martindale, 777 P.2d at 518 (emphasis added) 12 Selvage argues that although the 
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trial court listed the factors upon which it based its award, it did not explain how these factors 
acted to reduce the amount of attorney fees awarded. 
Sear-Brown responds that under a "fair reading" of the record, the trial court did, in fact, 
make sufficient findings to uphold the award of $ 42,500 in fees to Selvage. Sear-Brown argues 
that findings of fact "can be implied if it is reasonable to assume that the trial court actually 
considered the controverted evidence and necessarily made a finding." Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 
1018, 1025 (Utah App. 1993). Sear-Brown argues that because the amount of the attorney fees 
award is approximately the same as the amount of fees incurred by Selvage prior to Johnson's 
bankruptcy,13 this court can determine that the trial court implicitly reached this same conclusion 
under the Hall analysis. 
However, this conclusion does not meet the requirements of the Hall test for implying 
findings of fact. To satisfy Hall, there must be clear evidence that the court "actually considered" 
and "necessarily" made its findings.Id. As noted, the trial court's findings of fact based the award 
of attorney fees on "the amount in dispute, the complexity of the issues presented, the hourly rates 
charged by the plaintiffs1 attorneys and the total evidence presented at trial." From this, it is not 
clear that these factors were actually considered (no details to support this belief are mentioned), 
nor that the result was necessary (no clear mathematical support for the result was presented by 
Sear-Brown) *4 We cannot conclude that the amount awarded by the trial court was supported 
by implied findings of fact, and cannot therefore affirm the award on this basis. Accordingly, we 
remand this issue to the trial court for entry of findings of fact supporting the amount of the 
award of attorney fees for enforcement of the contracts, and for any appropriate revision of the 
award as such findings may suggest. ^ 
Finally, we address the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to hold 
an evidentiary hearing on the issue of attorney fees. As noted, both parties submitted proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the trial court heard argument on the issue. This 
court's concern is not that another hearing be held, if such a hearing is not necessary, but that the 
trial court enter sufficient findings of fact to justify the award of attorney fees. I£ upon remand, 
the trial court is able to enter sufficient findings of fact from the evidence already submitted, it is 
within its discretion to do so. Otherwise, it is free to accept evidence or briefing in whatever 
manner it deems appropriate, and then enter findings of fact. 
CONCLUSION 
We agree with the trial court that the time limit for bringing an insider transfer claim in section 
25-6-10(3) of the U.F.T.A. is a statute of limitation, not a statute of repose. Furthermore, the trial 
court did not need statutory authority to apply the discovery rule, and did not err in applying the 
relation back rule. Therefore, the insider transfer claim was properly submitted to the jury. We 
also find that there was sufficient evidence presented to the jury to support its finding that 
Sear-Brown acted with an actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud. Because Sear-Brown was 
found independently liable on four separate grounds under the U.F.T.A., we do not address 
whether the mere instrumentality claim was properly submitted to the jury. Finally, we uphold the 
trial court's determination that Selvage is entitled only to attorney fees incurred in pursuing the 
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original contract claims, but remand to the trial court to enter further findings of fact, or to hold 
an evidentiary hearing and then make findings of fact, at its discretion, regarding the amount of 
fees awarded. Both parties are to bear their own costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, 
Presiding Judge 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
OPINION FOOTNOTES 
1 On appeal from a jury verdict the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we recite the facts accordingly. Pratt v. Prodata, 
Inc., 885 P.2d 786, 787 (Utah 1994). 
2 Because we affirm the judgment against Sear-Brown based upon the U.F.T.A., it is not necessary 
to reach the issues regarding the mere instrumentality claim. 
3 In addition, we note that comments of Uniform Law commissioners or compilers do not have the 
force of law. 
4 The general rule regarding statutes of limitations is that the limitation period begins to run when 
the last event necessary to complete the cause of action occurs. The discovery rule is an exception to 
the general rule, and it delays the running of the limitation period 'until the discovery of facts forming the 
basis for the cause of action." Sevy v. Security Title Co. of So. Utah, 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995) 
(citations omitted). 
5 Section 25-6-10(1) provides that a claim under subsection 25-6-5(1) is extinguished within four 
years after the transfer was made or the debt was incurred, "or, if later, within one year after the transfer 
or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant." Utah Code Ann. § 
25-6-10(1) (1995). 
6 Incidentally, application of Rule 15(c) moots Sear-Brown's arguments as to when Selvage 
discovered or should have discovered the facts relevant to the Second Amended Complaint. 
7 In addition to finding liability under the insider provision, the trial court also found liability based 
upon section 25-6-5 (1)(a) under the intent to hinder, delay or defraud provisions. Sear-Brown contends 
on appeal that the improper inclusion of instructions and presentation of evidence on the time-barred 
insider transfer claim prejudiced the jury, and invalidates their findings under section 25-6-5(1 )(a). 
Because we find that the insider transfer claim was not time-barred, and therefore property submitted to 
the jury, and because Sear-Brown concedes liability on the insider transfer claim, we need not address 
these issues. 
8 Sear-Brown also argues, in part, that the improper submission of the insider claim confused the 
jury. This contention fails for two reasons. First, the submission of the insider claim to the jury was not 
improper because, as discussed, the insider claim was not time-barred. Second, the fact that a transfer 
was to an insider is one of the enumerated statutory factors which the jury may consider in determining if 
there was actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud. See Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(2)(a) (1995). Therefore, 
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even if the insider claim itself was time-barred, the evidence of an insider transfer was still properly 
before the jury. 
9 In In re Estate of Reed, 566 P.2d 587 (Wyo. 1977), the court construed similar language in the 
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, and noted that "an intent to 'hinder or delay' is sufficient to void a 
transfer even though there is no actual fraud as contemplated following the disjunctive 'or." id. at 590. 
The court also observed that intent can rarely be established directly, and therefore circumstantial 
evidence must be examined as to the circumstances surrounding the transactions in question. Id. at 
590-91. 
10 However, as this court noted in Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053, 1058 (Utah App.)v cert 
dented, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995), "there are exceptions to the general rule that attorney fees may only 
be awarded pursuant to contract or statute." See also Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 
759, 782 (Utah 1994) . Because Selvage has not argued at trial or on appeal that any such exception 
applies, we do not consider that possibility. 
11 Although we do not reach the propriety of the mere instrumentality theory, as discussed supra 
note 2, we assume for purposes of this argument that the theory was property submitted to the jury and 
the evidence supported the jury's verdict. 
12 Vague statements which require speculation as to the actual reasons behind the ruling are not 
enough to meet this burden. In Willey, in reviewing the trial court's reduction of fees, this court noted 
that: 
The [trial] court merely noted in its oral ruling that [the amount of attorney fees] was a "very 
unfortunate use of funds." While this statement may indicate the trial court believed both parties' fees 
were unreasonable, it does not constitute a finding addressing the reasonableness of Mrs. WUIey's 
attorney fees according to the Bail factors. 
Willey, 866 P.2d at 556 (emphasis added); 
13 Selvage and Sear-Brown agree that Selvage incurred $ 45,811.90 in fees prior to the time 
Johnson filed its bankruptcy petition. 
14 The Hall court noted that implied findings must be based upon "detailed subsidiary findings of fact 
. . . which, by themselves, show the steps by which the court arrived at its apparent conclusion." Hall, 
858 P.2d at 1025. Such detailed findings of fact do not appear in the record before this court. 
15 Sear-Brown notes that the trial court could have denied Selvage's entire request for attorney fees 
because he did not allocate between those fees incurred in enforcing liability on the contracts and those 
incurred pursuing non-contract claims, relying upon Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P2d 266,269-70 
(Utah 1992) and Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1394 (Utah App. 1994). However, Sear-Brown did 
not cross-appeal the trial court's decision to award attorney fees, and so this issue is not properly before 
the court. Furthermore, while it may be proper to deny a request for attorney fees if the requesting party 
fails to allocate in accord with the directive of Cottonwood Mali, such a decision is within the trial court's 
discretion, rather than being a strict legal requirement. Schafir, 879 P.2d at 1394. 
C 1999 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. All rights reserved. 
Third Party Defendant's Affidavit In Support of Third Party 
defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment; and In 
Opposition to third Party Plaintiffs Motion 
For Summary Judgment 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
"nil. 
County of Carbon I 
CHERY L ]R A CHFLIii, being lirsl ilulv swnin deposes and sa;) s: 
1. I am over the age of 21 and all matters attested hereto are based upon first hand 
knowledge 
2. I did not receive any funds which I generated to redeem the 48 East Property from 
James Brockbank. 
3. I enjoy full possession of the 48 East Property. 
4. My redemption of the 48 East Property was not intended to defraud Penny 
Brock bank I iiilended ?u by Ihe piopntv lor $15. 000. 
5. Penny Brockbank has never tried to return the redemption check to me, has not 
objected to the payment, has not placed any restriction on reciept of the payment, nor any portion 
of the redemption price. 
DATED this _ _ day of January, 2000. 
CHERYL RACHELE 
Subscribed and sworn before me this day of January, 2000. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
H:\COMMON\MARK\BRENTABROCKBAK'' AffidavitofCherylRachele.doc 
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for James L. Brockbank and Cheryl Rachele 
226 W. 2230 North 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo, Utah, 84603 
Telephone: (801) 375-3000 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
JAMES L. BROCKBANK, 
Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHERYL RACHELE IN 
SUPPORT OF THIRD PARTY 
DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; and IN 
OPPOSITION TO THIRD PARTY 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
Third party plaintiff, 
Civil No. 954700226DA 
Judge: Bruce K. Halliday 
CHERYL RACHELE, 
Third Party Defendant. 
r memorandum decision concerning cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment (labeled "Order^ 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PENNY BROCKBANK ORDER 
Petitioner, 
Third Party Plaintiff, Case No.: 954700226 
v s. 
Judge: Bruce K HaUiday 
JAMES L. BROCKBANK 
Respondent, 
vs. 
CHERYL RACHELE 
Third Party Defendant 
This Court in an earlier proceeding found that Mr. Brockbank's conveyance (assignment 
and/or warranty deed) to Ms. Rachele was a violation of this Court \ mrlei I akin indicated thn' 
since Ms Rachellt n-as ml .1 pail, In the action ,11 that time, the relief which I could order was 
limited. Petitioner subsequently joined Ms. Rachele and brought an action for fraudulent transfer of 
the property under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act. SS 25-6-1 et seq. UCA. 
The petitioner has now moved for summary judgement. The third party defendant cross-
moved for summary judgemeni .*: : ,... . .. .J« ision has been filed. The pleadings in this matter 
' '"* v--i * rh* N ^ i I requested counsel provide me with copies of the 
pleadings so that I could proceed with ruling herein. I have reviewed the copies and the case law 
cited by the parties and hereby conclude that the Motion for Summary Judgement by petitioner should 
be and hereby is granted and the Motion for Summary Judgement by third party defendant is 
denied. The Court: in so doing finds there ai e n< : c> :mti cy erted issue's of feet, fi nds the facts as 
oi itlined in the petitioner ' ' s Memorandum for Summary Judgement and finally concludes that the relief 
should be an order that the assignment and/or warranty deed are void ab initio and that the property 
should be ordered reconveyed into the ownership and possession of the respondent and shall remain 
subject to the judicial lien imposed by this Court. Third pair i y ddendani' s right ti > relief or i e-dress 
iL/n 0 
should be directed towards respondent for unjust enrichment; if the same has not been lost by her 
failure to make such a claim in the pleadings filed herein. 
The Court has had some concern relative to counsel for Mr. Brockbank representing Ms. 
Rachelle, as it appears that the interests of those two parties are in opposition and a conflict of 
interest may, and I believe does, arise in these proceedings. 
Mr. Schindler shall draft findings of fact, conclusions of law and Order accordingly. 
Dated this X day of May, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICA11: OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a signed copy of the foregoing ORDER on the T ^ 
to the following: 
Mr. John Schindler, Attorney at Law, Price, UT 84501 
Mr. Brent Attorney at Law, PO Box 657, Provo, UT 84603 
Clerk/Deputy Court Clerk 
bindings of Fact and conclusions of Law (concerriinri I hi« 
cross Motions for Summary Judgment) 
JOHN E. SCHINDLER#3619 
Attorney for Petitioner 
80 West Main, Suite 201 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435)637-1783 
FAX: (435) 637-5269 
FILED 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
CARBON COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
vs. 
JAMES L. BROCKBANK, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
CHERYL RACHELE a/k/a 
CHERYL HUNSAKER. 
Third Party Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCERNING 
CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BY THIRD PARTY 
PLAINTIFF AND THIRD PARTY 
DEFENDANT 
Civil No.: 954700226DA 
Judge: Bruce K. Halliday 
THIS MATTER is before the Court pursuant to cross motions for summary judgment 
submitted by Third Party Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant. Third Party Plaintiff 
submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment dated December 23, 1999. Third Party 
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Plaintiff, and a Memorandum in support thereof. Third Party Defendant submitted a Motion 
for Summary Judgment dated January 21, 2000. Third Party Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was supported by an Affidavit of the Third Party Defendant, and a 
Memorandum in support thereof. Third Party Defendant's Memorandum also was 
submitted in opposition to Third Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Court's file was not available to the Court as this case is on appeal to the Utah Court Of 
Appeals. The Court requested, and received, copies of these pleadings. The Court has 
reviewed these pleadings, and the case law cited by the parties. The Court now makes 
and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. A Supplemental Decree was entered awarding, inter alia, alimony to Third Party 
Plaintiff, real property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, Utah (hereinafter referred to as 
48 East), to Respondent, and establishing Third Party Plaintiff a lien in favor of Third Party 
Plaintiff against all real property awarded to Respondent. 
2. The real property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, Utah, is more particularly 
described as follows, to-wit: 
Beginning at a point 214 feet East of the Northwest Corner of 
Lot 3, Block 40 PRICE TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running Eat 
50 feet; thence South 152.5 feet, thence West 50 feet; thence 
North 152.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
Subject to, and together with a joint right of way over and 
across the following described tract of land: 
Beginning at a point 209 feet East of the Northwest Corner of 
Lot 3, Block 40 PRICE TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running 
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thence East 10 feet; thence South 152.5 feet; thence West 10 
feet; thence North 152.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
3. Third Party Plaintiff filed a Notice of Interest with the Carbon County Recorder 
concerning 48 East on October 28,1997. 
4. Respondent was restrained and enjoined from ciimfeyim,.] ,)iiy iiilei^st in ifnl 
property. This restraint was imposed by an Order dated September 22, 1998, labeled, 
"Order Cause Heard September 1, 1998." 
5. 48 East was sold at a sheriffs sale to Third Party Plaintiff. 
6. Respondent executed an Assignment (Exhibit A attached to Third Party Plaintiffs 
Memorandum) to Third Party Defendant, assigning his right of redemption, pursuant to 
Rule 69 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, concerning the sheriffs sale of 48 East. This 
Assignment was filed in the records of the Carbon County Recorder's Office at Book 425 
Page 821 (Entry #71125). 
7. Respondent executed a Warranty Deed (Exhibit B attached to Third Party 
Warranty Deed was filed in the records of the Carbon County Recorder's Office at Book 
425 Page 822 (Entry #71126). 
8. Respondent's transfer of 48 East by both the Assignment and the Warranty Deed 
were in contravention of the restraining order implemented in the Order dated September 
in contempt of the Court's restraining order implemented in the order dated September 22, 
1998 
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9. Third Party Defendant redeemed 48 East. 
10. The value of 48 East, as of the date of redemption, was at least $45,000. 
11. Third Party Plaintiff obtained a joinder to the divorce action of Third Party 
Defendant by filing a Third Party Complaint, and Motion for Joinder. 
12. Third Party Plaintiff alleged a cause of action under the Utah Fraudulent 
Transfer Act (Utah Code Annotated Section 25-6-1 et seq.). 
13. After the redemption, one payment of the mortgage on 48 East was made from 
Respondent's account. 
14. At the time of the execution of the Assignment and Warranty Deed, Respondent 
and Third Party Defendant had been dating. Third Party Defendant characterized her 
relationship with Respondent as "boyfriend and girlfriend." 
15. Third Party Defendant paid $100 for the Assignment. 
16. Third Party Defendant paid $50 for the Warranty Deed. 
17. 48 East was an "asset" within the definition of that term under the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
18. Third Party Plaintiff has a claim against Respondent within the definition the 
term "claim" under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
19. Third Party Plaintiff was a creditor of Respondent's within the definition of the 
term "creditor" under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
20. Respondent owed a debt to Third Party Plaintiff within the definition of the term 
"debt" under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
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21. Respondent was a debtor within the definition of the term "debtor" under the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
22. 48 East was property within the definition of the term "property" under the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
23. The Assignment and Warranty Deed was a transfer within the definition of the 
term "transfer" under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
24. No value was given by Third Party Defendant to Respondent for the 
Assignment. 
25. No value was given by Third Party Defendant to Respondent for the Warranty 
Deed. 
26. There was no bargained for exchange concerning the transfer of Respondent's 
interest in 48 East by the Assignment. 
27. There was no bargained for exchange concerning the transfer of Respondent's 
interest in 48 East by the Warrnty Deed. 
28. Respondent and Third Party Defendant were not parties dealing at arms length. 
29. The amount paid by Third Party Defendant to Respondent for the Assignment 
did not constitute fair market value. 
30. The amount paid by Third Party Defendant to Respondent for the Warranty 
Deed did not constitute fair market value. 
31. The transaction between Respondent and Third Party Defendant did not 
involve a willing buyer and a willing seller. 
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32. The transfer of 48 East by Respondent to Third Party Defendant was intended 
to place the asset - 48 East - beyond the reach of Third Party Plaintiff. 
33. Third Party Plaintiff has established the existence of fraudulent intent on behalf 
of Respondent and Third Party Defendant in the transaction between Respondent and 
Third Party Defendant. 
34. Badges of fraud are present in this case. Those facts evidencing badges of 
fraud are: 
a. The nature of the relationship between Respondent and Third Party 
Defendant; 
b. The insignificant monetary amount paid by Third Party Defendant to 
Respondent for the Assignment and Warranty Deed; 
c. Payment of the mortgage from Respondent's account subsequent to the 
Assignment, Warranty Deed, and redemption; 
d. Timing of the Assignment and Warranty Deed in relation to the posture 
of the divorce case; 
e. Respondent's testimony concerning the reason for the Assignment and 
Warranty Deed;1 
f. The transaction between Respondent and Third Party Defendant seemed 
'Respondent testified that the reason he transferred the property to Third Party 
Defendant was because he did not want the property "to be trashed like the apartments were 
before I got them back". If Respondent was, in truth, and in fact, transferring away his interest 
in the property, he would have no reason to be concerned about the continuing condition of 
the property as his interest was terminated. This testimony indicates Respondent's belief that 
he would someday, in the future, regain, and/or remain, in possession of the property. 
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to be concluded in a hurried manner; 
g. The transaction between Respondent and Third Party Defendant seemed 
to depart from the usual method of business where arms length parties negotiate a 
transaction for fair market value; 
h. The fact that Third Party Defendant has not made a claim against 
Respondent concerning the funds utilized to exercise the Right of Redemption transferred 
by the Assignment in light of the Third Party Complaint against her. 
35. These undisputed facts throw suspicion on the transaction between 
Respondent and Third Party Defendant. 
36. Neither Respondent nor Third Party Defendant submitted a reasonable 
explanation concerning the facts which indicate badges of fraud. 
37. Third Party Plaintiff did not waive her right to challenge Respondent's transfer 
of 48 East to Third Party Defendant by the Assignment and Warranty Deed. 
38. Third Party Defendant has a cause of action against Respondent concerning 
the funds delivered by Third Party Defendant to Third Party Plaintiff in exercising the Right 
of Redemption transferred by the Assignment. 
39. The fact that Third Party Defendant has failed to pursue tnat cause of action 
strengthens this Court's belief that collusion exists between Respondent and Third Party 
Defendant concerning the transfer of 48 East, and that the transaction between 
Respondent and Third Party Defendant (both the Assignment and Warranty Deed) is 
fraudulent. 
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40. All of these facts are undisputed. 
41. The undisputed facts establish that Third Party Plaintiff is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
42. Third Party Plaintiff is entitled to an order declaring the transfer of 48 East from 
Respondent to Third Party Defendant pursuant to the Assignment and Warranty Deed are 
void. 
43. As the Assignment and Warranty Deed are void, title and possession of 48 East 
is restored to Respondent. 
44. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties hereto and the subject matter 
hereof. 
Having made the above Findings of Fact the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties hereto and the subject matter hereof. 
2. The undisputed facts establish that Third Party Plaintiff is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
3. Third Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. 
4. Third Party Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied and 
dismissed. 
5. The transaction between Respondent and Third Party Defendant, in the form of 
the Assignment and Warranty Deed, is fraudulent. 
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6. The transaction between Respondent and Third Party Defendant, in the form of 
the Assignment and Warranty Deed, is void. 
7. The Assignment and Warranty Deed purporting to transfer Respondent's Right 
of Redemption and title to 48 East are both void. 
8. Respondent is entitled to an order: 
a. Declaring void the Assignment and Warranty Deed; 
b. Restoring Respondent to possession of 48 East; 
c. Declaring Respondent to be the owner of record of 48 East; 
d. Continuing, and emphasizing, that Respondent continues to be subject 
to a restraining order, restraining, and enjoining, Respondent that he not grant, bargain, 
sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage, encumber, lien, transfer, waste, dispose of, deed, or 
sign any document to grant, bargain, sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage, encumber, lien, 
transfer, waste, dispose of, or deed the property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, 
Carbon County, Utah, or any interest in said property, or to alter, amend, or change the 
status of the title thereto, or to grant, bargain, sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage, 
encumber, lien, transfer, waste, dispose of, deed, or sign any document to grant, bargain, 
sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage, encumber, lien, transfer, waste, dispose of, or deed 
any property interest, including, but not limited to the right of redemption allowed by Rule 
69 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or to take any action which would allow any other 
person, firm, corporation, partnership, or entity, to make any claim on, for, against, or to 
the property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, Carbon County, Utah; 
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e. Declaring that the property located at 48 East remains subject to the 
judicial lien in favor of Third Party Plaintiff implemented by previous orders of this Court. 
DATED this ^ ^ - %ay of ^^^^^^zjiL^ . 2000. 
BRUCE K. HALLIDAY 
District Court Judge 
myftles\Brockbank\ffc.mot.sum.judg\5-12-000 
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H. Order (concerning the cross Motions for Summary Judgment) 
FILED 
JOHN E. SCHINDLER#3619 
Attorney for Petitioner 
80 West Main, Suite 201 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435)637-1783 
FAX: (435) 637-5269 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
CARBON COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JAMES L BROCKBANK, 
Respondent. 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
CHERYL RACHELE a/k/a 
CHERYL HUNSAKER. 
Third Party Defendant. 
n 
THIS MATTER is before the Court pursuant to cross motions for summary judgment 
submitted by Third Party Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant. Third Party Plaintiff 
submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment dated December 23, 1999. Third Party 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was supported by an Affidavit of the Third Party 
Plaintiff, and a Memorandum in support thereof. Third Party Defendant submitted a Motion 
JUN - 2 : 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS 
ORDER CONCERNING CROSS 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BY THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF AND 
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT 
Civil No.: 954700226DA 
Judge: Bruce K. Halliday 
for Summary Judgment dated January 21, 2000. Third Party Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was supported by an Affidavit of the Third Party Defendant, and a 
Memorandum in support thereof. Third Party Defendant's Memorandum also was 
submitted in opposition to Third Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Court's file was not available to the Court as this case is on appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The Court requested, and received, copies of these pleadings. The Court has 
reviewed these pleadings, and the case law cited by the parties. The Court has entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED as follows: 
1. Third Party Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied and 
dismissed. 
2. The Assignment filed for record in the Carbon County Recorder's Office at Book 
425 page 821 is hereby declared, and ordered, void, and of no effect. 
3. The Warranty Deed filed for record in the Carbon County Recorder's Office at 
Book 425 Page 822 is hereby declared void, and ordered, void, and of no effect. 
4. Respondent is hereby restored ownership of the real property located at 48 East 
100 North, Price, Utah, more particularly described as follows, to wit: 
Beginning at a point 214 feet East of the Northwest Corner of 
Lot 3, Block 40 PRICE TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running Eat 
50 feet; thence South 152.5 feet, thence West 50 feet; thence 
North 152.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
Subject to, and together with a joint right of way over and 
across the following described tract of land: 
Beginning at a point 209 feet East of the Northwest Corner of 
Lot 3, Block 40 PRICE TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running 
thence East 10 feet; thence South 152.5 feet; thence West 10 
feet; thence North 152.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
5. Respondent is hereby restored to possession of the real property located at 48 
East 100 North, Price, Utah. 
6. Respondent is hereby restrained, and enjoined, and shall not grant, bargain, sell, 
convey, hypothecate, mortgage, encumber, lien, transfer, waste, dispose of, deed, or sign 
any document to grant, bargain, sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage, encumber, lien, 
transfer, waste, dispose of, or deed the property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, 
Carbon County, Utah, or any interest in said property, or to alter, amend, or change the 
status of the title thereto, or to grant, bargain, sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage, 
encumber, lien, transfer, waste, dispose of, deed, or sign any document to grant, bargain, 
sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage, encumber, lien, transfer, waste, dispose of, or deed 
any property interest, including, but not limited to the right of redemption allowed by Rule 
69 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or to take any action which would allow any other 
person, firm, corporation, partnership, or entity, to make any claim on, for, against, or to 
the property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, Carbon County, Utah. 
7. The real property located at 48 East 100 North. Price, Utah remains subject to 
the judicial lien implemented^ previous orders of the Court. 
DATED t h i s ^ ^ r t J k v o f ^J^UJZ^ . 2000. 
BRUCE K. HALLIDAY 
District Court Judge 
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I. Bradford vs. Demita, 993 P.2d 887, (Ct. App. 1999) 
1 
1999 UT App 373, 384 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 BRADFORD V. DEMITA (Ct App. 1999) 
I 993 P.2d 887,1999 Utah App. Lexis 157 | 
George R. Bradford, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
Andrea O. Bradford and James A. Demita, Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 981745-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
1999 UT App 373, 384 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 993 P.2d 887,1999 Utah App. LEXIS 157 
December 16,1999, Filed 
Fourth District, Provo Department. The Honorable Steven L. Hansen. 
COUNSEL 
Howard Chuntz, Orem, for Appellants. 
Thomas R. Patton, Provo, for Appellee. 
JUDGES 
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Billings. WE CONCUR: Russell W. Bench, Judge, Judith M. 
Billings, Judge. 
AUTHOR: GREENWOOD 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge: 
(I} Mr. George K. Bradford filed for divorce from his wife, Mrs. Andrea O. Bradford, on 
June 10, 1997. In the same complaint, he alleged Mrs. Bradford had fraudulently conveyed a 
property interest in the couple's home to her son, Mr. James A. Demita, a named defendant. This 
appeal thus arises from two related cases tried together by agreement of the parties and the trial 
court. Mrs. Bradford appeals the trial court's order setting aside her conveyance of her interest in 
the home to Mr. Demita and the trial court's order awarding the home entirety to Mr. Bradford. 
We affirm the order setting aside the conveyance, but reverse the award of the home to Mr. 
Bradford and remand for further proceedings regarding property division between Mr. and Mrs. 
Bradford. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
(2} The Bradfords were married in June 1985. Each had been married once before, and each 
had at least one child from the prior marriage. No children were born of their marriage to each 
other. 
{3} During their marriage, the couple lived in Mr. Bradford's home located in Spanish Fork, 
Utah. Mr. Bradford was raised in this home, which his grandfather and father both owned before 
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him. Before marrying Mrs. Bradford, he received title to the home from his father as a gift. 
Several improvements were made to the home during the couple's marriage, including a repaired 
roof and septic system, the addition of a new furnace, and plumbing work connecting the home to 
the city's water supply Mr. Bradford paid for these improvements with funds he received before 
the marriage as part of a settlement with Geneva Steel. Mrs. Bradford's only contribution to the 
improvements consisted of making phone calls and arranging for the work to be done. The 
undisputed present estimated value of the home is $ 180,000. 
In 1989, approximately four years after they married, Mr. Bradford transferred the home by 
way of warranty deed to himself and his wife as "joint tenants with foil rights of survivorship and 
not as tenants in common." Three years later, however, Mr. Bradford filed for divorce and asked 
that the home and real property be awarded to him. That action was dismissed in 1993 after the 
parties reunited. 
{5} The couple continued to have marital difficulties, and Mr. Bradford threatened divorce 
many times. Nevertheless, in 1996, the couple engaged in a joint business venture with Mrs. 
Bradford's son, Mr. Demita, to develop property, upon which the home was located. Mr. Demita 
was to receive twenty-five percent of the profits for his assistance in developing the property. At 
the time of this business arrangement, Mr. Demita was living with the Bradfords and had done so 
rent-free since December 1995. 
{6j In July 1996, shortly after the property venture began, Mr. Bradford arrived home to find 
several engineers in the house. He was upset with the slow progress of the project and had an 
argument with Mrs. Bradford. This time, the argument was severe, and the couple again discussed 
divorce. 
{7} On August 8, 1996, Mrs. Bradford transferred her interest in the home by way of quit 
claim deed to her son, Mr. Demita. She later claimed this transfer was for "estate planning 
purposes." Mr. Demita gave Mrs. Bradford $ 10 as consideration for the property transfer. 
Neither Mrs. Bradford nor Mr. Demita told Mr. Bradford about this transaction, and Mrs. 
Bradford continued to live in the home. Mr. Bradford discovered the existence of the quit claim 
deed several months later when his daughter went to the County Recorder's Office to verify Mr. 
Demita's representations that the home and property had been rezoned for development. She 
found the quit claim deed and discovered the property, in fact, had not been rezoned. 
(8} On June 10, 1997, soon after he learned about the deed to Mr. Demita, Mr. Bradford 
filed a complaint for divorce against Mrs. Bradford and included Mr. Demita as a party to the 
action. After a bench trial, the court awarded Mr. Bradford a divorce. The trial court also found 
that the transfer between Mrs. Bradford and Mr. Demita was fraudulent and set aside the 
conveyance. In awarding the subject property, the trial court concluded the house and real 
property were not partitionable and would have to be refinanced or sold if awarded to both Mr. 
Bradford and Mrs. Bradford. The court thus awarded the home and the real property to Mr. 
Bradford. In addition, the court awarded Mrs. Bradford alimony in the amount of $ 600 a month 
and divided equally the remaining marital property, including bank accounts, an IRA account, 
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retirement funds, and the cash value of an insurance policy. 
{9} Mrs. Bradford moved the trial court to amend its findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
but the court denied her motion. Mrs Bradford and her son then filed this appeal. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
{10} This case involves three critical issues. First, did Mrs. Bradford's conveyance of her joint 
tenancy interest in the home constitute a fraudulent transfer? Because this issue involves both 
questions of law and of fact, we review the trial court's findings of fact for clear error. See Jeffs v. 
Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998). "In contrast, we review a trial court's conclusions as 
to the legal effect of a given set of found facts for correctness.H Id. (citing State v. Pent, 869 
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)). Nevertheless, "we may still grant the trial court discretion in its 
application of the law to a given fact situation." Id. 
{11} Second, if the transfer was fraudulent, and therefore void, was the nature of the property 
marital or separate? This issue primarily presents a question of law; therefore, we review the trial 
court's legal conclusions concerning the nature of property for correctness. See Jefferies v. 
Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835, 836 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (considering whether 401(k) plan is marital 
property). 
{12} Third, did the trial court properly award the subject property entirely to Mr. Bradford? 
In deciding this question, we acknowledge that "trial courts have considerable discretion in 
determining alimony and property distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal 
unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated." Howell v. Howell, 806 P 2d 
1209,1211 (UtahCt App. 1991). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Fraudulent Conveyance 
{13} We first address the fraudulent conveyance issue. The trial court concluded the transfer 
was fraudulent under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-1 to -13 
(1998), and declared the transfer void. 
(14} A fraudulent transfer in Utah first requires a creditor- debtor relationship. Essentially, a 
fraudulent transfer occurs what a debtor transfers substantially all his or her assets to another to 
defraud a creditor or avoid a debt. A "creditor," according to section 25-6-2(4), Hmeans a person 
who has a claim." A '"claim* means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to 
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, 
legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(3) (1998) (emphasis added); 
see also Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 206, 48 P 2d 513, 516 (1935) (holding persons having 
tort claim against grantor that was not reduced to judgment at time of conveyance are 
"creditors"). 
{15} Although no Utah cases directly address whether a husband or wife becomes a creditor 
of his or her spouse when contemplating divorce, the Oregon Supreme Couifs statement on the 
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subject is helpful to our analysis: 
In Weber v. Rothchild, 15 Ore. 385, 388-89, 15 P. 650, 3 Am. St. Rep. 162 (1887), we held 
that a person in the position of plaintiff may maintain a suit to set aside a transaction which may 
defeat her recovery and rights in a contemplated suit for divorce. This rule prevails in other 
jurisdictions that have considered the matter. 
We conclude, as did the trial court, that the conveyance by deed of April 14, 1972, was 
obtained by fraud to hinder or prevent plaintiffs recovery of [defendant's] equitable interest in the 
fourplex, in the divorce suit, and is therefore set aside and held to be void. 
Adamson v* Adamson, 273 Ore. 382, 541 P 2d 460, 466 (Or. 1975) (citations omitted). 
{16} In this case, the trial court determined that "pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(4) 
and § 25-6-5 Mr. Bradford is a creditor of Mrs. Bradford in that he has a claim to the real 
property which Mrs. Bradford deeded to her son, Mr. Demita." The trial court based this 
conclusion on the fact that Mr. Bradford had threatened divorce just weeks before Mrs. Bradford 
made the transfer. That conclusion is consistent with the Oregon Supreme Court's analysis in 
Adamson, which we adopt. In our view, the trial court correctly concluded Mr. Bradford was, 
indeed, a creditor of Mrs. Bradford, given that his claim to the house—although not reduced to 
judgment in a divorce proceeding-had arisen through recent threats of divorce. We note this 
conclusion is consistent with our supreme court's admonition to construe the statute liberally "to 
reach all artifices and evasions designed to rob the Act of its frill force and effect." Butler v. 
Wilkinson, 740 P 2d 1244, 1260 (Utah 1987); see also Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 
291, 351 P.2d 959, 962 (I960) (H,AH statutes made against fraud should be liberally and 
beneficially expounded to suppress the fraud."1) (quoting Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 
(1601)). 
{17} Having concluded Mr. Bradford is a creditor of Mrs. Bradford, we next examine 
whether Mrs. Bradford made a fraudulent transfer of her joint tenancy interest to her son. 
According to Utah's Fraudulent Transfer Act,H A transfer made . . . by a debtor is fraudulent as to 
a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made . . ., if the 
debtor made the transfer . . . (a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the 
debtor." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(1) (1998). 
J18 J A creditor who claims a debtor transferred property with actual intent to defraud under 
section 25-6-5(lXa) must establish that claim by clear and convincing evidence. See Territorial 
Sav. & Loan Assfo v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452,462 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Nevertheless, "fraudulent 
intent is ordinarily considered a question of fact, and 'may be inferred from the presence of 
certain indicia of fraud or "badges of fraud.m" Id. at 462 (quoting Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 
726 P.2d 420, 423 (Utah 1986)) (other citations and footnotes omitted). Utah's statute codifies 
those factors historically considered by the common law as indicia or badges of fraud in section 
25-6-5(2), which states: 
To determine "actual intent" under Subsection (IX*), consideration may be given, among 
other factors, to whether: 
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(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;[* ] 
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer; 
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; 
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or 
threatened with suit; 
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; 
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the 
value of the asset transferred . . . . 
See also Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540, 553, 15 P.2d 1051, 1056 (1932) (holding 
conveyances between near relatives, calculated to prevent creditor from realizing on claim, are 
subject to rigid scrutiny); Givan, 351 P 2d at 962 (holding transactions among close relatives 
receive close scrutiny but close relationship does not necessarily mean transaction is invalid). 
{19} The trial court used these factors in concluding Mrs. Bradford had actual intent to 
defraud Mr. Bradford. Specifically, the trial court found Mthat the transfer was concealed from Mr. 
Bradford, Mrs. Bradford continues to live in the house as before, Mr. Bradford had threatened 
Mrs. Bradford with divorce a matter of weeks before the transfer, and the transfer was 
substantially all of the assets that Mrs. Bradford believed that she had.19 
P20 We, too, conclude these badges of fraud are adequate to show actual intent by Mrs. 
Bradford to fraudulently convey her interest to her son. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's 
findings (including those denominated as conclusions) that the transfer was fraudulent and void. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 25-6- 8(lXa) (1998). 
II. Nature of Property 
(21} Our conclusion that the transfer is void necessarily restores the joint tenancy title to the 
home in Mr. and Mrs. Bradford. Nevertheless, Mr. Bradford argues the property should be 
treated as separate property because he inherited it, brought it into the marriage, and maintained 
and improved it. The trial court, he contends, was therefore correct in awarding the subject 
property to him despite its joint tenancy status. 
(22} Utah law provides that a spouse may transfer his or her interest in separately acquired 
property into the marital estate. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-3 (1998). A transfer of otherwise 
separate property to a joint tenancy with the grantor's spouse is generally presumed to be a gift, 
see 41 CIS . Husband and Wife § 103(a), at 397 (1991) (citing Kramer v. Kramer, 709 
S.W.2d 157, 159 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)), and, when coupled with an evident intent to do so, 
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effectively changes the nature of that property to marital property. See Mortensen v. Mortensen, 
760 P.2d 304, 307-08 (Utah 1988); see also BonneU v. Bonnet 117 Wis. 2d 241, 344 N.W.2d 
123, 126 (Wis. 1984) (stating spouse may transfer separate property into marital estate and 
"separate property transferred into joint tenancy becomes part of the marital estate"); cf. 
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980) (finding trial court did not abuse 
discretion in awarding home held in joint tenancy to wife when "there was no intention by [wife] 
to create a one-half property interest in [husband], nor any expectation by [husband] that he had 
received a one-half property interest"). 
123) In Mortensen, our supreme court considered how property inherited during a marriage 
should be divided upon divorce. After examining the law in other jurisdictions, the court 
announced that, as a general rule, "property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance 
during the marriage [should be awarded] to that spouse, together with any appreciation or 
enhancement of its value." Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308,2 see also Haumont v. Hanmont, 793 
P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("Equity [generally] requires that each party retain the 
separate property he or she brought into the marriage"). This rule applies unless (1) the other 
spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or 
protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it, . . . or (2) the property 
has been consumed or its identity lost through commingling or exchanges or where the 
acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse. 
Mortensen, 760 P 2d at 308 (emphasis in original). 
(24} In this case, the record is clear, and the trial court found, that Mr. Bradford conveyed 
his interest in the home to himself and his wife as "joint tenants with full rights of survivorship and 
not as tenants in common.M According to the trial testimony, Mr. Bradford intended at that time 
to give a one-half interest in the home to his wife. 3 Nothing in the trial court's findings or the 
record indicates otherwise. We therefore conclude the transfer of Mr. Bradford's separate 
property to his wife as a joint tenant with himself effectively transformed the subject property 
from Mr Bradford's separate property into marital property. 
HI. Property Award 
{25} Our determination regarding the property's nature does not end our inquiry, for we must 
also decide whether the trial court properly awarded the home, even though marital property, 
entirely to Mr. Bradford. 
"We afford the trial court 'considerable latitude in adjusting financial and property interests, 
and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity.' Accordingly, changes will be made in a 
trial court's property division determination in a divorce action 'only if there was a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the 
evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to 
manifest a clear abuse of discretion."* 
Thomas v. Thomas, 1999 Utah App. LEXIS 108, 375 Utah Adv. Rep. 23,25 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1999) (quoting Watson v. Watson, 837 P 2d 1, 5 (Utah 1992) (quoting Naranjo v. Naranjo, 
751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah Ct. App. 1988))). 
{26} Generally, in a divorce proceeding "each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or 
her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property. " Id. (alteration in original) 
(citations and additional quotation marks omitted). This presumptive rule of thumb, however, 
does not supersede the trial court's broad equitable power to distribute marital property, 
regardless of who holds title. See Finlayson, 874 P.2d at 849 ('"Both this court and the Utah 
Supreme Court have long held that once a court has determined something is marital property, the 
court may distribute it equitably, notwithstanding which party's name appears on the title.1" 
(Citation omitted.)); Haumont, 793 P 2d at 424 til ("The trial court may, in the exercise of its 
broad discretion, divide the property equitably, regardless of its source or time of acquisition."); 
Naranjo, 751 P.2d at 1146 ("There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a division of 
properties in a divorce action"). A trial court may elect to distribute marital property unequally 
when the circumstances and needs of the parties dictate a departure from the general rule (e.g., to 
enable one party to fulfill an alimony or child support obligation). See Thomas, 375 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 25; see also Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987) (holding trial courts should 
be guided by general purpose of property division, "which is to allocate the property in a manner 
which best serves the needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue their separate lives"); 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P2d 1276, 1279 n.l (Utah 1987) ("In determining whether a 
certain division of property is equitable, . . . the relative abilities of the spouses to support 
themselves after the divorce are pertinent to an equitable . . . division of the fixed assets of the 
marriage."), Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262, 1269-70 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (affirming award to 
husband of marital home previously owned by husband but conveyed to wife in joint tenancy just 
before marriage; trial court found marriage was of short duration, no children were born, and 
couple married later in life). 
{27} An unequal division of marital property, however, is only justified when the trial court 
"memorializes in commendably detailed findings" the exceptional circumstances supporting the 
distribution. Thomas, 375 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25; see also Haumont, 793 P 2d at 425 (holding 
property division must be supported by adequate factual findings). In this case, the trial court's 
only finding justifying the award of the home to Mr. Bradford was that "the house and property is 
in fact not partitionable as it contains a residence, road and river frontage. If an interest were to be 
conveyed the house would have to be refinanced or sold."4 This finding is insufficient, by itself, to 
support an award of the marital home entirely to Nfr. Bradford. Trial courts often order a sale of 
marital property and equitably divide the proceeds between the parties. See, e.g., Workman v. 
Workman, 652 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah 1982). A trial court may also allow one spouse to "buy out" 
the other spouse's interest in marital property. See, e.g., id. The trial court made no adequate 
finding explaining why either of these two remedies was not appropriate for the parties in this 
case. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's award of the marital home solely to Mr. Bradford. 
{28} Nevertheless, our role is not to supplant the trial court's function in making a property 
distribution; the trial court is in a much better position to determine a proper remedy. Moreover, 
an award of the subject property in this case has an integral relationship to the trial court's other 
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orders concerning alimony and other property. We therefore remand this case to the trial court to 
determine these matters in light of our conclusion that the subject property is marital, not 
separate, property. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
OPINION FOOTNOTES 
1 The relevant portion of the Act includes in its definition of an "insider" a person who is "a relative of 
the debtor." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(7)(a)(i) (1998). 
2 Although the subject property in Mortensen was inherited during the couple's marriage, 
subsequent courts have applied the Mortensen ruling to property inherited before marriage. See, e.g., 
Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah a . App. 1994) (""Each party should, in general, 
receive the real and personal property he or she brought to the marriage or inherited during the 
marriage.""* (Quoting Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 306.) (Alteration in original.) (Other citations omitted.)). 
3 Mr. Bradford testified as follows: 
Q: What do you remember about [your discussion with your daughter concerning the joint tenancy]? 
Did you ever have a concern that [Mrs. Bradford] would get all of the property if you died first? 
A: No, I didn't. 
Q: You never worried about that? 
A: Well, I signed it expecting that-her name on there expecting that she would only get half of it. 
Q: And that was your intention, wasnt it? 
A: Yes. 
4 We note, also, that the parties at one time, at least, contemplated development and sale of the 
property and had enlisted Mr. Demita's assistance in doing so. 
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OPINION 
JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Judge: 
This appeal arises from a garnishment proceeding filed by appellant Territorial Savings & 
Loan Association ("TSL") to enforce a deficiency judgment against respondent John N. Baird. 
The parties cross-motioned for summary judgment. The trial court granted Baird's motion and 
denied TSL's motion. TSL appeals from this order, claiming the trial court erred in concluding as 
a matter of law, that Baird's conveyance of real estate into an irrevocable trust was not void under 
various provisions of the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act.1 We affirm in part, and reverse and 
remand in part. 
FACTS 
Since this case was disposed of on a motion for summary judgment, we review the facts and 
inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to TSL. See, e.g., Hardy v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer*, 763 P 2d 761, 763 (Utah 1988); Guardian State Bank v. 
Hnmpherys, 762 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Utah 1988). In May 1983, TSL loaned $325,000 to John 
Baird and his wife. The ban was secured by a second mortgage on the Bairds1 Hawaii residence. 
The Bairds defaulted on the loan in September 1984. TSL completed foreclosure proceedings, 
applied the sale proceeds to pay the first mortgage and foreclosure expenses, and obtained a 
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deficiency judgment against Baird in the amount of $237,174.79 in June 1986, 
On June 22, 1984, approximately two months before the Bairds defaulted on the TSL loan, 
Baird created the KOA Irrevocable Trust ("trust"), and designated his son, John Knapp Baird, as 
trustee. Baird conveyed one of his only remaining valuable assets, the Meadowview Convalescent 
Center (MMeadowviewM),2 to the trust. At the time of the conveyance, Meadowview was valued 
at approximately $1.7 million but was encumbered by $1.2 million in mortgage debt. 
Meadowview was operated by an independent lessee under a ten-year lease. The lessee paid Baird 
monthly payments in excess of $16,000. The leasehold was also conveyed to the trust. 
Contemporaneously with creating the trust, Baird directed the trustee to issue $166,000 in 
promissory notes from the trust to Baird, his wife, and his children. 
In exchange for the property and lease agreement, the trust assumed the following obligations: 
1. Mortgages on Meadowview $1,225,000.00 
2. Notes to non-family creditors 245,467.93 
3. Notes to family creditors 136,250.00 
4. Note payable to Baird 30,000.00 
TOTAL (excluding interest) $1,636,717.93 
Two of the notes to non-family creditors were also apparently executed contemporaneously 
with the creation of the trust. The notes to Baird's family and non-family creditors allegedly 
represented antecedent debts and past services performed. The trust has paid approximately 
$28,000 to Baird personally, and $12,000 to his wife and children since the trust was created. No 
payments have been made to the non-family creditors. 
Although the property was conveyed to the trust in 1984, Meadowview continued to make 
lease payments to Baird directly until 1986. Moreover, Baird has made personal payments on 
several of the obligations purportedly assumed by the trust. The trustee has maintained no record 
of these payments or of the trust's resulting obligations to Baird.3 The trust has never filed a state 
or federal income tax return. 
After TSL obtained the Hawaii deficiency judgment against the Bairds, it conducted a search 
for the Bairds* assets but found none sufficient to satisfy its judgment other than Meadowview and 
the related lease. Accordingly, TSL filed its deficiency judgment in Sah Lake County, and served 
a writ of garnishment on the nursing facility lessee to garnish the lease payments owed by the 
lessee to Baird. The lessee answered that Baird's interest in the lease had been assigned to the 
KOA Trust. TSL then served a writ of garnishment on the trustee to garnish the lease payments 
and any other sums owed by the trust to Baird. The trustee answered that the trust owed Baird 
only $2,000. TSL commenced these proceedings by filing a reply to the trustee's answer alleging 
that Baird's conveyance of the nursing facility and lease into the trust was void under several 
provisions of the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act. 
Following extensive discovery, both TSL and the trustee moved for summary judgment. The 
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district court denied TSL's motion and granted the trustee's motion. TSL appeals from this order, 
claiming the district court erred in concluding as a matter of law, (1) that the conveyance was not 
void under Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-11, and (2) that there are no genuine issues of material fact 
concerning whether the conveyance was constructively fraudulent under Utah Code Ann. § 
25-1-4, or actually fraudulent under Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-1-7, -8; and that (3) the district court 
erred in imposing a clear and convincing standard of proof under Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-11, and 
in failing to properly apportion the parties' respective burdens of proof 
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD 
Prior to oral argument, TSL moved to supplement the record claiming it had inadvertently 
failed to include John Baird's deposition in the record filed on appeal. Baird responded that not 
only had TSL failed to file the deposition on appeal, but that TSL also did not file it with the trial 
court in conjunction with TSL's motion for summary judgment. Thus, the trial court did not have 
John Baird's deposition before it when it granted the trustee summary judgment. Evidence not 
available to the trial judge cannot be added to the record on appeal, Cornier v. A.L. Williams & 
Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 635-36 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), and thus we deny TSL's motion to 
supplement. Accordingly, we consider only facts properly before the trial court, notwithstanding 
that both parties to this action repeatedly cite to Baird's deposition in their appellate briefs. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the undisputed material facts before the trial court 
demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, e«g., Utah R 
Civ. P. 56(c); Guardian State Bank v. Humpherys, 762 P 2d 1084, 1086 (Utah 1988). In 
reviewing a summary judgment, we afford no deference to a trial court's conclusions of law but 
review them for correctness. See, e.g., Madsen v. Borthkk, 769 P 2d 245,247 (Utah 1988). 
In granting summary judgment, a trial court must not weigh or resolve4 disputed evidence. 
See, e.g., Hardy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 763 P 2d 761, 765 (Utah 1988); W.M. 
Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P 2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981). "[T]he sole inquiry 
to be determined by the trial court] is whether there is a material issue of fact to be decided. "5 
Furthermore, "[cjross-motions for summary judgment do not dissipate factual issues, even though 
both parties contend for the purposes of their motions that they are entitled to prevail because 
there are no material issues of fact.M Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Assocs., 635 P 2d 53, 55 
(Utah 1981). 
With the foregoing principles in mind, we review TSL's claim that there are material issues of 
fact concerning whether the conveyance into the trust was void under the Utah Fraudulent 
Conveyances Act. 
TRUST FOR GRANTOR VOEMJtah Code Ann. § 25-1-11 
We first address whether the trial court correctly concluded as a matter of law, that the 
conveyance was not void under Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-11. Section 25-1-11 provides, with our 
emphasis: 
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All deeds, gifts, conveyances, transfers or assignments, verbal or written, of goods, chattels, 
or things in action made in trust for the use of the person making the same shall be void as 
against the existing or subsequent creditors of such person. 
There are no reported Utah decisions defining the term "for the use o f as it appears in § 
25-1-11. However, the Utah Supreme Court has declared that the underlying purpose of § 
25-1-11 is to prevent debtors from using trusts as a device to place their property beyond the 
reach of their creditors1 just claims, while simultaneously retaining and enjoying virtually all the 
advantages of ownership. Leach v. Anderson, 535 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1975). The relevant 
inquiry for purposes of § 25-1-11 is not how much the grantor actually receives from the trust, 
but "what [he or] she has a right to take under its terms during [his or] her lifetime...." Id. In 
Leach, the grantor created a spendthrift trust and by the express terms of the trust provided, 
among other things, that it would: 
1. "pay to or for the benefit of the grantor" the necessary income to maintain the grantor's 
reasonable standard of living and to maintain her home; 
2. purchase a new car every two or three years at the grantor's request; and 
3. provide the necessary income for the grantor and a companion to vacation.... 
Id. at 1242. The terms of the trust in also permitted the grantor to direct and control the 
operation of the trust assets. The trust in Leach clearly transgressed the provisions of § 25-1-11, 
as the Utah court aptly noted, "the entire trust res, income and principal, [was] committed to 
maintain [the grantor] in her standard of living and adjuncts thereto." Id. at 1243-44. 
Similarly, other jurisdictions considering analogous, if not identical, statutes invalidating a 
trust created for the use and benefit of the grantor have stated that the primary focus is whether 
the grantor has effectively insulated his or her assets against creditors' lawful claims, while 
retaining all the advantages of ownership.6 Moreover, in all of the cases considered, it was clear 
that the grantor retained significant control over the trust assets and, in most, reserved the right to 
the trust income over the grantor's lifetime, while simultaneously insulating the income from his or 
her creditors. 
TSL contends it is entitled to summary judgment on its claim under § 25-1-11 because there 
are no genuine issues of material fact concerning the use and benefits reserved by Baird under the 
trust, claiming: 1) The trust assumed Baird's liability for the first and second mortgages on the 
nursing facility; 2) the trust assumed Baird's liability on purported debts owed to Baird's family 
and friends; 3) the trust executed a $30,000 promissory note payable to Baird, of which $28,000 
has been paid; 4) Baird is entitled to cash reimbursements from the trust for all payments he 
makes on the debts to family and friends, a potential benefit in excess of $500,000; and 5) Baird is 
relieved from paying the debts to all creditors not listed in the trust agreement because, having 
safely conveyed away his last valuable asset, he is now judgment and collection proof. 
Baird, on the other hand, asserts the trial court properly dismissed TSL's claim under § 
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25-1-11 because these facts do not establish that Baird retained the type of benefits contemplated 
by the statute. We agree. 
Unlike the trust invalidated in Leach, Baird has not reserved any power of revocation or 
control over the trust. The express terms of the trust divest Baird of ownership and control over 
Meadowview and its income, and give full ownership and control to the trustee. The trustee has 
no authority to pay Baird trust income for his personal needs. When all the debts are satisfied, the 
trustee is obligated to distribute the income only to Baird's children. It is true that Baird received a 
$30,000 note in exchange for conveying the property to the trust. However, the $30,000 was not 
insulated from his creditors. Had the garnishment been in place at the time of the exchange, TSL 
would have been entitled to the proceeds paid to Baird. Any compensation Baird is entitled to in 
the future to reimburse him for payments to his creditors, is similarly subject to his creditor's 
lawful claims. 
Thus, we agree with Baird that the "benefits" alleged by TSL do not constitute the type of 
reserved interests contemplated and prohibited by the statute. Accordingly, we hold there are no 
genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the benefits retained by Baird under the trust 
agreement were for his use and benefit and affirm the trial court's summary judgment dismissing 
TSL's claim under § 25-1-117 
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD-Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-4 
We next address TSL's claim that there are genuine issues of material feet concerning whether 
Baird's conveyance was constructively fraudulent under Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-4. Section 25-1-4 
provides: 
Every conveyance made, and every obligation incurred, by a person who is, or will be thereby 
rendered, insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors, without regard to his actual intent, if the 
conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair consideration. 
To prevail under this section, TSL bears the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing 
evidence* that 1) TSL was a creditor, 2) Baird was insolvent or rendered insolvent by the 
conveyance, and 3) the conveyance was made without fair consideration. See, e.g., Furniture 
Mfrs. Sales, Inc. v. Deamer, 680 P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 1984); Meyer v. General Amen Corp., 
569 P.2d 1094,1096 (Utah 1977). If the undisputed facts clearly demonstrate that TSL could not, 
under any circumstances, meet one of the foregoing elements, the trial court's summary judgment 
dismissing the constructive fraud claim was proper. 
1. Creditor Status. 
For purposes of the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act, a creditor is defined as "a person 
having any claim, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or 
contingent." Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-1. It is undisputed that cm May 27, 1983, Baird executed a 
promissory note to TSL evidencing a loan of $325,000. TSL foreclosed on the loan and obtained 
a deficiency judgment in excess of $237,000. Based on the foregoing, we find as a matter of law, 
TSL was a creditor within the meaning of § 25-1-1 at the time of the conveyance. Cf. Furniture 
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Manufacturers, 680 P 2d at 399; Meyer, 569 P.2d at 1096. 
2. Insolvency 
The Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act defines insolvency as follows: 
A person is insolvent when the present fair salable value of his assets is less than the amount 
that will be required to satisfy his probable liability on his existing debts as they become absolute 
and matured. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-2. In Meyer, the Utah Supreme Court construed § 25-1-2 and stated: 
The level of insolvency necessary to meet the statute requirement is not insolvency in the 
bankruptcy sense but merely a showing that the party's assets are not sufficient to meet liabilities 
as they become due. 
569 P 2d at 1096. See also Furniture Manufacturers, 680 P 2d at 400 n.10 (insolvency is 
established by showing a negative net worth). 
TSL claims, and we agree, there are significant material issues of fact concerning whether 
Baird was insolvent either before or after he transferred the property into the trust. Baird claimed 
in his affidavit filed in support of his motion for summary judgment, that he had a positive net 
worth of over $1 million both before and after the date of the conveyance. However, TSL 
submitted comprehensive expert testimony asserting that Baird had overstated his assets and 
understated his liabilities. One of the most significant asset discrepancies is a speculative mining 
venture that Baird invested in as a tax shelter. Baird claimed the investment was worth over $1 
million. TSL produced an affidavit from the chief geologist at the mine attesting that the incidence 
of gold in the mine was insignificant, and that extractions could not possibly be profitable. 
Accordingly, TSL claims the mine was worth nothing. 9 
Based on the foregoing, we find there are factual disputes as to Baird's solvency. 
3. Fair Consideration 
Section 25-1-3 defines the "fair considerationH necessary to avoid a finding of constructive 
fraud under § 25-1-4 as follows: 
Fair consideration is given for property, or obligation: 
1) when in exchange for such property, or obligation, as a fair equivalent therefor, and in good 
faith, property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied. 
Thus, under the statute, fair consideration requires a fair equivalent exchange and that the 
conveyance was made in good faith. See also Meyer v. General Amer. Corp-, 569 P.2d 1094, 
1096 (Utah 1977). Presented another way, TSL can demonstrate that the conveyance lacked fair 
consideration if either, 1) a fair equivalent was not exchanged, or 2) the conveyance was not made 
in good faith. ^  We conclude there are material issues of fact concerning both elements. 
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a. Fair Equivalent 
Fair equivalent means H,such a price as a capable and diligent businessman could presently 
obtain for the property after conferring with those accustomed to buy such property.f" Meyer, 
569 P.2d at 1097 (quoting Utah Assets Corp. v. Dooley Bros. Ass'n, 92 Utah 577, 70 P.2d 738, 
742 (1937)). Fair equivalent does not mean "exact equivalent" but rather the statute requires only 
that the consideration be fair. Utah Assets, 70 P.2d at 741 ("The qualifying term here is fair1 and 
implies some modification of the term 'equivalent/"). 
As noted earlier in this opinion, the trust assumed approximately $12 million in mortgage 
debt and $400,000 in unsecured antecedent debt in exchange for property valued at approximately 
$1.7 million. The trial court concluded that the foregoing constituted fair consideration as a 
matter of law, stating: 
The documents on file herein show that there is no genuine issue concerning the fact that the 
KOA Irrevocable Trust gave, and John N. Baird received, a full and fair consideration in exchange 
for the real property transferred into the Trust. 
TSL claims that the agreement by the trustee to pay off the encumbrances on the property is 
not regarded as valuable consideration as against Baird's creditors. Additionally, TSL argues there 
are material factual issues concerning whether the debts assumed by the trust were bona fide. We 
address each of these arguments separately. 
As a general proposition, the assumption of mortgage debt in exchange for the conveyance of 
property constitutes a fair equivalent "where the value of the land and the amount of the mortgage 
are substantially equal."** However, in cases where the value of the property conveyed exceeds 
the amount of its encumbrances, a creditor may challenge the conveyance for want of adequate 
consideration due to the disparity. See, e«g., Peterson v. Wilson, 88 Cal. App. 2d 617, 199 P 2d 
757, 763 (1948). 
Disparity between the amount of the mortgage and the value of the property is a factor which 
will arouse the suspicion of the court... and where the disparity is so great as to be inequitable it 
will be set aside. How great the disparity must be to accomplish this result it is difficult to state, 
the question being one of degree. * 2 
It is undisputed that at the time of the conveyance, Baird's equity in the nursing facility was 
worth approximately $500,000. Accordingly, the very narrow issue presented on appeal is 
whether the trial court correctly concluded that the antecedent debts assumed by the trust 
constituted the fair equivalent for Baird's $500,000 equity in Meadowview as a matter of law. 
Both parties agree that the trust's assumption of Baird's antecedent debts constituted valuable 
consideration for the conveyance of Meadowview so long as the debts were genuine and bona 
fide.13 However, Baird claims TSL did not challenge the bona fide nature of the debts in the 
proceedings below, and is, therefore, precluded from challenging them on appeal. 
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Conversely, TSL claims its memorandum opposing the trustee's motion for summary 
judgment cited portions of the record raising an issue of fact concerning whether the debts were 
bona fide. After reviewing TSL/s memorandum and those portions of the record referred to 
therein, we are persuaded, although it was a very close call, that TSL sufficiently disputed the 
legitimacy of the antecedent debts assumed by the trust in the proceedings below. The 
memorandum alleges, among other things, that the notes to the family creditors were executed 
contemporaneously with the creation of the trust, and prior to that time, there was no 
documentation of the claimed family debts and services; all monies from the trust have gone to 
Baird and his family creditors, and non-family creditors have received no payments; and although 
Baird is authorized to receive reimbursement from the trust for payments he makes on the 
non-mortgage debts, the trustee keeps no record of those payments or the resulting obligation to 
Baird. In fact, the trustee testified that he has no idea how much is owing on the various 
obligations. The record also indicates that several of the non-family notes were also executed 
contemporaneously with the creation of the trust. 
Not only do we find that TSL sufficiently raised the issue, but based on the foregoing, we also 
conclude that TSL's allegations demonstrate that there are material issues of fact concerning 
whether the debts assumed by the trust were genuine and bona fide. Cf. Zuniga v. Evans, 87 
Utah 198, 48 P 2d 513, 518-20 (1935); Paxton v. Paxtoii, 80 Utah 540, 15 P.2d 1051, 1056 
(1932). Accordingly, we hold the trial court erred in concluding the debts assumed by the trust 
were bona fide and thus a fair equivalent as a matter of law. 
In the alternative, Baird claims even if the antecedent debts are not considered toward the 
purchase price, the mortgages alone equal eighty percent of the value of the nursing facility and 
constitute a fair equivalent as a matter of law. We are not persuaded by Baird's argument. Baird 
conveyed $500,000 in excess equity to the trust and we are not prepared to declare that an 
exchange of $1.2 million in mortgage debt for property valued at $1.7 million is a fair equivalent 
as a matter of law. Ordinarily, fairness is an issue of fact and should be resolved, only after the 
fact finder has had the opportunity to hear testimony and review the evidence.14 
b. Good Faith 
As we discussed earlier, under Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-3, fair consideration requires both a 
fair equivalent, and a good faith conveyance. We find there are also genuine issues of fact 
concerning whether the good faith element was satisfied. 
Although the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act does not define "good faith/ the term is 
defined elsewhere in the Utah Code as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.*' 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(19) (1989) (Utah Uniform Commercial Code). In the context of 
fraudulent conveyances, other courts considering whether a conveyance was made in good faith, 
have examined the subjective beliefs and intentions of both the transferor and transferee 
concerning the propriety of the activities, and their knowledge that the result would take 
unconscionable advantage of others. ^ 
TSL asserted multiple facts that could support a finding that the transfer lacked good faith. 
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For instance, TSL claims Baird conveyed his only valuable asset into a trust controlled by his 
son, 16 both Baird and his son ignored the trust for several years, the trustee has kept no records 
of Baud's payments to secured and unsecured creditors, and the trust was insolvent from its 
inception. Moreover, there is evidence in the record that Baird's son knew of pending litigation 
and of Baird's financial difficulties at the time of the conveyance. 
As TSL notes in its reply brief, 
[Respondents cover seven pages of their brief attempting to refute all the indicia of bad faith 
present in this case. The attempt merely illustrates and confirms the sharp differences and how 
reasonable persons may view the same evidence. Clearly, the issue of good faith is both material 
and disputed. 
In sum, what constitutes good faith or fair equivalent under the fair consideration requirement 
is not susceptible to a bright-line test. Rather, it involves a subjective interpretation of all of the 
surrounding circumstances. Such an endeavor renders a fair consideration determination generally 
a jury question. Accordingly, we find there are genuine issues of material feet as to whether the 
conveyance was constructively fraudulent under Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-4, and thus reverse the 
trial court's order in this respect. 
ACTUAL FRAUD-Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-1-7, -8 
As a preliminary matter, Baird claims TSL did not raise this theory below, and therefore 
cannot now raise the actual fraud theory on appeal. TSL, on the other hand, claims its reply to the 
answer of garnishee, John Knapp Baird, specifically alleged that the conveyance of the nursing 
facility to the trust "was a fraudulent conveyance and voided by the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances 
Act—Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-1-1 et seq," without limitation as to particular sections within the 
Act. Furthermore, TSL moved for summary judgment Mon all issues raised in its reply." 
The trial court's summary judgment order provides in relevant part: 
Plaintiff claimed that the conveyance was in violation of the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances 
Act in that allegedly: 
Various badges of fraud existed in connection with the trust and the conveyance into trust; 
The conveyance into trust was actually fraudulent (intentionally).... 
The trial court's summary judgment order concluded: 
The established facts fail to establish the necessary elements of the claims that the subject 
transfer into trust was fraudulent. 
Accordingly, based on the record before us, we conclude TSL's actual fraud claim was raised 
below, and therefore adequately preserved for this appeal. ^ 
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Addressing the merits of TSL's claim, Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-7 provides: 
Every conveyance made, and every obligation incurred, with actual intent, as distinguished 
from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay or defraud either present or future creditors is 
fraudulent as to both present and future creditors. 
Similarly, § 25-1-8 provides: 
Every conveyance or assignment, in writing or otherwise, of any estate or interest in lands,... 
or of rents or profits issuing therefrom,... made with the intent to delay, hinder or defraud 
creditors, or other persons, of their lawful suits, damages, forfeitures, debts or demands,... shall be 
void. 
Actual fraud is never presumed, but instead must be established by clear and convincing 
evidence.1** Fraudulent intent is ordinarily considered a question of feet,19 and "may be inferred 
from the presence of certain indicia of fraud or badges of fraud.,M20 
"[Badges of fraud] are said to be facts which throw suspicion on a transaction, and which call 
for an explanation... More simply stated, they are signs or marks of fraud. They do not of 
themselves or per se constitute fraud, but they are facts having a tendency to show the existence 
of fraud, although their value as evidence is relative not absolute. They are not usually conclusive 
proof; they are open to explanation. They may be almost conclusive, or they may furnish merely a 
reasonable inference of fraud, according to the weight to which they may be entitled from their 
intrinsic character and the special circumstances attending the case. Often a single one of them 
may establish and stamp a transaction as fraudulent.... "21 
The generally recognized badges of fraud are the lack of consideration for the conveyance, the 
transfer of the debtor's entire estate, relationship between transferor and the transferee, the 
pendency or threat of litigation, secrecy or hurried transaction, insolvency or indebtedness of the 
transferor, departure from the usual method of business, the retention by the debtor of possession 
of the property, and the reservation of benefit to the transferor. 22 
However, "*[t]he facts which are recognized indicia of fraud are numerous, and no court could 
pretend to anticipate or catalog them alT" Koch, 716 P 2d at 184(quoting 37 Am. Jur. 2d 
Fraudulent Conveyances § 10 (1968)). 
In light of the foregoing, we find that, based on facts set forth throughout this opinion, there 
are genuine issues of material fact as to multiple badges of fraud rendering the trial court's 
summary judgment inappropriate.23 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we affirm the trial court's order insofar as it dismisses TSL's claim under § 
25-1-11. There are no material issues of fact concerning whether Baird created the trust for his 
use and benefit under the narrow meaning of the statute and accordingly, he is entitled to 
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judgment as a matter of law. We further hold that there are material issues of fact precluding 
summary judgment in favor of Baird under § 25-1-4 including whether, 1) Baird was insolvent 
either before or after the conveyance, 2) Baird received the fair equivalent for conveying 
approximately $500,000 worth of equity into the trust, and 3) whether the conveyance was made 
in good faith. There are also material issues of fact precluding judgment under §§ 25-1-7, and -8. 
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court's summary judgment dismissing the 
constructive and actual fraud claims under §§ 25-1-4 and -7, -8 respectively, and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with our opinion. 
OPINION FOOTNOTES 
1 Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-1-1 to -16 (1984) (repealed by 1988 Utah Laws, ch. 59, § 16). For current 
comparable provisions, Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-1 to -13 (1988), Utah's Fraudulent Transfer Act. All 
references to the Fraudulent Conveyances Act throughout this opinion are to the 1987 version, as 
amended. 
2 This facility is presently operating as the Qlenwood Convalescent Center. 
3 One provision in the trust agreement expressly provides that the trust was to reimburse Baird for 
any payments he made on the obligations assumed by the trust. 
4 Madsen v. Bortttick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988), wherein the court wrote, "[wje note at the 
outset that a challenge to a summary judgment presents for review conclusions of law only because, by 
definition, summary judgments do not resolve factual disputes.*9 
5 W.M. Barnes, 627 P.2d at 59. The trial court's summary judgment order stated, with our emphasis, 
H[TSL] has a burden of supporting its contentions by clear and convincing evidence (burden) and 
the established facts show that [T3LJ is unable to do so...." 
If the trial court had relied on the foregoing statement for the purpose of concluding that TSL was 
entitled to summary judgment on its claims, the statements concerning burden of persuasion were 
appropriate. However, in reviewing the trial courts entire order, it appears that the trial judge improperly 
relied on the proposition as the basis for granting Baird's motion for summary judgment. This was error, 
as it is well settled that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment need not "prove" its theory or 
theories, but rather it need only establish facts that "create a genuine issue of material fact." See, e.g., 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42,47 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
6 See, e.g., Arizona Bank v. Morris, 6 Ariz. App. 566,435 P.2d 73,74 (1967), modified, 7 Ariz. App. 
107, 436 P.2d 499 (1968); In re Camm's Estate, 76 Cal. App. 2d 104,172 P.2d 547, 551 (1946); Herd v. 
Chambers, 158 Kan. 614, 149 P.2d 583, 589 (1944). Gross v. Douglass Slate Bank, 261 F. Supp. 
1002, 1006 (D. Kan. 1965); Morton v. Morton, 394 Pa. 402, 147 AJ2d 150, 151-52 (1959); Glass v. 
Carpenter, 330 S.W.2d 530, 533-34 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). 
7 As one of its principal arguments on appeal, TSL claims the trial court incorrectly imposed a dear 
and convincing standard of proof under § 25-1-11. We agree that the appropriate burden under § 25-1-11 
is preponderance of the evidence. Leach, 535 P.2d at 1243. However, since we find that the trust was 
not for Baird's use and benefit as contemplated by the statute, we find the trial court's error harmless. 
8 As discussed earlier, one of TSLs arguments on appeal is that the trial court erred in apportioning 
the parties' respective burdens of proof. TSL claims that under § 25-1-4, the initial burden of proof lies 
with the moving party to make a prima facie showing of (1) creditor status, (2) insolvency, and (3) lack of 
consideration. TSL argues that once this is done, the defendant then has the burden of going forward 
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with evidence to rebut the moving party's evidence. TSL mistakenly relies on Brimhall v. Grow,25 Utah 
2d 298, 480 P.2d 731, 734 (1971), which involved § 25-1-8. However, we concede there is some 
confusion in Utah authority concerning the applicable burdens of proof. For a full discussion, In re 
Grooms, 13 Bankr. 376, 377-84 (D. Utah 1981). Nonetheless, we find that the more recent decisions 
clearly state that a creditor must prove all three elements by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g.. 
Furniture Mfrs. Sales, Inc. v. Deamer, 680 P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 1984); Nelson v. Nelson, 30 Utah 2d 
80, 513 P.2d 1011, 1013 (1973). 
9 In addition to the conflicting evidence concerning Baird's net worth, Baird candidly admits in his 
brief that there are issues of fact "left unresolved with respect to... Baird's insolvency." 
10 See also, e.g., United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 574 (D. Pa. 1983) (initial 
question of fair consideration determination is whether the transaction was made in good faith, second 
question is whether it was exchanged for a fair equivalent); Neal v. Clark, 75 Ariz. 91,251 P.2d 903,906 
(1952) (determining what constitutes "fair consideration" involves more than considering only the price 
received); Smith v. Whitman, 39 N.J. 397, 189 A.2d 15, 20 (1963) (there can be no fair consideration in 
the absence of good faith); Sparfcman & McLean Co. v. Oerber, 4 Wash. App. 341, 481 P.2d 585, 
589-91 (1971) (good faith is separate element of the fair consideration requirement). 
11 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraudulent Conveyances § 22 (1968). See also Annotation, Assumption of 
Mortgage BM Consideration for Conveyance Attacked as in Fraud of Creditors, 6 A.L.R.2d 270, 272 
(1949). 
12 Annotation, supra note 9, at 274. 
13 See, e.g., Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063, 1067 (1942); Matusik v. Large, 85 
Nev. 202, 452 P.2d 457, 460 (1969). See generally Grvan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959, 
963 (1960); Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540,15 P.2d 1051,1056 (1932). 
14 See, e.g., Kielb v. Johnson,23 N.J. 60,127 A.2d 561, 564 (1956) (fairness is a question of fact). 
We emphasize that whether a fair equivalent was exchanged is ordinarily a factual determination. There 
may be, on occasion, instances where it is clear that a fair equivalent was exchanged. However, this 
case is not such an occasion. 
15 See generally In re Independent Clearing House Co., 77 Bankr. 843,868 (D. Utah 1987); United 
States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 574 (D. Pa. 1983); Smith v. Whitman, 39 N.J. 397, 
189 A.2d 15, 20 (1963). Comment, Good Faith and Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 Harv. L Rev. 495 
(1983). 
16 Although transactions between family members do not, by themselves, render a transaction 
fraudulent, Utah courts, nonetheless, have often declared that the transactions must be closely 
scrutinized. See, e.g., Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 13 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962, 963 (1962); Given 
v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959, 962 (1960); Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540,15 P.2d 1051, 
1056(1932). 
17 Cf. Clark v. Second Circuit Court, 741 P.2d 956, 957 (Utah 1987) (issues deemed tried by 
consent of the parties); Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Wick Constr. Co., 680 P.2d 1100, 1103 n.1 (Ak. 
1984) (findings and conclusions demonstrate the issues were litigated); QuiBin v. Hesston Corp., 230 
Kan. 591, 640 P.2d 1195, 1196 (1982) (issue was considered by trial court even though not specifically 
raised by the parties). 
18 See Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423,519 P.2d 236, 239 (1974); In re Grooms, 13 Bankr. 376, 
379-83 (D. Utah 1981). Koch Eng'g Co. v. Faulconer, 239 Kan. 101, 716 P.2d 180, 185 (1986). Once 
again, as one of its principal arguments on appeal, TSL contends that the trial court improperly allocated 
the parties' respective burdens of proof. TSL claims that a plaintiff may create a presumption of 
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fraudulent intent by establisNng the presence of badges of fraud. Once this occurs, TSL asserts that the 
defendant then bears the burden of proof to rebut such a presumption. Although it is arguably a matter of 
semantics, we find the more accurate terminology is that once a plaintiff establishes by circumstantial 
evidence or otherwise, an inference that the defendant harbored actual intent to defraud, the burden of 
coming forward with rebuttal evidence, not the burden of proof, shifts to the defendant. Compare Koch, 
716 P.2d at 186, with In re Grooms, 13 Bankr. at 383. 
19 See, e.g., Gabaig v. Gabaig.717 P.2d 835,838 (Ak. 1986); Gilford-Hid & Co. v. Stolter, 221 Neb. 
757, 380 N.W.2d 625, 630 (1986) (provided by statute). 
20 Dahnken Inc. of Salt Lake City v. WHmarth,726 P.2d 420, 423 (Utah 1986) (quoting Givan v. 
Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959, 982 (1960)). See also Boccatero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 
P.2d 1063,1065 (1942). 
21 Montana Naf I Bank v. Michels, 631 P.2d 1260,1263 (Mont. 1981) (quoting Humbird v. Arnet.99 
Mont. 499, 44 P.2d 756, 761 (1935)). 
22 Id. (citing 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraudulent Conveyances § 10 at 701 (1968)). See also Gabaig v. 
Gabaig, 717 P 2d 835, 839 (Ak. 1986); Koch,716 P.2d at 184; Morris v. Holland, 529 S.W.2d 948, 953 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Gifford-HM & Co. v. Stolter, 221 Neb. 757, 380 N.W.2d 625,630 (1986). 
23 Cf. Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d 
685, 688 (1985); Conder v. A.L WUiiams & Assocs., Inc., 739 P 2d 634,637 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (both 
cases reverse summary judgments in fraud cases on the basis of material issues of fact). 
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OPINION 
CALLISTER, Justice. Action by a judgment creditor to have set aside, as a fraudulent 
conveyance, a certain real estate mortgage. From a judgment of no cause of action, plaintiff 
appeals. 
The mortgage in question, and the $10,000 promissory note which it secures, were executed 
on December 4, 1959, by the defendants Jones E. White and Sara S. White, his wife. The 
mortgagee is the defendant, Dr. E. H. White, father of Jones. At the time the mortgage was 
executed and recorded (December 16, 1959) there was pending in the Third District Court a civil 
suit by plaintiff against Jones. Plaintiff was subsequently awarded a judgment against Jones and 
unsuccessfully attempted to levy execution upon the real property described in the mortgage, 
which is the home of Jones and Sara. 
Both Jones and Dr. White testified that the mortgage was executed in compliance with a 
promise made in 1947 when Dr. White loaned Jones $7,403 to help purchase the home. They 
testified that it was only through neglect that the note and mortgage were not executed until some 
12 years after the loan. The principal sum of $10,000, they explained, represented the loan of 
$7,403 plus accrued interest. 
For many years, both prior and subsequent to this 1947 loan, Dr. White has loaned money to 
his son Jones. Two thousand dollars was loaned to Jones for his education, and a note for that 
amount was given to the doctor. Prior to 1947, Dr. White loaned Jones $12,000 to enable him to 
purchase a home in Altadena, California, and Dr. White was given a mortgage upon the home. 
Jones made payments of $100 each month for 18 months, and upon selling this home in 1947, 
Jones repaid all but $387 of the balance to his father. It was at this time that Jones desired to 
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purchase a home in Salt Lake City and received the money in question from his father. Since 
1947, Dr. White has loaned Jones over $7,000, of which Jones has repaid $2,000. 
There was also testimony by both Dr. White and Jones that these loans were in no way 
intended as a gift and that they were to be repaid by Jones. Dr. White further stated that if he died 
before Jones had fully repaid his indebtedness, the balance still owing would be deducted from 
Jones' share of his father's estate. 
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in the following particulars: 
(1) In failing to find that Jones received the money from Dr. White as an 'advancement* rather 
than a loan; and that the mortgage, being without consideration and its execution rendering Jones 
insolvent, amounted to a fraud upon his creditors under 25-1-4, U.C. A. 1953; 
(2) In not finding that the mortgage was made with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud 
Jones' creditors, so as to constitute a fraudulent conveyance under 25-1-7, U.C.A. 1953; 
(3) In finding that Jones' equity in the property was less than his homestead exemption and 
therefore not subject to execution, regardless of the validity or invalidity of the mortgage 
executed to Dr. White. 
Under our statutes, a creditor with a matured claim may have a conveyance* set aside to the 
extent necessary to satisfy his claim,2 where such conveyance was made without fair 
consideration^ and would render the person making it insolvent. Under these circumstances, the 
conveyance constitutes statutory fraud and the existence of a subjective intention to defraud is not 
required.4 A creditor may also have a conveyance set aside if it was made with actual intent to 
hinder, delay or defraud either present or future creditors. 5 On the other hand, if a mortgage and 
note are given by a debtor to secure his bona fide pre-existing debts, which are not of an 
unreasonably small proportion of the mortgage, the conveyance will be upheld. 
While conveyances between close relatives are subject to rigid scrutiny, that fact alone does 
not render the conveyance fraudulent 6 Whether a conveyance is fraudulent as to creditors must 
be determined from the facts of each case and from the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction,? keeping in mind that the purpose of our statutes is not to prevent a debtor from 
securing his honest debts.8 
In the instant case there is ample undisputed evidence which, even under the closest scrutiny, 
shows that the mortgage in question was executed to secure a bona fide pre-existing debt. Both 
Dr. White and Jones White testified that at the time Dr. White gave $7,403 to Jones to purchase a 
home Jones promised to execute a note and mortgage to secure repayment of this sum, and that 
failing to execute such note and mortgage until 1959 was merely due to their neglect. Considering 
this testimony along with other financial dealings between Dr. White and his son Jones White, it 
seems likely that such testimony is an accurate account of the facts. This seems especially so, in 
light of the feet the mortgage given Dr. White for funds to purchase Jones1 previous home has 
been almost completely paid off. It would seem unlikely that Dr. White would take a mortgage 
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and require repayment of a loan to his son for the purchase of a home in California and then, after 
the loan had been repaid, give his son over $7,000 to purchase a home in Salt Lake City without 
any obligation to repay. 
Plaintiff also contends that there was no consideration for the mortgage in that the money was 
given to Jones without any obligation to repay during Eh- White's lifetime, and that such money 
constituted an 'advancement1 to be deducted from Jones' share of his father's estate rather than a 
legal debt. Our statute defines 'advancement1 as a gift or grant which is either: (a) expressed in the 
gift or grant to be an advancement, or (b) charged in writing by the decedent as an advancement, 
or (c) acknowledged in writing as an advancement by the child or other successor or heir. 9 The 
loan by Dr. White to his son does not come within the statutory definition of 'advancement1; and 
the testimony of Dr. White was to the effect that the money was loaned to Jones, and that Jones 
had a legal obligation to repay. The mere fact that the balance of Jones' indebtedness still owed at 
Dr. White's death would be deducted from Jones' share of his father's estate, is not sufficient to 
convert what would otherwise be a valid loan into an advancement. 
Under the facts of this case, the trial court did not err in finding that the note and mortgage 
executed on December 4, 1959, were made in good faith to secure a pre-existing obligation which 
Jones White owed Dr. White, and in further finding that the mortgage did not constitute a 
fraudulent conveyance as to plaintiff. 
Our determination that the trial court correctly refused to set aside the mortgage renders any 
discussion on whether Jones would have had an equity which was subject to execution had the 
mortgage been declared void unnecessary. 
Judgment affirmed. Costs awarded to defendants. 
OPINION FOOTNOTES 
1. 'Conveyance1 includes every * * * mortgage * * *' 25-1-1, U.C.A.1953. (Emphasis added> 
2. 25-1-15(1), U.C.A.1953.-
3. 'Fair consideration is given for property, or obligation: * * * (2) When such property or obligation, is 
received in good faith to secure a * * * antecedent debt * * V 25-1-3, U.C.A.1953 (Emphasis added.)-
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5. 25-1-7, U.C.A.1953. 
6. Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540,15 P.2d 1051; Lund v. Howell, 92 Utah 232,67 P.2d 215; Given v. 
Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959.-
7. Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12,126 P.2d 1063.-
8. Billings v. Parsons, 17 Utah 22, 53 P. 730. 
9. 74-4-20, U.C.A.1953. 
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25-6-2. Definitions. 
In this chapter: 
(1) "Affiliate" means: 
(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20% or 
more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the 
securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote; 
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or 
indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or a person who directly 
or indirectly owns, controls, or holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding voting 
securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote; 
(c) a person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a 
person substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or 
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business under a lease or other agreement or controls 
substantially all of the debtor's assets. 
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not include: 
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien; 
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or 
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the extent it is not subject to 
process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant. 
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, 
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, 
equitable, secured, or unsecured. 
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim. 
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim. 
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim. 
(7) "Insider" includes: 
(a) if the debtor is an individual: 
(i) a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor; 
(ii) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(iii) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(a)(ii); 
(iv) a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control; or 
(v) a limited liability company of which the debtor is a member or manager; 
(b) if the debtor is a corporation: 
(i) a director of the debtor; 
(ii) an officer of the debtor; 
(iii) a person in control of the debtor; 
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(v) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(bXiv); 
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(vi) a limited liability company of which the debtor is a member or manager; or 
(vii) a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor; 
(c) if the debtor is a partnership: 
(i) a general partner in the debtor; 
(ii) a relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a person in control of the debtor; 
(iii) another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(c)(iii); 
(v) a limited liability company of which the debtor is a member or manager; or 
(vi) a person in control of the debtor; 
(d) if the debtor is a limited liability company: 
(i) a member or manager of the debtor; 
(ii) another limited liability company in which the debtor is a member or manager; 
(iii) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7Xd)(iii); 
(v) a person in control of the debtor; or 
(vi) a relative of a general partner, member, manager, or person in control of the debtor; 
(e) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor; and 
(f) a managing agent of the debtor. 
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt or 
performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by agreement, a judicial lien 
obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien. 
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, limited liability company, corporation, 
association, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, 
estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial entity. 
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership. 
(11) "Relative" means an individual or an individual related to a spouse, related by 
consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law, or a spouse, and includes 
an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree. 
(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, or voluntary or 
involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes 
payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance. 
(13) "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently 
obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings. 
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25-6-8. Remedies of creditors. 
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this chapter, a creditor, subject 
to the limitations in Section 25-6-9, may obtain: 
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's 
claim; 
(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property 
of the transferee in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; 
(c) subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with applicable rules of civil 
procedure: 
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset 
transferred or of other property; 
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of 
the transferee; or 
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require. 
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the creditor, if the 
court orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or its proceeds. 
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